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Abstract  
This thesis contains of three empirical essays on the area of energy economics. In particular, 
we investigate the impact of oil price changes on the financial market performance and 
generally the relationship between oil markets and financial markets. During the last two 
decades, the examination of this relationship has received particular attention by the research 
community, however, research in this area is still growing. Indeed, oil price peaks and troughs 
create uncertainty to the financial markets and therefore a link between the two markets is 
continuously set and requires further attention.  
 
A plausible explanation regarding the growing popularity of research in this area can be 
attributed to the fact that oil price fluctuations have been noteworthy increased since the recent 
global financial crisis of 2007-2009. In addition, financial markets seem to be significantly 
affected by developments created during this period, since financial institutions collapsed. 
Furthermore, the financialisation (increasing speculative trading) of the oil market which 
coincides with this period suggests that oil futures derivatives are considered as financial assets 
by market participants. Therefore, this research choice based on the fact that these two markets 
appear to be highly linked the recent years. Overall, the latest developments suggest that the 
relationship between oil markets and financial markets may potentially change. Subsequently, 
the aim of this study is to enhance the existing literature by investigating changes in the patterns 
between the two markets. 
 
To this end, we employ monthly data available from commercial data suppliers such as 
Thomson-Reuters or Bloomberg. Regarding the time period, both the beginning period and the 
end period of our sample depend on the needs of each empirical chapter and the data 
availability. In terms of econometric methods, the chosen frameworks vary in order to 
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accommodate each empirical study specific requirements. In this regard, we employ a battery 
of single-equation multiple linear regression models, a Scalar-Baba-Engle-Kraft-Kroner 
(BEKK) model and a structural vector autoregressive model (SVAR). All three static and time-
varying specifications have been well explained by the existing literature, are well-matched 
with the economic theory and have been adopted by many authors in their research. 
 
The first empirical chapter examines the determinants of WTI/Brent oil futures price 
differential and the globalisation-regionalisation hypothesis in the oil futures market. The 
findings suggest that the WTI/Brent oil futures price differential is influenced by crude oil-
market specific (convenience yield, consumption, production) and oil-futures market specific 
(open interest, trading volume) determinants. In addition, the oil futures market appears to be 
regionalised in the short-run.  
 
The second empirical chapter examines the time-varying correlation between oil price shocks 
and the 10-year sovereign yield spread of core and periphery countries in the EMU. The results 
reveal that the correlation between sovereign yield spreads and oil price shocks is indeed time-
varying and show heterogeneity among the three oil price shocks (supply-side, aggregate 
demand, precautionary demand). Specifically, the correlation varies between positive and 
negative areas. Furthermore, even though the correlation patterns are constantly low or zero 
prior to the Great Recession, a change is revealed in the post-2008 period, when correlations 
become moderate and more volatile.  
 
The third empirical chapter investigates the origins of precautionary demand in the oil market 
and its effects on stock market returns and volatility in the US. The precautionary demand is 
disaggregating into two components, the precautionary demand shock based on the 
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convenience yield and the idiosyncratic oil price shock. The results demonstrate that oil price 
changes are affected in a smaller magnitude by precautionary demand shocks, whereas the 
largest effect is generated by idiosyncratic oil price shocks. Furthermore, stock market returns 
and stock market volatility are affected differently by these two shocks before and after the 
Great Recession of 2007-2009.  
 
Overall, the findings of this study contribute to the existing oil-related literature by filling voids 
and provide avenues for further research in the attention of researchers. In addition, our results 
may be of interest to energy investors and financial traders since oil market is appeared to be 
financialised the recent years and the oil futures market-related products are considered as 
financial assets.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Research Background 
Since the oil price fluctuations of the 1970’s, the analysis of the relationship between oil prices 
and economic activity has received a great deal of attention from academics, researchers, 
market participants and policy makers. This can be explained by the fact that oil is a basic 
energy source for the global economy. More specifically, particular attention has been paid to 
investigating the degree to which developments in the oil market trigger responses from the 
macroeconomy and financial markets. Overall, the research in this area is still growing and the 
attention of the researchers has been expanded to new directions in the oil-related literature. 
 
The first general point is that oil is an important input in production and therefore a higher oil 
price increases production costs, affects negatively firm’s output levels and consequently 
reduces corporate earnings. In addition, due to higher petrol prices and heating oil prices, the 
consumer’s demand (household spending) is expected to decline. The second general 
consensus is that higher oil prices drive inflation towards higher levels and reduce industrial 
production as energy factors become more expensive. Due to the lower consumption, a 
reduction in economic activity is expected and hence a decrease in employment. Higher oil 
prices may also lead to a reduction in investment due to uncertainty generated in the market. 
Furthermore, oil price movements are likely to have significant effects on stock market activity. 
Specifically, higher oil prices affect negatively stock market prices and returns through lower 
corporate profits and dividends, and increase stock market volatility through investment delays.  
 
Nevertheless, the view concerning the consequences for stock market returns of higher oil 
prices tends to be different when we consider the status of the country as oil-exporting (oil 
producer) or oil-importing (oil consumer). Indeed, oil price increases suggest negative 
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implications for oil-importing economies similar to the previous analysis. Pertaining to the oil-
exporting economies, oil price increases are anticipated to positively affect the prosperity in 
these countries through a higher income. Overall, higher oil prices trigger heterogeneous 
reactions from the stock markets when the aforementioned status of the country is considered. 
Specifically, a lower (higher) economic activity is expected for oil-importing (oil-exporting) 
economies given that a higher oil price is regarded as negative (positive) news. 
 
Furthermore, the relationship between oil price fluctuations and stock market activity should 
be considered not only in static but also in time-varying environments. This differentiation is 
based on the fact that static approaches consider this relationship as constant over time, whereas 
time-varying models emphasise heterogeneous patterns during different economic and 
geopolitical events and at different time periods. Therefore, a time-varying framework is 
indicative of the fact that this relationship may not be stable but, instead, varies over time.  
 
This thesis attempts to provide additional information on the relationship between oil markets 
and financial markets. In this regard, a detailed review of the literature is essential to identify 
gaps or areas in which the literature remains limited. Armed with the key findings of the 
available literature and focusing on the most recent studies, we indicate three areas for further 
research. We expect to expand the existing knowledge further by proposing a new direction for 
the attention of the research. We anticipate that the findings of this study would provide 
valuable information to academic researchers and energy investors. To this end, we turn to the 
objectives and contributions in order to underscore the importance of this study. 
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1.2 Research Objectives and Contributions 
The first research objective is related to the examination of the determinants of the WTI/Brent 
oil futures price differential, and the testing of the globalisation-regionalisation hypothesis in 
the oil futures market. It is worth noting that research into the determinants of oil futures 
differential is very limited and the globalisation-regionalisation hypothesis has received 
limited attention in the use of oil futures prices. Therefore, we seek to expand the scarce 
literature on this theme. Turning to the contributions of this study, we employ a set of both oil-
market and oil-futures market specific determinants, which have not been explored by the oil 
related literature before. Moreover, the use of oil futures prices rather than oil spot prices builds 
on the fact that the former reveals more information in reflecting oil market conditions. 
Furthermore, we consider the significant divergence between WTI and Brent oil futures prices 
in late-2010, which caused changes in the crude oil market dynamics. Finally, we concentrate 
on different futures contracts, such as 1, 3 and 6-month contracts, in order to test futures prices 
with shorter and longer maturities. 
 
Turning to the second research objective, we examine the time-varying correlation between oil 
price shocks and the 10-year sovereign yield spread of core and periphery countries in the 
EMU. Importantly, this study brings together for the first time the disaggregation of the oil 
price, a time-varying environment and the sovereign yield spreads in the EMU, which is in 
aggregate the largest oil-importer of the world. More specifically, our contribution to the 
existing literature is threefold. First, this study sheds new light on the relation between 
unanticipated changes in the oil price and sovereign yield spreads, measured as the difference 
in terms of 10-year sovereign bond yields between a member of the European Monetary Union 
and Germany. Second, this study examines the extent to which the relation between oil price 
shocks and sovereign yield spreads is driven by the origin of oil price shocks. Third, this study 
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complements the existing literature by examining the relationship between oil price shocks and 
EMU sovereign yield spreads in a time-varying framework. 
 
The third research objective is to detect the exact origin of the precautionary demand shock in 
the oil market and then to evaluate the financial effects of this shock on the US stock market 
block. This research employs the convenience yield in order to capture shifts in precautionary 
demand which is a strategy that has not previously been adopted in the oil literature. Focusing 
on the contributions of this study, we disaggregate the precautionary demand shock into two 
components, namely, the precautionary demand shock (driven by changes in the convenience 
yield) and the idiosyncratic oil price shock. The purpose of this innovation is to test the 
convenience yield’s ability to act as a good approximation of the precautionary demand shocks. 
Furthermore, we test the responses of stock market returns and volatility to precautionary 
demand and idiosyncratic oil price shocks. Finally, due to the fact that oil markets and stock 
markets are largely affected by the Great Recession, we examine whether our findings 
regarding the stock market response to aforementioned shocks are qualitatively similar before 
and after this event. 
 
1.3 Research Structure 
Chapter 2 reviews the existing literature. The relationship between oil prices and the macro-
economy has received a considerable amount of attention for more than 30 years now and the 
research in this area is still growing. Specifically, studies in this field mainly concentrate on 
the link between oil and financial markets. Overall, in this chapter, we attempt to provide a 
clear overview regarding three strands in the existing oil-related literature. Specifically, we 
initially define the key terms, then we point out the econometric models and the data that 
authors used and finally summarise the main findings from the key studies. Given the existing 
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literature and the readily provided information, we are able to clearly identify fields in which 
this oil-related literature is still silent. Our goal is to identify potential gaps in the literature and 
fill these voids. In this regard, we emphasise the main issues that the literature has uncovered 
or revealed in the final part of this chapter. Next, we clearly indicate the choice of our variables, 
the online databases from which the data are obtained, the time period of our study and the 
econometric software packages that are used to analyse our data. Last but not least, we provide 
information on how our econometric approaches employed in the three empirical chapters 
serve to improve and extend the existing knowledge in the oil-related literature of the 
relationship between oil prices and financial markets. 
 
Turning to the Chapter 3, we investigate the role of potential determinants of the oil futures 
price differential between the two major benchmarks of crude oil, namely West Texas 
Intermediate (WTI) and Brent, and subsequently examine the globalisation-regionalisation 
hypothesis in the oil futures market, based on the WTI/Brent oil futures price differential. This 
study builds upon a battery of single-equation multiple linear regression models. We employ 
monthly data over the period from January1993 to December 2016. Our findings suggest that 
the convenience yield spread, the oil production spread, the oil consumption spread, the open 
interest spread and the trading volume spread are significant determinants of the WTI/Brent oil 
futures price differential. We conclude that these physical oil market fundamental factors and 
the oil futures market variables collectively drive a significant wedge between the WTI and 
Brent oil futures prices, which is indicative of a regionalised oil futures market in the short-
run. 
 
As far as Chapter 4 is concerned, we examine the time-varying correlation between oil price 
shocks and the 10-year sovereign yield spread of core and periphery countries in the EMU. We 
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employ a Scalar-BEKK framework that is applied to monthly data over the period from January 
1999 to January 2016 for the core countries and the period between January 2001 and January 
2016 for the periphery countries. Our results reveal that the correlation between sovereign yield 
spreads and oil price shocks does not remain stable with respect to different time periods. 
Specifically, the correlation varies between positive and negative values. In addition, the 
correlations appear to be less volatile in the pre-2008 period and more volatile in the post-2008 
period. Finally, we do not observe noticeable evidence of differentiation in the correlation 
patterns for the core and periphery countries to different oil price shocks.  
 
With reference to Chapter 5, we investigate the origins of precautionary demand and its effects 
on stock market returns and volatility in the US. We maintain that the precautionary demand 
shock can be reasonably approximated by unexpected changes in the convenience yield, which 
reflects the uncertainty about shortfalls of future supply relative to expected demand. To 
evaluate this, we employ a SVAR model that is applied to monthly data over the period from 
January 1986 to December 2016. Our models comprise the convenience yield along with the 
world oil production growth, the real oil returns and the global economic activity index. We 
show that the convenience yield dominates the precautionary demand shock, with a lesser 
proportion attributable to idiosyncratic oil price shocks. Furthermore, our precautionary 
demand shock exerts a positive and significant effect on real oil returns. Our research findings 
further suggest that stock market returns and stock market volatility are affected differently by 
precautionary demand and idiosyncratic oil price shocks before and after the Great Recession 
of 2007-2009.  
 
Finally, Chapter 6 summarises and concludes this study. More specifically, we provide a 
summary of the key findings obtained from each empirical chapter and present a combination 
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of findings to form a unified entity. Since each empirical chapter is related to different strands 
of the oil-related literature, the conclusion provides a common ground for the findings 
documented in each empirical chapter on the relation among oil markets, financial markets and 
the macroeconomy. In addition, we outline some policy implications and discuss the limitations 
of this study. Last but not least, we provide avenues for future research for the attention of the 
research community and market participants.   
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter consists of three main sub-sections in which a detailed analysis of the related 
literature for each empirical chapter is provided (econometric methods, data and research 
findings). We note that this review includes only papers which are published in top ranked 
journals. The term “top” considers mainly journals which are standardised as 4* and 3*. 
Furthermore, some well-regarded 2* journals are also included in this review. In general, all 
journals are listed in the ABS (Association of Business Schools). In addition, a sub-section 
related to the identified gaps will be provided. In the final sub-section, we also indicate how 
our econometric methods help to improve upon the existing methods and results. 
 
2.2 Determinants of oil futures differential and the globalised / regionalised oil market 
2.2.1 Definition of the globalised / regionalised oil market 
 
An important question in the oil market literature with significant implications for the energy 
policy is the extent to which the oil market is globalised or regionalised. According to Adelman 
(1984), the world oil market is considered as “one great pool”, and therefore globalised, 
whereas Weiner (1991) argues that the oil market is regionalised. The oil market is globalised 
when the crude oil prices move closely together and regionalised when the crude oil prices 
move independently of each other. By considering the prices of two similar in quality crude oil 
benchmarks (e.g., WTI and Brent) in a globalised oil market, their oil price differential is 
expected to be nearly constant if oil supply and oil demand shocks which have an impact on 
oil prices in one region (US) are transmitted to another region (Europe) and influence the oil 
prices there. On the other hand, in a regionalised oil market, the impact of oil supply and oil 
demand shocks is limited to the particular regions or markets (US and Europe). Thus, a 
significant variation is anticipated in the oil price differential and suggests that the oil markets 
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are not fully integrated since regional differences exist. Therefore, when the term 
“globalisation-regionalisation hypothesis” is used by researchers in the oil market, it simply 
refers to the examinination of the state of the world oil market and consequently to the extent 
to which the oil market is globalised or regionalised. 
 
2.2.2 Econometric methods and data used 
 
Studies that concentrate on the WTI/Brent price differential include those by Liu et al. (2015), 
Reboredo (2011), Fattouh (2010), Hammoudeh et al. (2008) and Milonas and Henker (2001). 
In addition, empirical studies related to the “globalisation-regionalisation hypothesis” include 
the papers by Kuck and Schweikert (2017), Ji and Fan (2015), Wilmot (2013), Kaufmann and 
Banerjee (2014), Candelon et al. (2013), Kleit (2001) and Gülen (1997, 1999). By considering 
the econometric approach, the existing literature indicates different frameworks to test the 
above hypothesis. On general principles, cointegration tests, regression analysis, correlation 
analysis and copula analysis have been used among others.  
 
More specifically, Gülen (1997, 1999) uses bivariate and multivariate cointegration tests 
introduced by Johansen (1988). Furthermore, Kleit (2001) follows an arbitrage cost approach, 
while Milonas and Henker (2001) choose to estimate various regression models. Hammoudeh 
et al. (2008) use the Engle-Granger method (1987) and the Momentum-Threshold 
Autoregressive (M-TAR) model by Enders and Siklos (2001). Moreover, Fattouh (2010) uses 
standard unit root tests and a Threshold Autoregressive (TAR) process proposed by Caner and 
Hansen (2001). Reboredo (2011) considers several copula models with time-varying and time-
invariant dependence structures. Candelon et al. (2013), propose a technique which allows for 
testing for Granger causality in down- and up-side risk for multiple risk levels across tail 
10 
 
distributions. Finally, Wilmot (2013) employs cointegration tests that allow for endogeneously 
determined structural breaks.  
 
By considering more recent studies, Kaufmann and Banerjee (2014) use the Engle-Granger 
cointegration method (1987). Ji and Fan (2015) employ an error correction model, combined 
with a directed acyclic graph technique in order to construct contemporaneous causal relations. 
Liu et al. (2015) use three econometric approaches to test for cointegration patterns. Initially, 
they use Johansen’s (1995) test, then they employ Hasbrouck’s (1995) Information Shares 
measure and finally they employ Gonzalo and Granger’s (1995) Permanent‐Transitory 
Common Factor Weights to gauge the roles played by WTI and Brent in price discovery 
between the two crude oil benchmarks. Finally, Kuck and Schweikert (2017) apply a Markov-
switching Vector Error Correction (VECM) model to account for potential time-varying 
adjustment. 
 
In terms of data, authors consider the prices of the two main crude oil benchmarks, namely the 
WTI and the Brent. Furthermore, regional crude oil benchmarks are also employed such as the 
Dubai Fateh, the Bonny light (produced in Nigeria), the Tapis (produced in Malaysia), the 
Oman, the Mexican Maya, the Canadian Lloyd Blend and the Algerian Saharan Blend, among 
others. Specifically, authors examine the price differential between crude oils of similar (for 
example, WTI and Brent, or Maya and Lloyd Blend) and different (for example, WTI and 
Dubai Fateh) quality characteristics.   
 
2.2.3 Empirical findings 
 
The debate regarding the structure of the global oil market begins with Adelman (1984) who 
uses the interdependence of regional oil prices in order to measure market integration. He 
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claims that the world oil market is one great pool. Nevertheless, evidence of regionalisation is 
endorsed by Weiner (1991) who provides the first formal empirical analysis and argues that 
the ensuing effectiveness of energy policies, such as changes in the Strategic Petroleum 
Reserves in the US, depends on whether such policies pertain to the US market or are 
internationally transmitted. On the contrary, Gülen (1997, 1999) provides evidence that oil 
prices in different markets fluctuate closely together, which is indicative of co-integration. 
Furthermore, Kleit (2001) reports that oil markets are more unified which is evident by the 
decline in transaction costs between different oil markets. In addition, Milonas and Henker 
(2001) indicate that oil prices are not fully integrated with reference to the oil futures markets 
of WTI and Brent. 
 
In a recent study, Fattouh (2010) suggests that oil markets are not necessarily integrated in 
every time period and provides evidence of threshold effects in the adjustment process of crude 
oil price differentials to the long-run equilibrium.  Along a similar vein, Reboredo (2011) finds 
evidence of globalisation from 1997 to mid-2010. However, his evidence of a globalised 
market has been undermined by increasing regionalisation in the crude oil market since late-
2010. Authors such as Kaufmann and Banerjee (2014) indicate that the world oil market is not 
completely unified and provide support to the findings by Milonas and Henker (2001) and 
Fattouh (2010). More recently, Liu et al. (2015) show evidence that oil supply disruptions at 
Cushing, the delivery point for WTI, have significantly contributed to decreasing levels of co-
integration between the WTI and Brent markets. Finally, Kuck and Schweikert (2017) report 
that the oil market is globalised and produce similar findings to Reboredo (2011). 
 
2.2.4 Definition of the oil futures differential 
 
12 
 
The oil futures differential simply refers to the WTI/Brent oil futures price differential and 
represents the futures price differential between the two crude oil benchmarks (WTI futures 
price minus Brent futures price). The examination of the oil futures differential rather than 
other crude oil benchmarks is based on the fact that both WTI and Brent are not only crudes of 
similar quality but also have the most actively and highly liquid traded oil futures contracts. 
Since more accurate information is contained in futures prices, we expect that oil futures 
markets convey information that is used by traders to form expectations about future supply, 
demand and the equilibrium price of oil. 
 
2.2.5 Econometric methods and data used 
 
There are only two studies that concentrate on the research area of the determinants of the 
WTI/Brent oil futures differential and therefore the research is very limited. For example, the 
studies by Heidorn et al. (2015) and Büyükşahin et al. (2013) which both employ an 
autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model. Following Pesaran and Shin (1999), the ARDL 
model has the ability to test the existence of a long-run relationship between variables and 
further to deliver unbiased and consistent estimates of the long-run parameters under I(0) and 
I(1) regressors. In terms of data, Büyükşahin et al. (2013) use daily data for the nearby futures 
price of WTI and Brent, whereas Heidorn et al. (2015) use weekly data from various futures 
contracts (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 12 and 24 months). 
 
2.2.6 Empirical findings 
 
This channel for research involves the examination of the WTI and Brent differential (spread) 
by placing an emphasis on their determinants. Due to the limited research that has been 
conducted in this field, further investigation is required. As previously mentioned, there are 
few studies that concentrate on this research area. For instance, Büyükşahin et al. (2013), who 
show that the WTI/Brent spread is partly predicted by trading activities of commodity index 
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traders and partly affected by macroeconomic conditions and physical market fundamental 
factors. More specifically, the commodity index traders represent a large group of non-
commercial institutional traders in commodity markets who are offsetting the activities of other 
participants such as hedgers and speculators. Due to their size and specific strategies, 
commodity index traders are able to trigger volatility in commodities futures markets by 
generating disruptive price formations.  
 
In addition, Heidorn et al. (2015) document that financial traders rather than fundamental 
traders are the most important drivers of the WTI/Brent spread and contribute to the integration 
of the two markets. The authors classify as financial traders the positions attributed to managed 
money and swap dealers, whereas as fundamental traders are associated with the positions 
attributed to producers, merchants, processors, and users. Specifically, fundamental traders 
refer to institutions that are involved in the production and processing of a physical commodity 
and use the futures markets to hedge risks related to those activities. The swap dealers act as 
hedge funds that are managing risk arising from their dealings in the physical commodity. 
Finally, managed money traders are managing futures trading on behalf of clients. 
 
2.3 Oil price shocks and sovereign risk  
2.3.1 Definition of oil price shocks 
 
A more recent strand of the literature is related to the origin of the oil price change. Since the 
seminal theoretical work by Barsky and Kilian (2002, 2004) and the first structural analysis by 
Kilian (2009), there has been an increasing interest amongst academics to explore the link 
between the origin of the oil price shock and the financial market activity. In particular, Kilian 
(2009) classifies oil price shocks into two components: the supply-side, and the demand-side. 
More specifically, supply-side shocks are originate from oil supply disruptions which are 
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caused by major geopolitical events such as the Arab Spring, whereas demand-side shocks are 
caused by changes in the global business cycle, such as the industrialisation of emerging 
economies such as China or India. 
 
More specifically, Kilian (2009) classifies further the demand-side component into aggregate 
demand shocks and precautionary demand shocks. The former is attributed to movements in 
global aggregate demand. The latter occurs due to uncertainty about the future availability of 
oil. Specifically, precautionary (or oil-market specific or idiosyncratic) demand shocks are 
determined by market participants’ expectations in response to major geopolitical unrest events 
and the extent to which these events will trigger oil disruption in the future. Kilian (2009) 
provides evidence that precautionary demand shocks have a negative effect on the economy 
whereas aggregate demand shocks cause positive reactions from the economy. In addition, 
supply-side shocks play a less important role in the economy compared with the demand-side 
shocks.  
 
Adopting the same line of reasoning, Hamilton (2009a,b) classifies oil price shocks into 
supply–side and demand–side shocks, based on whether these shocks can be triggered by 
developments in world oil production or in the global business cycle. The distinction between 
the empirical studies of Hamilton and Kilian is related to the fact that Hamilton’s study 
highlights the significance of supply-side shocks, whereas Kilian’s study emphasises the 
importance of demand-side shocks to drive oil prices towards higher levels. For example, 
Hamilton argues that events in the oil market such as the Arab Spring in 2011 were triggered 
by oil supply disruptions without any impact (a reduction) on oil demand and thus this supply-
side shock contributed to higher oil prices. 
 
2.3.2 Definition of sovereign risk 
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Sovereign risk broadly represents an important strategic indicator for domestic and 
international investors. This is because sovereign risk takes into consideration a sovereign’s 
willingness and ability to pay its commercial obligations debt. A country which has a 
manageable debt burden will be expected to pay back its debt which consequently leads to a 
stable business environment. In turn, this encourages the major ratings agencies to assign 
higher credit ratings. In this regard, the sovereign yield spreads can be used as a numerical 
representation of sovereign risk. This choice is justified by the fact that sovereign yield spreads 
provide substantial information regarding a country’s creditworthiness (the ability to serve its 
debt) and they are affected by unexpected changes to the key macroeconomic indicators and 
unexpected developments in the financial markets. By employing the European Monetary 
Union (EMU) sovereign yield spreads, this is measured as the difference in 10-year sovereign 
bond yields between a member of the EMU and Germany. 
 
2.3.3 The relationship between oil price shocks and sovereign risk 
 
Higher oil prices may have a significant direct impact on government budgets. The impact of 
oil price changes on economic activity tends to be different when we consider the status of the 
country as oil-exporting or oil-importing. For instance, oil-exporting countries, due to higher 
income, are expected to experience improvements in their macroeconomic balances, whereas 
oil-importing countries are faced with uncertainty since increased oil prices could require 
government interventions, which could create budgetary risks. In this regard, an oil price 
increase is regarded as positive (negative) news for oil-exporting (oil-importing) economies 
through the higher (lower) government revenues. Additionally, allowance should be made for 
the reverse channel through which sovereign risk impacts oil prices. In particular, the widening 
of sovereign risk spreads signifies a greater degree of default risk, which could subsequently 
lead to a reduction in aggregate demand and thus lower demand for oil. In addition, higher 
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sovereign risk might lead to lower uncertainty about future oil supply shortfalls, given the lower 
demand for oil. 
 
2.3.4 Econometric methods and data used 
Looking at the econometric methods employed in this line of research, we notice different 
methods. For example, Alexandre and de Benoist (2010) employ panel analysis, whereas 
Aizenman et al. (2013) employ a generalised method of moments approach. In addition, 
Wegener et al. (2016) employ bivariate VAR-GARCH-in-mean models, while Bouri et al. 
(2017) employ a Lagrange Multiplier methodology. Moreover, Lee et al. (2017) employ a 
SVAR model, whereas Shahzad et al. (2017) employ a time-varying approach based on the 
modified bootstrap rolling-window procedure. Finally, Bouri et al. (2018) employ a bivariate 
cross-quantilogram approach. It should be noted that the aforementioned studies employ static 
econometric approaches. One notable exception is the study by Shahzad et al. (2017) who use 
a time-varying framework. 
 
In terms of data, sovereign Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads are mainly used to quantify the 
sovereign risk in different economies to associate with developments in the oil market. For 
instance, Alexandre and de Benoist (2010) use the Emerging Market Bond Index Global 
(EMBIG) index as a measure of global risk and seventeen emerging economies. Similarly, 
Aizenman et al. (2013) use sovereign CDS spreads and the EU market. In a similar fashion, 
Wegener et al. (2016) use sovereign CDS spreads and data from nine oil-producing countries. 
Furthermore, Bouri et al. (2017) use sovereign CDS spreads for a sample of emerging and 
frontier markets. Moreover, Shahzad et al. (2017) use sovereign CDS spreads and data from 
oil-exporting countries. In a similar vein, Lee et al. (2017) use the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) data for a sample of oil-exporting and oil-importing countries. Finally, Bouri et 
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al. (2018) use sovereign CDS spreads for BRICS oil-exporting (Brazil and Russia) and oil-
importing (China and India) countries and the implied volatility index of crude oil (OVX). The 
majority of studies prefer to use daily data and the only exceptions are the studies by Lee et al. 
(2017) and Aizenman et al. (2013) which prefer to use monthly frequency data. 
 
2.3.5 Empirical findings 
 
The existing literature within this line of research attempts to explore the channel through 
which oil price movements have an impact on the sovereign risk. In general, there is limited 
evidence on the relationship between oil price movements and sovereign risk. Some related 
studies which have considered this relationship include papers by Bouri et al. (2018), Bouri et 
al. (2017), Lee et al. (2017), Shahzad et al. (2017), Wegener et al. (2016), Aizenman et al. 
(2013) and Alexandre and de Benoist (2010). The picture painted by the aforementioned 
studies indicates that oil price changes appear to exercise a significant impact on sovereign risk 
and therefore oil price fluctuations can be considered as an important factor in assessing 
sovereign risk. 
 
In particular, Alexandre and de Benoist (2010) examine the effect of oil prices on government 
bond risk premiums during the period from 1998 to 2008. They document that the risk premium 
of government bonds is positively and significantly affected by higher oil prices. Aizenman et 
al. (2013) suggest that rises in world commodity prices and oil prices lead to lower sovereign 
CDS spreads. By considering the period during 2004-2012, they argue that this could be 
explained by the fact that global economic conditions are largely strong when both prices are 
increasing. In the same vein, Wegener et al. (2016) investigate the relationship between oil 
prices and credit default swaps (CDS) spreads over the period 2011-2016. They document that 
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positive oil price shocks lead to lower sovereign CDS spreads and therefore to reductions in 
sovereign risk.  
 
Lee et al. (2017) investigate the relationship between oil price shocks and the sovereign risk 
over the period 1994-2015. They show that oil price shocks exert a reduction (increase) in 
sovereign risk for net oil-exporting (oil-importing) countries. The authors highlight the 
importance of supply-side (demand-side) oil price shocks to the sovereign risk of net oil-
exporting (oil-importing) countries. Additionally, Bouri et al. (2017) investigate the volatility 
transmission from commodities markets (including oil) to sovereign CDS spreads during the 
period from 2010 to 2016. They report that sovereign CDS spreads are significantly affected 
by commodity price volatility. Moreover, Shahzad et al. (2017) examine the predictability from 
oil market uncertainty to the sovereign CDS spreads by considering the period, 2009-2016. 
They find a directional predictability from oil price volatility to sovereign CDS spreads and 
further conclude that higher oil price volatility contributes to increases in sovereign risk. 
Finally, Bouri et al. (2018) examine the dependence between oil price volatility shocks and 
sovereign risk for the period 2009-2017. They find that the sovereign risk of oil-exporters 
(importers) is more sensitive to positive (negative) shocks in oil price volatility. 
 
2.4 The precautionary demand for oil and stock market activity   
2.4.1 Nature of precautionary demand in the oil market 
 
As previously mentioned, Kilian (2009) separates oil price shocks into two components, the 
supply-side and the demand-side. More specifically, supply-side shocks are originated by oil 
supply disruptions which are caused by major geopolitical events, whereas demand-side shocks 
are caused by changes in global business cycle. Kilian (2009) classifies further the demand-
side component into aggregate demand shocks and precautionary (oil-market specific or 
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idiosyncratic) demand shocks. The former is attributed to movements in global aggregate 
demand. The latter occurs due to uncertainty about the future availability of oil. Kilian (2009) 
maintains further that oil price fluctuation during geopolitical events such as the Iranian 
Revolution and the time-line thereafter were caused by increased uncertainty of future oil 
availability (precautionary demand shocks). In addition, the study by Kilian and Murphy 
(2014) indicates that speculative purchases may also be precautionary since they could 
represent increased uncertainty about future oil supply shortfalls. 
 
2.4.2 Econometric methods and data used 
 
Research on the nature of the precautionary demand for oil with a particular emphasis on the 
oil market cpnsists of only the paper by Kilian and Murphy (2014). Specifically, they employ 
a SVAR model and use monthly data for total US crude oil inventories scaled by the ratio of 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) petroleum stocks over US 
petroleum stocks. However, they attempt to capture the speculative demand in the oil spot 
market. Thus, they use global crude oil inventories to estimate speculative purchases and 
consequently they refer to a speculative demand shock. It should be stated that Kilian (2009) 
associates shifts in precautionary demand with changes in the convenience yield but he does 
not explicitly use it in his SVAR empirical framework. 
 
2.4.3 Empirical findings 
 
Kilian and Murphy (2014) examine the role of speculative (inventory demand) shocks in order 
to capture shifts in expectations about future oil supply and demand by considering the period 
during 1973-2009. They reveal that the oil price increase between 2004 and 2008 is driven by 
unexpected global demand shocks rather than speculative trading, whereas speculative shocks 
play an important role in the oil price fluctuations of 1979, 1986 and 1990.  
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2.4.4 Precautionary demand shocks and stock market activity 
 
The empirical work by Kilian and Park (2009) motivates the further investigation of the impact 
of oil price shocks based on their origin not only on the economy but also on stock markets. 
They suggest that exploring the oil price change based on its origin provides a better 
understanding and a clear picture regarding the impact of oil price changes on stock market 
performance (stock market returns and stock market volatility).  
 
2.4.5 Econometric methods and data used 
 
Regarding the econometric methods, studies that examine the link between the origin of the oil 
price shock and stock markets mainly use Kilian and Park’s (2009) SVAR who use US stock 
market variables to test their responses to demand and supply shocks in the global crude oil 
market. For example, Abhyankar et al. (2013), Basher et al. (2012), Apergis and Miller (2009), 
among others.  
 
Another strand of the literature investigates the relationship between oil markets and stock 
markets in a dynamic time-varying rather than a static environment. This is due to the fact that 
this relationship appears to change at different points in time. To this end, multivariate GARCH 
specifications such as the DCC-GARCH-GJR (Dynamic Conditional Correlation-Generalized 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity-Glosten, Jagannathan, Runkle) method or the 
the BEKK (Baba, Engle, Kraft and Kroner) method are used. For instance, the DCC-GARCH 
approach is employed by Antonakakis and Filis (2013), while Broadstock et al. (2012) adopt 
the BEKK method and Filis et al. (2011) employ a time-varying DCC-GARCH-GJR method. 
 
Finally, regarding the impact of the three structural oil price shocks on stock market volatility, 
the research is limited and include papers by Degiannakis et al. (2014) who consider a SVAR 
framework and Kang et al. (2015) who use a time-varying parameter VAR model. 
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In terms of data, three variables are commonly used to approximate the three structural oil price 
shocks based on Kilian’s (2009) empirical study. More specifically, changes in the world oil 
production is the proxy for supply-side shocks, global economic activity index is the proxy to 
aggregate demand shocks which is designed to capture shifts in the global demand for industrial 
commodities and the real price of oil, which is based on US refiners’ acquisition cost of crude 
oil is the proxy to precautionary demand shocks. Furthermore, different stock market indices 
either in aggregate or sectoral level have been used and the US markets, the European markets 
and the Asian markets are commonly employed.  
 
On a final note, the majority of studies show a preference for monthly frequency data. Since 
the existing literature in this field follows Kilian’s (2009) empirical framework, a plausible 
explanation in using monthly data can be attributed to the fact that structural shocks 
identification greatly depends on delay restrictions that are economically credible only at the 
monthly frequency. 
 
2.4.6 Empirical findings 
 
Kilian and Park (2009) examine the responses of industry-specific US stock returns to oil 
demand and oil supply shocks over the period 1973-2006. They document that US stock market 
returns are more influenced by demand-side oil price shocks than supply-side oil price shocks. 
They argue that if the demand-side oil price shock is driven by higher global economic activity 
(uncertainty of future availability of oil) then higher oil prices will cause a positive (negative) 
effect on stock market returns. Apergis and Miller (2009) investigate eight countries, namely, 
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK and the US for the period 1981-2007. 
They report that stock market returns do not respond significantly to aggregate demand, 
precautionary demand and supply-side oil price shocks. In addition, Basher et al. (2012) 
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provide evidence of a positive (negative) effect of aggregate (precautionary) demand shocks 
on emerging market stock returns, whereas supply-side shocks do not have any influence on 
stock market returns. Finally, Abhyankar et al. (2013) find that oil price shocks driven by 
changes in aggregate (precautionary) demand have a positive (negative) effect on the Japanese 
stock market returns, whereas the stock market returns do not react significantly to supply-side 
shocks. 
 
With reference to the relationship between oil markets and stock markets in a dynamic time-
varying environment, one of the early studies is by Filis et al. (2011) who examine developed 
and emerging economies over the period from 1987 to 2009. They show that there is a time-
varying correlation between oil and stock markets and further point out that demand-driven 
shocks exert a stronger influence on the correlation between oil and stock market returns than 
supply-side shocks. Furthermore, Broadstock et al. (2012) investigate the Chinese market by 
covering the period 2000 to 2011. They find an increasing correlation between oil price changes 
and energy stock returns during the recent financial crisis of 2007-2009. Finally, Antonakakis 
and Filis (2013), who focus on industrialised economies and consider data from 1988 to 2011, 
report that the demand-side oil price shocks tend to exercise a negative effect on the oil market-
stock market correlation, whereas the supply-side oil price shocks do not have any significant 
impact on stock market-oil market correlation. 
 
In summary, studies in this field consider that supply-side shocks do not influence the stock 
market returns whereas aggregate demand shocks have a positive effect on the stock market 
returns and precautionary demand shocks exert a negative effect on the stock market returns. 
By focusing on precautionary demand shocks, this can be explained by the fact that this shock 
occurs due to the uncertainty about the future availability of oil. An increasing oil market 
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uncertainty is associated with an increase in the concerns about future oil supply shortfalls. 
This causes a fall in economic activity. The unstable business and financial environment 
corresponds to a decrease in stock market activity and therefore lowers the real economic 
activity. 
 
Although the research on the relationship between the origin of the oil price shocks and the 
stock market returns has received attention, there are only few attempts to investigate the 
impact of the three previously mentioned oil price shocks on stock market volatility. Namely, 
Kang et al. (2015) and Degiannakis et al. (2014) assess the aforementioned relationship. More 
specifically, Degiannakis et al. (2014) report that the stock market volatility is affected 
negatively by positive aggregate demand shocks whereas positive supply-side shock and 
precautionary demand shocks do not significantly affect the stock market volatility. Similarly, 
Kang et al. (2015) indicate that positive aggregate demand shocks and positive precautionary 
demand shocks lead to lower levels of stock market volatility, whereas unanticipated 
disruptions of crude oil supply do not have a statistically significantly effect on stock market 
volatility. 
 
Last but not least, an important study related to the precautionary demand for oil is the paper 
by Anzuini et al. (2015) who examine the impact of precautionary demand shocks, 
approximated by changes in the futures-spot price spread, on US economic activity and 
inflation. They employ a two-stage identification procedure of a regression equation and a 
SVAR and use daily data over the period 1986-2008. They find that an unanticipated oil price 
increase driven by higher precautionary demand leads to a decrease in US economic activity 6 
months after the impact and an immediate increase in the Consumer Price Index (CPI). In 
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addition, they show that this shock raises oil inventories, depresses the stock market returns 
and increases stock market volatility. 
 
2.5 Conclusion  
Overall, the purpose of this chapter is to provide a detailed review of the literature which is 
associated with three empirical essays. We note that a shorter review of literature is also 
presented within each empirical chapter. A number of sub-sections is provided in order to 
clarify the terms of interest. In other words, in each sub-section we begin with the definition of 
the keywords, then we indicate the econometric methods and data used related to the existing 
literature and finally we present the empirical findings from each research study. Initially, we 
highlight the extent to which the oil market is globalised or regionalised, paying attention to 
the WTI and Brent prices, and, further, we detect potential determinants of the WTI/Brent oil 
futures price differential. Next, we review the link between oil price changes, based on their 
origin, and sovereign risk. Finally, we present the research about the exact origin of the 
precautionary demand shock and discuss the relationship between this shock and the stock 
market activity by focusing on the stock market returns and stock market volatility. 
 
2.6 Gaps in the literature  
The existing literature provides a mounting empirical evidence on the relationship between oil 
prices and financial markets and further to the economy. However, research in this area is still 
growing and expanding in various directions. In this regard, the current research focuses on 
three specific strands in the literature and attempts to identify gaps by filling voids, in which 
the literature remains silent or to explore links where the literature is limited. By reviewing the 
key studies in these three specific fields, we identify several avenues for further research.  
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Subsequently, the first respect in which the research is clearly limited refers to the investigation 
of the globalisation-regionalisation hypothesis in the oil futures market by reflecting on a set 
of potential determinants of the oil futures differential between the WTI and Brent crude oil 
benchmarks. Overall, research into the determinants of oil futures differential is very limited 
and the globalisation-regionalisation hypothesis has received limited attention in the context 
of oil futures prices. 
 
The second area in which research remains limited is the examination of the correlation 
between sovereign yield spreads as a numerical representation of sovereign risk, and oil price 
shocks. In this respect, we bring together for the first time the disaggregation of the oil price, a 
time-varying environment and the sovereign yield spreads in the EMU, which is on aggregate 
the largest oil-importer in the world. Overall, research into the link between oil prices and 
sovereign risk does not fully consider a time-varying econometric framework, the origin of the 
oil price shock and the EU market by separating this into core and periphery economies.  
 
The third respect in which we add significantly to the existing literature is the investigation of 
the exact nature of a precautionary demand shock by disaggregating precautionary demand into 
two components, namely, the shock that is based on the convenience yield and the idiosyncratic 
oil price shock. Subsequently, an evaluation is performed of the financial effects of both shocks 
on US stock market activity.  
 
2.7 Data collection and research methods in the current study 
2.7.1 Data collection 
 
The purpose of data collection from various sources can be considered as the main input to 
acquire information, to make decisions and transfer information to other researchers. In this 
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thesis, which is based on an econometric analysis, time series and therefore secondary data will 
be used. Time series are usually reused and do not require a lot of effort and time and hence is 
less costly for the researcher. Once we clearly decide about the chosen variables, the next step 
is the collection of those data. Since we use time series and based on the fact that there are no 
issues related to data availability, we have the advantage to collect these data which are 
available as e-resources and are free of charge since the University has bought these resources 
from the commercial suppliers. Examples of e-resources include: Bloomberg and Thomson-
Reuters global financial markets databases. In addition, time series can be costless, downloaded 
by agencies and organisations such as the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and the US 
Energy Information Administration (EIA). 
 
Last but not least, the period of our study is dictated by the availability of data. This necessitates 
that we cover three different time periods either in respect of the beginning period or the end 
period. To be more specific, for the first empirical chapter, the time period spans from January 
1993 to December 2016, for the second empirical chapter, the time period runs from January 
1999 to January 2016, and, for the third empirical chapter, the data sample ranges from January 
1986 to December 2016. Thus, the time periods in the empirical chapters are not identical and 
thus we do not succeed in terms of consistency regarding the time period. In addition, it must 
be noted that we collect and use only monthly data. A plausible explanation could be attributed 
to our decision to employ the SVAR methodology in two empirical chapters. According to 
Kilian (2009), delay restrictions are required to identify structural shocks to the real oil price 
which are economically credible only at a monthly frequency. 
 
2.7.2 Research methods  
 
In order to gain an understanding of the use of our research methods, we state our econometric 
approaches employed in the three empirical chapters. In particular, Chapter 3 mainly employs 
27 
 
a single-equation multiple linear regression (static) model, Chapter 4 mainly uses a Scalar-
BEKK (time-varying) model and Chapter 5 employs a SVAR (static) model. Overall, it is 
evident that our econometric approaches stretch from static to time-varying models. Briefly, 
static models offer advantages in terms of detecting and interpreting the elasticities of the 
independent variables, whereas time-varying models suggest that the relationship between two 
variables may not be constant over time. A more detailed analysis of each econometric 
specification is provided in the following empirical chapters and therefore this information falls 
beyond the scope of this chapter. Therefore, the next chapters introduce our empirical analysis. 
 
2.7.3 The contribution of the research methods to the literature 
 
With reference to Chapter 3, it must be noted that our econometric technique to test the 
globalisation-regionalisation hypothesis, based on the F test, originates from our multiple 
regression equation, which provides an innovative approach and is applied for the first time in 
the respecting literature. To be more specific, we follow Milonas and Henker (2001), who 
employ a regression analysis and reveal that factors such as the convenience yield contribute 
to price disparities between WTI and Brent and furthermore cause partial market segmentation. 
However, Milonas and Henker (2001) examine potential determinants and argue that, due to 
the volatility in the WTI/Brent price spread triggered by a number of predictors, oil prices are 
not fully integrated. Therefore, we expand further this research by using the F test which 
indicates a more formal analysis of the extent to which the regression equation describes a 
significant amount of variation in the oil futures differential. 
 
Turning to the Chapter 4, the time-varying econometric framework, Scalar-BEKK, guarantees 
an investigation of the relationship between different oil price shocks and sovereign yield 
spreads at each point in time. Indeed, as previously mentioned, a strand of the literature 
demonstrates that the relationship between oil and financial markets may not be stable over 
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time. The use of Scalar-BEKK represents an advancement in the research area of the 
relationship between different oil price shocks and sovereign risk as the majority of the 
previous studies employ static econometric approaches. Although there is a study which uses 
a time-varying modified bootstrap rolling-window procedure, it is worth noting that this 
approach suffers from the identification of the appropriate window size and from a weak 
expression of test statistics. In contrast, our Scalar-BEKK time-varying framework does not 
suffer from these limitations. 
 
Regarding Chapter 5, in which we employ a SVAR model, it should be mentioned that all 
studies that focus on oil price shocks based on their origin largely follow Kilian’s (2009) SVAR 
model, which allows the identification of the three oil price shocks. Similarly, the inclusion of 
the stock market block requires us to follow Kilian and Park’s (2009) SVAR model. Thus, we 
recognise that the econometric approach that is adopted in this chapter does not contribute to 
further innovations in this strand of the literature in terms of econometric methods. However, 
we point out that the motivation behind this chapter was neither to follow a specific model nor 
to develop a new model but, instead, to investigate the exact nature of the precautionary 
demand shock in the oil market. Overall, armed with this knowledge, we are able to proceed to 
the empirical analysis. 
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Chapter 3: The WTI/Brent oil futures price differential and the 
globalisation-regionalisation hypothesis 
3.1. Introduction 
Crude oil is an important commodity and constitutes a large part of trade in global financial 
markets (Westgaard et al., 2011). In addition, the price of crude oil is an important factor which 
affects the global economy and contributes to financial stability (Chang, 2012). Since oil is 
traded through futures contracts, oil futures markets can play an important role in providing an 
efficient price discovery mechanism (Bekiros and Diks, 2008). Therefore, the analysis of crude 
oil futures contracts is an important tool to explain developments in the international crude oil 
market (Alquist and Arbatli, 2010). Furthermore, oil futures contracts are important derivative 
instruments for hedging the risk of unanticipated changes in future oil prices (Lean et al., 2010) 
and thus, traders and investors design hedging strategies using these contracts to deal with 
energy risk management. 
 
Hedging strategies may vary across different crude oil benchmarks, such as; WTI (West Texas 
Intermediate) and Brent. Hence, the degree of co-movement between those benchmarks 
provides valuable information regarding the effectiveness of crude oil benchmarks as hedging 
instruments (Reboredo, 2011). In this regard, Adelman (1984) posits that the world oil market 
is “one great pool”, thus advancing the globalisation hypothesis. Under a globalised market, 
the crude oil prices will fluctuate together in both upswings and downswings of the oil market. 
By contrast, the regionalisation hypothesis implies that crude oil prices do not move in unison. 
Therefore, the globalisation-regionalisation hypothesis recognises the existence of two states 
of the world oil market. 
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In this respect, it is important to explain further these two concepts. In a globalised oil market, 
the prices of two similar in quality crude oil benchmarks (e.g., WTI and Brent) in two different 
markets should move closely together. Oil supply and oil demand shocks which have an impact 
on oil prices in one region are transmitted to another region and influence the oil prices there. 
This implies that under the globalisation hypothesis, the oil price differential does not feature 
any systematic component and hence cannot be predicted. Any price difference can be 
attributed to transportation costs. Considering a regionalised oil market, oil prices of similar 
qualities in the two different regions show independent reactions to oil supply and oil demand 
shocks. Therefore, the impact of these shocks is limited to the particular regions or markets. 
This could contribute to significant variations in the oil price differential. These significant 
variations imply the oil markets are not fully integrated since regional differences exist. 
 
Historically, WTI trades slightly above Brent. This price advantage for WTI can be due to 
higher quality characteristics. Since WTI and Brent are generally considered as crude oils of 
similar quality, the consensus is that their prices should move in unison. However, factors such 
as regional logistical bottlenecks and geopolitical turmoil may have contributed to a significant 
divergence between WTI and Brent prices in late-2010, reducing the price of WTI below Brent 
(trading at a discount).1 This is broadly indicative of regionalisation in the crude oil market 
since the two major benchmarks are significantly affected by local market conditions and 
geopolitical events. 
 
Turning to the infrastructure logistics, WTI as a landlocked crude oil can experience 
bottlenecks in supply via pipelines, whereas Brent does not experience bottlenecks, as it is 
                                                 
1 In summary, the main causes for the observed variation over time in the oil price differential were (i) the 
increasing US domestic production from shale formations (Bakken in North Dakota and Eagle Ford in Texas) and 
crude oil imports from Canada, and, (ii) the political instability in the Middle East, known as the Arab Spring. 
Reports and additional information can be found on the Energy Information Administration (EIA). 
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extracted at sea and transferred by ship. Regarding the geopolitical turmoil, Brent crude oil is 
affected mainly by geopolitical events such as political instability in Syria and Libya, pushing 
Brent to a higher price level.2 This can be attributed to the fact that African and Middle Eastern 
oil production tends to be priced relative to the price of Brent. Regional oil market fundamental 
conditions (supply and demand) or world turmoil conditions (the global financial crisis of 
2007-2009), as well as political tensions and instability, appear to affect to a greater magnitude 
separately on one market relative to the other. This can be considered a key supportive factor 
of decreasing levels of market integration and consequently it amplifies regionalisation.  
 
The WTI/Brent oil futures price differential (henceforth “oil futures differential”) represents 
the futures price differential between the two crude oil benchmarks (WTI futures price minus 
Brent futures price). We examine the WTI (US) and Brent (European) crude oil markets rather 
than the Dubai/Oman (Persian Gulf) crude oil market since globally, both WTI and Brent have 
the most actively and highly liquid traded oil futures contracts (see Elder et al., 2014). Our 
preference for the oil futures differential, as opposed to the oil spot differential, is motivated 
by relatively more accurate information contained in futures prices (see, Kao and Wan, 2012). 
Oil futures markets convey information that is used by traders to form expectations about future 
supply, demand and the equilibrium price of oil. 
 
The behaviour of the oil futures differential is considered a key element in explaining changes 
in oil market dynamics and international oil-trade flows.3 The examination of the oil futures 
differential is essential since the oil futures market’s participants need to be aware of these 
                                                 
2 Choi and Hammoudeh (2010) underscore the importance of the geopolitical crises on the price of Brent, which 
can adversely affect exports of crude oil from the Middle East and Africa. Barsky and Kilian (2004) emphasise 
the effect of events such as war in the Middle East on the oil markets. 
3 The EIA provides a detailed scope regarding the two crude oil futures benchmarks of WTI and Brent.  
For more information, see: https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=24692 
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changes in order to design effective hedging strategies and exploit arbitrage profit 
opportunities. Trading oil futures contracts in the oil futures market allows for hedging 
activities by commercial consumers and producers, and arbitrage activities by market agents.4 
Given that historically the oil futures differential exhibits a mean reverting behaviour by 
oscillating within fixed bounds apart from the post-2010 period, trading strategies with a 
particular emphasis on the oil futures differential can be employed to handle energy risk 
management.  
 
Surprisingly, the globalisation-regionalisation hypothesis has received limited attention in the 
use of oil futures prices (see, for instance, Milonas and Henker, 2001) and the research into 
determinants of oil futures differential is very limited (see, for example, Büyükşahin et al., 
2013). Our choice to focus on the spread form in the set of explanatory variables which has not 
been discussed previously in other literature, such as the WTI/Brent convenience yield spread, 
is justified by the fact that the oil futures differential is traditionally identified by the difference 
between the quality and freight rates (location) in the two crude oil markets. As a result, we 
should expect that additional differentials may possibly provide predictive power in market 
expectations regarding the future value in WTI and Brent benchmarks. Thus, this research aims 
to fill this void.  
 
In a more detailed analysis, although our study builds upon the study of Büyükşahin et al. 
(2013) who provide evidence that physical-market fundamentals and financial variables have 
                                                 
4 Arbitrage is the process where agents taking advantage of a price differential between two commodities (WTI 
and Brent) by simultaneously buying and selling the two crudes to generate profits. Hedging allows traders to 
protect (hedge) themselves against price risk by taking a position in the futures market which is opposite to their 
position in the physical market. Thus, hedging with oil futures contracts reduces the risk of price fluctuations on 
the physical market. When WTI and Brent crude oil trade closely together and hence move in unison, the scope 
for arbitrage opportunities diminish and the effectiveness of hedging strategies increases. On the other hand, if 
one market trades significantly above or below relative to the other, driving the oil market to operate at higher 
levels of price uncertainty, the arbitrageurs can take advantage of the oil futures differential and the effectiveness 
of hedging strategies declines.  
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predictive power to explain the WTI/Brent behaviour, our study differentiates from 
Büyükşahin et al. (2013) by considering three main differences which can be described as 
follows. First, we pay particular attention to the inclusion of the convenience yield, given that 
oil is a storable asset and unexpected changes in the demand for inventory are expected to affect 
movements in WTI/Brent. In contrast, Büyükşahin et al. (2013) do not employ this oil market-
specific variable. Second, the Büyükşahin et al. (2013) study is based on the very short-run 
period concentrating only on the WTI/Brent nearby spread, while we employ the 1-month, 3-
month and 6-month futures contracts between WTI and Brent in order to test the short-run 
period more extensively. Third, Büyükşahin et al. (2013) use data from 2003 to 2012, whereas 
we use a longer time period which runs from 1993 to 2016. 
 
The contributions of the study can be described succinctly as follows. First, we consider a 
comprehensive set of crude oil-market specific factors and oil-futures market specific 
indicators, which have not been explored by the existing literature to test the globalisation-
regionalisation hypothesis. Second, we focus on the futures oil price differentials rather than 
the spot oil price differentials, given that futures prices are more informative. Third, we 
consider the recent period which has seen a significant divergence in the oil futures differential 
since late-2010. Finally, we consider these effects on various futures contracts maturities (i.e. 
1, 3 and 6-month contracts). 
 
Our findings are as follows. First, the WTI/Brent convenience yield spread has a negative and 
significant effect on the oil futures differential for the contracts near to maturity (1-month and 
3-month). Second, the WTI/Brent oil consumption spread has a negative and significant effect 
on the oil futures differential for the 6-month to maturity contract. Third, the WTI/Brent oil 
production spread has a negative and significant effect on the oil futures differential among the 
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corresponding maturities of 1-month, 3-month and 6-month contracts. Fourth, the WTI/Brent 
open interest spread has a negative and significant effect on the oil futures differential for the 
3-month and the 6-month to maturity contracts. Fifth, the WTI/Brent trading volume spread 
has a positive and significant effect on the oil futures differential for the contracts near to 
maturity (1-month and 3-month). Overall, we suggest that the state of the oil futures market is 
not stable in every time period. Specifically, we provide evidence that the market is 
regionalised in the short-run and globalised in the long-run. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the literature of the 
study. Section 3.3 describes the data and provides a preliminary analysis of the variables. 
Section 3.4 outlines the econometric models. Section 3.5 analyses the estimation results. 
Section 3.6 offers some concluding remarks and discusses points for further research. 
 
3.2. Review of the related literature 
Chang et al. (2010) argue that among the four international crude oil benchmarks (WTI, Brent, 
Tapis and Dubai/Oman), only WTI and Brent are the world references for crude oil. WTI and 
Brent have similar qualities as both belong to the light sweet category.5 As previously stated, 
our choice to examine the WTI and Brent markets is further justified by the fact that both 
markets have the most actively traded oil futures contracts in the world.6 WTI is the reference 
                                                 
5 These quality differences are due to the higher percentage of gasoline and the lower percentage of heating oil in 
WTI than in Brent (Milonas and Henker, 2001). They are light because of low density and sweet because of low 
sulphur. Using light sweet crude oil, products like gasoline can be produced easily and cheaply. More specifically, 
WTI has an API (American Petroleum Institute) gravity of 39.6 degrees and contains 0.20 percent of sulphur, 
whereas Brent API gravity is 38.3 degrees and contains 0.40 percent of sulphur. Thus, a price advantage for WTI 
may arise due to it being lighter and sweeter than Brent.  
The interested reader can find all the necessary information about different quality characteristics of crude oils in 
the following link: http://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.cfm?id=A#API_grav 
6 Although the Dubai/Oman futures contract is listed on the Dubai Mercantile Exchange Limited (DME), its 
trading volume is relatively small compared to the WTI and Brent, which are considered the most liquid traded 
futures contracts in the global oil market. 
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not only for other types of crude oil produced domestically in the US, but also for imported 
crude oil produced in Canada. Therefore, WTI is the dominant crude oil benchmark in the large 
North American market.  
 
Although Brent accounts for 1 percent of world-wide crude oil production, it is used to set 
prices for crude oil produced and traded not only in the smaller European market but also in 
other parts of the world like North Africa, the Middle East, Australia and a number of countries 
in Asia.7 Therefore, Brent represents two-thirds of the crude oil traded internationally (see, for 
instance, Arouri et al., 2011; Filis et al., 2011). The WTI has the most liquid futures contracts 
in the crude oil market compared with Brent. However, the trading volume of Brent futures 
contracts exceeded the trading volume of WTI futures contracts in April 2012 for the first time. 
This is indicative of the increasing significance of Brent as a global crude oil benchmark.8 
 
While Brent is considered a global crude oil benchmark, the discussion as to whether this crude 
oil benchmark can be mimicked by the WTI is dominated by the globalisation-regionalisation 
hypothesis, pioneered by Adelman (1984). As aforementioned, there is a globalised market 
when crude oil prices move in unison and a regionalised market when crude oil prices fluctuate 
with different intensities. Some studies related to the aforementioned hypothesis include papers 
by Liu et al. (2015), Ji and Fan (2015), Wilmot (2013), Candelon et al. (2013), Reboredo 
(2011), Fattouh (2010), Hammoudeh et al. (2008), Kleit (2001), Milonas and Henker (2001), 
Gülen (1997, 1999) and Weiner (1991). 
  
                                                 
7 The source of the information can be found on the EIA: 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=18571. 
8 Reports and additional information can be found on the EIA. 
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Evidence of regionalisation is endorsed by Weiner (1991) who argues that the ensuing 
effectiveness of energy policies, such as changes in the Strategic Petroleum Reserves in the 
US, depends on whether such policies pertain to the US market or are internationally 
transmitted. On the contrary, Gülen (1997, 1999) provides evidence that oil prices in different 
markets fluctuate closely together which is indicative of co-integration. In addition, Milonas 
and Henker (2001) indicate that oil prices are not fully integrated with reference to the oil 
futures markets of WTI and Brent. Along a similar vein, Fattouh (2010) suggests that oil 
markets are not necessarily integrated in every time period and provides evidence of threshold 
effects in the adjustment process of crude oil price differentials to the long-run equilibrium.  
 
Recently, Reboredo (2011) tests the globalisation-regionalisation hypothesis and finds 
evidence of globalisation from 1997 to mid-2010. However, the globalisation hypothesis has 
been undermined by increasing regionalisation in the crude oil market since late-2010.9 More 
recently, Liu et al. (2015) use high-frequency data to investigate the price discovery between 
WTI and Brent futures prices over the period from 2008-2011 and show evidence that oil 
supply disruptions at Cushing, the delivery point for WTI, have significantly contributed to 
decreasing levels of co-integration between the WTI and Brent markets. 
 
 
                                                 
9 In late-2010, the combination of two key events in the US oil market; namely, an increasing volume of domestic 
production from North Dakota and Texas, as well as, growing imports from Canada, outpaced the Cushing’s 
capacity to store and distribute excess oil supplies. The existing pipeline infrastructure in Cushing was inadequate 
to transport growing oil production to refineries in the Gulf Coast. This created stockpiles and bottlenecks in 
Cushing, reducing the price of WTI below Brent, resulting in WTI trading at a discount. However, in early 2013, 
improvements in oil transportation infrastructures diminished the scope for further bottlenecks between Cushing 
and the Gulf Coast, putting upward pressure on WTI prices. For further reading about the price differences in the 
WTI/Brent spread since late-2010, articles and reports on this subject may be found on the EIA. For more 
information, see:  
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=11891,  
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/special/pdf/2012_sp_02.pdf 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=12391 
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Considering the econometric approach, the existing literature sheds light on different 
methodologies that are employed to test the globalisation-regionalisation hypothesis. On 
general principles, cointegration tests, regression analysis, correlation analysis and copula 
functions have been used. It should be mentioned that studies related to the WTI/Brent price 
differential include only those by Liu et al. (2015), Reboredo (2011), Fattouh (2010), 
Hammoudeh et al. (2008) and Milonas and Henker (2001). It must be noted that our 
econometric technique to test the globalisation-regionalisation hypothesis is based on the F test 
that originates from the multiple linear regression model for the oil futures price differential. 
The intuition of the F test builds our previous arguments that globalised oil markets manifest 
in overlapping information contents. Consequently, the futures price differential under 
globalisation features no systematic component and thus should be unpredictable. To be more 
specific, we follow Milonas and Henker (2001) who employ a regression analysis and reveal 
that factors such as the convenience yield contribute to price disparities between WTI and Brent 
and further cause partial market segmentation. Therefore, the use of the F test indicates the 
extent to which the regression equation describes a significant amount of variance in the oil 
futures differential. 
 
The debate regarding the structure of the global oil market begins with Adelman (1984) who 
uses the interdependence of regional oil prices in order to measure market integration. He 
claims that “the world oil market, like the world ocean, is one great pool”. Nevertheless, Weiner 
(1991) provides the first formal empirical analysis by using correlation analysis and switching 
regression analysis with aim to test the degree of regionalisation in global oil markets. In 
addition, Gülen (1997, 1999) uses bivariate and multivariate cointegration tests introduced by 
Johansen (1988) in order to test the degree of efficiency arguing that regionalisation gives rise 
to arbitrage opportunities. Furthermore, Kleit (2001) follows an arbitrage cost approach based 
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on the theory of arbitrage as introduced by Spiller and Wood (1988a,b) to estimate transaction 
costs between oil regions, while the methodology of Milonas and Henker (2001) is based on 
various regression models. 
 
In more recent literature, Hammoudeh et al. (2008) use the Engle-Granger method (1987) and 
the Momentum-Threshold Autoregressive (M-TAR) model by Enders and Siklos (2001) which 
allows for asymmetry in the return to equilibrium levels. Moreover, Fattouh (2010) uses 
standard unit root tests with the aim of identifying if oil price differentials can or cannot deviate 
without bounds. Furthermore, he uses a Threshold autoregressive (TAR) process proposed by 
Caner and Hansen (2001) to distinguish between different regimes that allows oil price 
differentials to follow a random walk (mean reversion) if oil price differentials are above 
(below) a certain threshold. Reboredo (2011) considers several copula models with time-
varying and time-invariant dependence structures. Candelon et al. (2013), propose a technique 
which allows for testing for Granger causality in down- and upside risk for multiple risk levels 
across tail distributions. The authors build on Hong et al. (2009) who consider the concept of 
Granger causality in risk between two markets only at a particular risk level.  
 
Wilmot (2013) employs cointegration tests that allow for endogenously determined structural 
breaks. These structural changes could cause the cointegrating vector to shift. To this end, the 
author follows the Gregory and Hansen (1996) approach which is based on augmented Dickey-
Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests to account for structural breaks. Ji and Fan (2015) employ an 
error correction model combined with a directed acyclic graph technique in order to construct 
contemporaneous causal relations. Finally, Liu et al. (2015) use three econometric approaches 
to test for cointegration patterns. Initially, they use Johansen’s (1995) test, then they employ 
Hasbrouck’s (1995) Information Shares measure and finally they employ Gonzalo and 
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Granger’s (1995) Permanent‐Transitory Common Factor Weights to gauge the roles played by 
WTI and Brent in price discovery between them. 
 
The recent developments are discordant with the notion of globalised markets, according to 
which crude oil of similar quality characteristics in different markets should be priced very 
closely to each other, resulting in a constant range of fluctuations in their price differential 
(Wilmot, 2013; Fattouh, 2010). Specifically, in our empirical analysis we seek to identify 
channels through which the oil market is globalised or regionalised, which in turn can trigger 
a range of responses in energy policy. Following Fattouh (2010), due to their similar quality 
and because they are the most liquid traded futures contracts, WTI and Brent are characterised 
by the absence of threshold effects in their price differential. Thus, the WTI/Brent oil futures 
differential is expected to be stationary within certain bounds. Through the mechanism of error 
correction, as indicated by the arbitrage activity, the oil futures differential adjusts to certain 
boundaries in case of a deviation from the long-run equilibrium. Specifically, large deviations 
above or below a certain threshold can be eliminated quickly through arbitrage by market 
participants in both futures markets, leading to a long-run equilibrium. 
 
Against this background, our expectation is that the oil futures market is globalised in the long-
run. However, the recent developments in the crude oil market since late-2010, driven by 
regional supply and demand imbalances, as well as geopolitical unrest (both of which caused 
Brent trading at a persistent premium over WTI), can be a hindrance to the adjustment process 
to the long-run equilibrium. Thus, while the oil futures market may be globalised in the long-
run, this study seeks to advance the understanding of the short-run determinants of the oil 
futures differential, and hence regionalisation.  
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Within the limited body of research on the subject (see, among others, Hammoudeh et al., 2010; 
Caumon and Bower, 2004; Milonas and Henker, 2001), the importance of the fundamental 
factors on the oil futures differential (e.g., supply and demand) is accentuated. Specifically, 
Milonas and Henker (2001) underscore the importance of supply and demand conditions on 
the oil futures differential. Similarly, research by Caumon and Bower (2004) suggest that the 
oil futures differential can be affected by different supply and demand events which occur in 
both markets. A similar picture is painted by Hammoudeh et al. (2010) who indicate that the 
oil futures differential is affected by fundamental and transitory components in both the WTI 
and Brent crude oil benchmarks. 
 
Recently, Büyükşahin et al. (2013) identify that physical market fundamentals, such as the 
North American oil production (including the oil supply in US and imports from Canada), can 
help explain the oil futures differential. Thus, supply and demand imbalances for WTI and 
Brent crude oil generate a significant short-term impact on their futures prices. For example, 
an unexpected increase in global demand for crude oil (triggered by the industrialisation of 
some emerging economies) or unexpected oil supply disruptions (due to pipeline limitations or 
political instability in the Middle East) can create supply and demand imbalances. These 
imbalances can affect WTI and Brent crude oil futures prices and thus, their oil futures 
differential.  
 
Our research is conceptually similar to Duan and Lin (2010), who ascribe the WTI/Brent spot 
price differential to crude oil convenience yields. In addition, futures prices incorporate the 
investor’s belief regarding the value of the convenience yield (Mellios and Six, 2011). The 
convenience yield reflects market expectations about the future availability of crude oil. It is 
highly associated with shortages and inventories of oil. According to Hull (2012), shortages in 
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the crude oil market are reflected in a higher value of the convenience yield. If the probability 
of shortages in the near future is perceived to be relatively low and the holders possess 
relatively high inventories, the convenience yield decreases. In the case of low inventories, the 
convenience yield tends to be higher as shortages are more likely to occur. 
 
Studies related to the determinants of the oil futures differential include papers by Heidorn et 
al. (2015), Büyükşahin et al. (2013) and Milonas and Henker (2001). Specifically, Milonas and 
Henker (2001), who use various regression models to examine the relation among the 
WTI/Brent oil futures differential, convenience yield and supply and demand for both WTI and 
Brent crude oil. Fundamental factors of quality discrepancies are identified as the main drivers 
of the differential for those contracts away from expiration. However, for contracts near to 
maturity, the main determinant is the convenience yield. More recently, Büyükşahin et al. 
(2013) employ an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model on daily data to examine 
fundamental and financial drivers of the nearby oil futures differential between WTI and Brent. 
They conclude that positions from commodity index traders and physical traders in both futures 
markets partly help to predict the behaviour of the oil futures differential. 
 
Furthermore, Heidorn et al. (2015) use a term structure model on weekly data to investigate 
the impact of fundamental and financial traders’ market positions on the Brent/WTI oil futures 
differential for a range of different maturities. They find that financial rather than fundamental 
traders tend to exercise a significant influence on WTI/ Brent market integration by eliminating 
price differences between them. As aforementioned, the goal of this chapter is to investigate 
the globalisation-regionalisation hypothesis in the WTI/Brent oil futures price differential by 
assessing a broader set of crude oil-market specific factors and oil-futures market specific 
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indicators. There is little research in the above context and thus we seek to contribute to this 
literature. 
 
3.3. Data and preliminary analysis 
The sample period runs from January 1993 to December 2016, including 288 monthly 
observations. The time period is dictated by data availability.  
3.3.1 WTI/Brent oil futures differential 
 
The present study focuses on the oil futures contracts that are traded in two international 
markets. For the US crude oil market, we include 1, 3 and 6 month futures contracts available 
from the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX). For the European crude oil market, we 
include the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) oil futures contracts for the same maturities. Prices 
of crude oil are expressed in US dollars per barrel and the size of a contract is 1,000 barrels 
(contract unit) with a minimum fluctuation of $0.01 per barrel. These prices are extracted from 
Bloomberg.  
 
Futures prices can be obtained from various available databases, such as the Energy 
Information Administration, Bloomberg and Datastream. Therefore, in this study, the futures 
prices are readily available and not constructed. For example, the continuous futures prices are 
collected from Bloomberg for the purposes of this chapter. The Bloomberg terminal is a 
computer system that allows investors and researchers to access the Bloomberg data service, 
which provides real-time financial data. Overall, the key element of the Bloomberg terminal is 
reliability in delivering fast and accurate information about economic and financial data, news 
and analytics. However, there is a need to provide a brief information regarding the 
construction of the continuous futures price series. To elaborate further, the construction of the 
continuous futures price series (also known as spread-adjusted price series), is composed by 
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adding the cumulative difference between the old and the new contracts at rollover points to 
the new contract series. The resulting price series would be free of the distortions due to spread 
difference that exist at the rollover points between contracts (see Schwager and Etzkorn, 2017). 
 
The identification of potential determinants on the oil futures differential is examined for 1, 3 
and 6-month maturities of futures contracts. Firstly, the 1-month futures contract has the 
greatest amount of predictive information which can potentially explain future movements and 
volatility in the spot price (see Hammoudeh et al., 2003). Secondly, futures contracts with 
shorter maturities (1-month and 3-month) present higher trading volumes and thus generate 
greater liquidity (see Hammoudeh and Li, 2005; Hammoudeh and Yuan, 2008) compared to 
futures contracts for other maturities. Thirdly, the 6-month oil futures contract is the average 
contract where the price of risk for the far to maturity month contract does not exceed the 
premium received on the nearest to maturity month contract. According to Miffre (2004), 
hedging with longer maturity futures contracts (six to nine months) is more uncertain than 
hedging with shorter maturity futures contracts (three to six months). In addition, Graham-
Higgs et al. (1999) find that the futures market is efficient for maturities shorter than 6 months. 
Therefore, the prices of such contracts reflect all available information.  
 
Monthly futures prices and the oil futures differential (both at 1, 3 and 6 months to maturity) 
are displayed in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. It is clear that both markets were traded at similar prices 
with the WTI price trading at a small premium over Brent. Since late-2010, this relationship 
began to change causing in a significant divergence between WTI and Brent prices, resulting 
in the price for WTI trading at a discount below Brent. However, during the period 2011-2015, 
the substantial premium of Brent over WTI diminished gradually to a small premium and 
returned to prior to late-2010 levels in December 2015, which coincided with the lifting of the 
44 
 
US crude oil export ban. As a result, in early 2016, the oil futures differential narrowed and 
almost returned to parity. By the end of December 2016, the oil futures differential widened 
slightly again (a higher rise in Brent relative to WTI).  
 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 further show that WTI and Brent oil futures prices fluctuate similarly during 
the period 1993-2010 (apart from late-2010), which suggests the existence of a globalised 
market in the long-run. On the other hand, during the period 2011-2016 (apart from December 
2015), WTI was trading at a persistent discount relative to Brent. This discount was pronounced 
from 2011 to 2014 when the difference between WTI and Brent widened considerably. This 
result suggests that at times of intense regional logistical bottlenecks and severe geopolitical 
unrest, which clearly emerged during 2011-2014, the globalised nature of the oil futures market 
appears to be challenged.  
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 Figure 3.1: Time series plots for WTI and Brent oil futures prices 
 
 
 
Note: This Figure depicts variation over time in the WTI and Brent futures prices. The sample period runs from January 1993 to December 
2016. 
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Figure 3.2: Time series plots for the WTI/Brent oil futures price differential 
 
 
 
Note: This Figure depicts variation over time in the WTI/Brent oil futures differential (SFP). M1 = one-month futures contract, M3 = three-
month futures contract, M6 = six-month futures contract. The sample period runs from January 1993 to December 2016. 
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3.3.2. Explanatory variables 
 
In this chapter, we use the spread of the WTI/Brent convenience yield, WTI/Brent oil 
consumption, WTI/Brent oil production, WTI/Brent open interest and WTI/Brent trading 
volume as possible explanatory variables. The Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
database is the source of monthly historical data for oil-market specific explanatory factors 
such as crude oil production10 and petroleum consumption.11 It is worth noting that our measure 
of the WTI crude oil production might in part reflect the rapid growth in US shale oil production 
(shale oil revolution) which was triggered by technological advances in drilling and contributed 
to the recent developments in US crude oil production. In particular, shale oil production 
experienced an increase in 2003 and a rapid expansion in 2009, which resulted in almost half 
of US crude oil production coming from the accumulation of US shale oil production in 2014 
(see, for instance, Kilian, 2016). Open interest and trading volume represent trading activities 
in the oil futures market.12 Open interest and trading volume together are employed to indicate 
changes in market depth and provide information in explaining futures price volatility. Market 
participants use these variables as indicators of price trends in the futures market. We use the 
open interest and the trading volume of WTI and Brent at 1, 3 and 6 month futures price 
contracts. Data on open interest and trading volume are collected from Bloomberg.  
                                                 
10 Although WTI is produced only in the Midwest region, it is considered as the major benchmark in the US 
(Speight, 2011). Crude oil production in the US and crude oil imports from Canada into the PADD 2 region is 
used as a proxy for WTI oil production, whereas the Brent crude oil output is given by the sum of the UK and 
Norway total crude oil production in the North Sea (Hamilton, 2008), insofar as both countries hold the majority 
of oil fields in this area. 
11 The EIA uses product supplied as a proxy for US petroleum consumption. We employ this variable as a proxy 
for WTI oil consumption. In the US, oil consumption is benchmarked to domestically produced WTI 
(Hammoudeh et al., 2010), whereas our measure of Brent oil consumption is constructed using data on petroleum 
consumption in France, Germany, Italy and the UK. This is due to the fact that Brent is typically refined in Europe 
and is consumed in large quantities in Northwest Europe (Speight, 2011). Candelon et al. (2013), argue that due 
to the continuous decline in production, Brent crude oil is largely consumed locally in Europe.    
12 Open interest is the number of outstanding contracts that have not been delivered on a specific day. Trading 
volume is the number of contracts bought and sold for a given time period. 
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Furthermore, we use the ICE LIBOR13 (Intercontinental Exchange, London Interbank Offered 
Rate) and the US Treasury bill rate, both at 1, 3 and 6 months as risk-free interest rates to 
construct our measure of the convenience yield. Specifically, we employ the LIBOR (Knetsch, 
2007) as the main risk-free interest rate, whereas the US Treasury bill rate (Gospodinov and 
Ng, 2013; Milonas and Henker, 2001) is used as an alternative measure of a risk-free interest 
rate in order to test the robustness of our results. Both rates are known as the most widely-used 
benchmarks for risk-free interest rates. Data on the ICE LIBOR interest rate are extracted from 
Bloomberg, whereas data on the US Treasury bill rate are collected from Datastream. In 
addition, for the construction of the convenience yield, we use WTI and Brent spot crude oil 
prices, which are obtained from EIA.  
 
It is worth noting that the choice of the US Treasury bill rate as an alternative measure is based 
on the recent claims of extensive manipulation of the LIBOR which contributed to increasing 
concerns about the integrity of this rate (i.e. the financial crisis of 2007-2009). From a 
theoretical perspective, banks could gain cumulative returns by manipulating LIBOR if they 
indicate a less volatile rate to attract the attention of investors. As far as payments in loans by 
companies are based on LIBOR movements, it appears to have an impact on their borrowing 
costs and further reduces the reliability of the banking sector and the confidence in the financial 
markets. According to Duffie and Stein (2015), manipulating the LIBOR is beneficial in 
periods of financial stress since a lower interest rate implies that a bank is able to receive credit. 
Furthermore, it is also beneficial for banks, in cases of small distortions in LIBOR fixing while 
having large trading positions in a derivative market which are also indexed to LIBOR.  
 
                                                 
13 Due to the fact that government bonds include liquidity premia, Alquist et al. (2014) argue that LIBOR seems 
to provide a good measurement of the borrowing costs experienced by companies in the oil industry. 
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Some related studies choose LIBOR rather than the T-bill as the main proxy for the risk-free 
rate of return in computing the convenience yield. These include the papers by Alquist et al. 
(2014) and Fontaine and Garcia (2012). By looking at the Fontaine and Garcia (2012) empirical 
study, they document that tight funding conditions lower substantially the risk premium on US 
Treasury bonds but raise the risk premium implicit in LIBOR rates, swap rates, and corporate 
bond yields. Similarly, Alquist et al. (2014) use LIBOR data for maturities of 1, 2, 3, 6 and 12 
months rather than US Treasury bill data, because the former represent a better measure of the 
borrowing costs incurred by oil companies. Government bonds can embody large liquidity 
premia due to favourable taxation treatment, repo specials, scarcity premia and benchmark 
status. 
 
Next, we present in detail the construction of the spread variables. Specifically, the oil futures 
differential is given by: 
𝑆𝐹𝑃𝑡,𝑛 = 𝐹𝑊𝑡,𝑛 − 𝐹𝐵𝑡,𝑛          (1) 
where 𝑆𝐹𝑃𝑡,𝑛 is the difference (spread) between WTI and Brent crude oil futures prices at time 
t and maturity n, 𝐹𝑊𝑡,𝑛 is the futures price for WTI at time t and maturity n and 𝐹𝐵𝑡,𝑛 is the 
futures price for Brent at time t and maturity n. 
 
Similarly, the convenience yield spread (SCY) is given as follows. 
𝑆𝐶𝑌𝑡,𝑛 = 𝐶𝑌𝑊𝑡,𝑛 − 𝐶𝑌𝐵𝑡,𝑛          (2) 
where 𝐶𝑌𝑊𝑡,𝑛 and 𝐶𝑌𝐵𝑡,𝑛 are the WTI and Brent convenience yields at time t and maturity n. 
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To calculate the convenience yield (CY) in crude oil markets, we adopt the recent approach 
proposed by Gospodinov and Ng (2013). This approach consists of calculating the net (of 
storage and insurance costs)14 percentage convenience yield as follows: 
𝐶𝑌𝑡,𝑛 =
(1+it,n)St− Ft,n
St
          (3) 
where 𝑖𝑡,𝑛 is the risk-free interest rate at time t and maturity n, 𝑆𝑡 denotes the spot price of crude 
oil for delivery at time t and 𝐹𝑡,𝑛 denotes the futures price of crude oil for delivery at time t and 
maturity n.  
 
It is worth mentioning that the convenience yield can be associated with shifts in precautionary 
oil demand arising from an unexpected disruption in oil supply or an unexpected growth in oil 
demand (see, for example, Kilian and Park, 2009). In other words, shifts in precautionary 
demand may represent increasing uncertainty in the oil market. In this regard, the greater the 
uncertainty in the oil market, the higher the convenience yield. Furthermore, uncertainty about 
oil supply shortfalls could potentially be attributed to geopolitical unrest caused by political 
instability and wars in the Middle East such as; the Persian Gulf crisis of 1990-1991, the second 
Iraq war of 2003 and the Arab Spring of 2011 (see Alquist and Kilian, 2010; Kilian, 2009). 
Therefore, we suggest that the geopolitical turmoil is well captured by the convenience yield 
that we employ in this study.  
 
Further, the oil consumption spread (SCO), the oil production spread (SPR), the open interest 
spread (SOI) and the trading volume spread (STV) are given as follows. 
𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑡 = 𝐶𝑂𝑊𝑡 − 𝐶𝑂𝐵𝑡         (4) 
𝑆𝑃𝑅𝑡 = 𝑃𝑅𝑊𝑡 − 𝑃𝑅𝐵𝑡         (5) 
                                                 
14 Fama and French (1988) in their empirical analysis for the theory of storage assume that the relative warehouse 
costs of holding the commodity are roughly constant.  
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𝑆𝑂𝐼𝑡,𝑛 = 𝑂𝐼𝑊𝑡,𝑛 − 𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑡,𝑛         (6) 
𝑆𝑇𝑉𝑡,𝑛 = 𝑇𝑉𝑊𝑡,𝑛 − 𝑇𝑉𝐵𝑡,𝑛         (7) 
where 𝐶𝑂𝑊𝑡 (𝐶𝑂𝐵𝑡) indicates the WTI (Brent) oil consumption, 𝑃𝑅𝑊𝑡 (𝑃𝑅𝐵𝑡) represents the 
WTI (Brent) oil production and finally, 𝑂𝐼𝑊𝑡,𝑛 (𝑇𝑉𝑊𝑡,𝑛) and 𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑡,𝑛 (𝑇𝑉𝐵𝑡,𝑛) are the WTI and 
Brent open interests (trading volumes) at time t and maturity n, respectively. The next section 
reports the preliminary analysis.  
 
3.3.3 Descriptive statistics 
 
All explanatory variables are expressed in logarithms, except for SCY, whereas the variables 
measuring oil consumption and oil production are seasonally adjusted. Descriptive statistics 
are presented in Table 3.1. Panel A summarises descriptive statistics of the oil futures 
differential (SFP) and the convenience yield spread (SCY) for 1, 3 and 6 months to maturity as 
well as the oil consumption spread (SCO). Panel B summarises the open interest spread (SOI) 
and the trading volume spread (STV) for 1, 3 and 6 months to maturity as well as the oil 
production spread (SPR). 
  
In panels A and B, we indicate that the SFP is fairly volatile as the contract approaches 
maturity. Also, since the future path of oil prices is highly uncertain as we move further out 
into the future, the SCY is more volatile for longer maturity futures contracts, exhibiting greater 
uncertainty of the future availability of oil in the more distant future. The Jarque-Bera statistic 
rejects the null of normality in all of the series. The observed non-normality is also evident in 
the skewness and kurtosis statistics. 
 
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) (Dickey and Fuller, 1981) and Philips-Perron (PP) 
(Phillips and Perron, 1988) unit root tests are reported in Table 3.2 (see Panels A and B). 
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Irregardless of the maturity of the futures contract, both tests indicate the presence of a unit 
root for WTI and Brent futures prices. The ADF test decisively rejects the null of a unit root 
for the differential form of our explanatory variables with the exception of the SPR. Similarly, 
the PP test cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for the SPR. Because these results 
may be biased towards the presence of a unit root in the event of a structural break, we also 
perform the Zivot-Andrews (ZA) (Zivot and Andrews, 1992) unit root test that allows for the 
presence of structural breaks in the constant, the trend or in both the constant and trend. The 
results of these tests are reported in Panel C. Crucially, the ZA test rejects decisively the unit 
root in the SFP. This result resonates well with evidence of co-integration between the two 
benchmarks, as the difference between the WTI and Brent oil prices can be perceived as a 
deviation from the long-run equilibrium relation (Fattouh, 2010; Chevillon and Rifflart, 2009).  
 
The results of the ADF and PP tests for the rest of the variables are endorsed by the ZA test. 
Variables such as SFP, SCY, SOI, STV (for all different maturities), and SCO appear to be 
stationary in levels and thus the null hypothesis of unit root is rejected. Also, the tests show 
that SPR features a unit root if the ADF and PP tests are used. Although the ZA test rejects the 
null of a unit root (in terms of the constant), since the variable shows no evidence of structural 
break, we establish the stationarity of SPR by transforming this variable into first differences. 
Furthermore, the ZA test is indicative of determining endogenously a structural break in the 
SFP. Figure 3.3 reveals the ZA test for the SFP. This vindicates the use of a dummy variable 
in the regression models in Section 3.4. More specifically, the structural break in the SFP was 
detected in January 2011, which is almost in line with Büyükşahin et al. (2013), who document 
a structural break in the middle of December 2010 by using a Chow test which roughly matches 
the period for which the dummy variable we construct takes on value 1. Furthermore, a 
structural break in the SFP is also evident in terms of a Bai and Perron (Bai and Perron, 1998) 
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breakpoint test. Similarly, a structural change was detected endogenously in January 2011. In 
Table 3.3, we observe the Bai and Perron breakpoint test results. 
 
Table 3.4 reports the coefficients of unconditional correlation of the series in order to identify 
the linear relation among the variables under investigation. Overall, the unconditional 
correlation between the dependent variable and the explanatory variables alters substantially. 
A negative and relatively weak or moderate correlation is observed between SFP and DSPR, 
as well as SFP and SCO, while a positive and relatively weak or moderate correlation is 
observed between SFP and the remaining explanatory variables (with the exception of the SCY 
for the 1-month). Further to the above diagnostic tests, we employ a multiple linear regression 
to proceed to the stage of the empirical analysis and the discussion of results. 
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Oil futures differential, convenience yield spread at 1, 3 and 6 months to maturity and oil consumption 
spread. 
 SFP M1 SFP M3 SFP M6 SCY M1 SCY M3 SCY M6 SCO 
Mean 0.0094 0.0124 0.0126 0.0083 0.0051 0.0050 0.8867 
Median 0.0243 0.0289 0.0347 0.0064 0.0042 0.0049 0.9061 
Maximum 0.1348 0.1465 0.1328 0.0933 0.0913 0.1259 1.0648 
Minimum -0.2604 -0.2377 -0.2209 -0.0795 -0.1164 -0.1309 0.6853 
Std. Dev. 0.0807 0.0736 0.0695 0.0253 0.0279 0.0333 0.1010 
Skewness -1.0777 -1.1212 -1.0296 0.3070 -0.0072 -0.0751 -0.2365 
Kurtosis 3.7644 3.6771 3.2532 4.3852 4.5035 4.3312 1.9771 
Jarque-Bera 62.7642*** 65.8398*** 51.6496*** 27.5498*** 27.1272*** 21.5345*** 15.2400*** 
Probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0005 
Panel B: Open interest spread, trading volume spread at 1, 3 and 6 months to maturity and oil production spread. 
 SOI M1 SOI M3 SOI M6 STV M1 STV M3 STV M6 SPR 
Mean 0.0317 0.3184 0.5954 0.4991 0.4693 0.6860 0.6116 
Median 0.0708 0.3650 0.5970 0.6029 0.4397 0.6728 0.4380 
Maximum 1.9522 1.9606 2.8793 1.2007 1.9519 2.6751 1.6066 
Minimum -1.0991 -1.1320 -1.0786 -0.3974 -0.6961 -1.1227 0.1333 
Std. Dev. 0.3676 0.4603 0.5988 0.3758 0.5660 0.7125 0.4578 
Skewness 0.1696 -0.2288 0.3401 -0.7908 0.1843 0.3079 0.9830 
Kurtosis 5.3830 3.6664 3.8589 2.7997 2.3610 2.8550 2.5111 
Jarque-Bera 69.5233*** 7.8402** 14.4029*** 30.5011*** 6.5299** 4.8028* 49.2488*** 
Probability 0.0000 0.0198 0.0007 0.0000 0.0382 0.0906 0.0000 
Note: This table summarises descriptive statistics (sample mean, median, maximum, minimum, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, the 
Jarque-Bera test statistic, and the p-value associated to the Jarque-Bera test statistic) of SFP, SCY and SCO (Panel A), SOI, STV and SPR 
(Panel B). SFP = WTI/Brent oil futures price differential, SCY = WTI/Brent convenience yield spread, SOI = WTI/Brent open interest spread, 
STV = WTI/Brent trading volume spread, SCO = WTI/Brent oil consumption spread, SPR = WTI/Brent oil production spread, M1 = one-
month futures contract, M3 = three-month futures contract, M6 = six-month futures contract. Asterisk * (**, ***) denotes the 10% (5%, 1%) 
significance level. The sample period runs from January 1993 to December 2016.  
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Table 3.2: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (1981), Philips-Perron (1988) and 
Zivot-Andrews (1992) unit root tests. 
                      Panel A – ADF test 
 C  C&T  N  
WF M1 -1.9510  -2.6510  -0.7701  
WF M3 -1.8621  -2.5520  -0.7026  
WF M6 -1.7839  -2.4683  -0.6435  
BF M1 -1.8152  -2.4932  -0.7329  
BF M3 -1.7695  -2.4535  -0.6931  
BF M6 -1.7109  -2.3899  -0.6470  
SFP M1 -3.0148 ** -4.7496 *** -3.0364 *** 
SFP M3 -2.3414  -3.7757 ** -2.3820 ** 
SFP M6 -2.0608  -3.3973 * -2.1153 ** 
SCY M1 -8.3123 *** -8.3002 *** -7.5233 *** 
SCY M3 -10.5766 *** -10.6720 *** -10.3510 *** 
SCY M6 -8.5793 *** -8.6728 *** -8.4708 *** 
SOI M1 -1.7973  -3.1596 * -1.9353 * 
SOI M3 -2.8536 * -5.1762 *** -2.0198 ** 
SOI M6 -2.8517 * -7.6895 *** -2.4716 ** 
STV M1 -2.0027  -3.8989 ** -1.6602 * 
STV M3 -2.0297  -3.0431  -2.3436 ** 
STV M6 -2.2944  -4.3515 *** -2.2839 ** 
SCO -1.4094  -5.0578 *** 1.3078  
SPR 1.1749  -2.7051  2.0786  
Panel B – PP test 
 C  C&T  N  
WF M1 -1.8716  -2.3591  -0.7450  
WF M3  -1.7789  -2.2612  -0.6721  
WF M6 -1.7247  -2.2557  -0.6004  
BF M1 -1.6550  -1.5935  -0.6288  
BF M3 -1.6143  -1.8902  -0.6204  
BF M6 -1.6057  -1.8324  -0.5763  
SFP M1 -2.8952 ** -4.6700 *** -2.9166 *** 
SFP M3 -2.0088  -3.6271 ** -2.0685 ** 
SFP M6 -1.7399  -3.3107 * -1.8219   * 
SCY M1 -14.0897 *** -14.0778 *** -13.7397 *** 
SCY M3 -10.8059 *** -10.8335 *** -10.7392 *** 
SCY M6 -8.5247 *** -8.6288 *** -8.3879 *** 
SOI M1 -10.4297 *** -15.7848 *** -10.3767 *** 
SOI M3 -6.7137 *** -12.1751 *** -4.5194 *** 
SOI M6 -7.3565 *** -12.6282 *** -4.0774 *** 
STV M1 -3.2619 ** -7.0202 *** -2.3469 ** 
STV M3 -4.0251 *** -10.1018 *** -3.8999 *** 
STV M6 -6.4948 *** -13.6656 *** -4.2980 *** 
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SCO -1.3777  -4.8127 *** 2.1368  
SPR 0.9326  -2.7937  1.7253  
Panel C – ZA test 
 C  C&T  T  
SFP M1 -5.8693 *** -7.7013 *** -5.0190  
SFP M3 -4.8116 ** -7.1282 *** -4.0245 * 
SFP M6 -4.0552 ** -6.6180 *** -3.4131 ** 
SCY M1 -6.1770 *** -6.3341 ** -5.9618 *** 
SCY M3 -11.1622 *** -11.4873 *** -11.0264 *** 
SCY M6 -9.1877 *** -9.5835 *** -8.9150 ** 
SOI M1 -6.3439 *** -6.4460 *** -5.8495 *** 
SOI M3 -6.8665 *** -6.8856 *** -6.1088 *** 
SOI M6 -6.0744 *** -6.2039 *** -5.1827 *** 
STV M1 -4.2999 *** -5.4440 *** -3.0423  
STV M3 -5.7855 ** -6.8295 *** -6.2879 *** 
STV M6 -6.7590 *** -7.3687 *** -6.7085 *** 
SCO -5.6936 *** -5.6834 *** -3.9760  
SPR -4.3066 *** -2.7964  -2.5360  
Note: For the ADF, PP and ZA unit root tests the null hypothesis is that the series features 
a unit root. In the ADF and PP tests, C denotes constant term, C&T denotes constant and 
time trend, N indicates no deterministic component in the test equation. In the ZA test 
equation, a constant and a linear time trend are included. C allows for a break in the 
constant, T allows for a break in the trend, and C&T allows for a break in both the constant 
and the time trend. WF = WTI futures price, BF = Brent futures price, SFP = WTI/Brent 
oil futures price differential, SCY = WTI/Brent convenience yield spread, SOI = WTI/Brent 
open interest spread, STV = WTI/Brent trading volume spread, SCO = WTI/Brent oil 
consumption spread, SPR = WTI/Brent oil production spread, M1 = one-month futures 
contract, M3 = three-month futures contract, M6 = six-month futures contract. Asterisk * 
(**, ***) denotes the 10% (5%, 1%) significance level. The sample period runs from 
January 1993 to December 2016. 
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Figure 3.3: Zivot-Andrews test for the WTI/Brent oil futures price differential 
 
 
 
Note: This Figure depicts the structural break in the WTI/Brent oil futures differential (SFP), based on the Zivot-Andrews unit root test, which is detected endogenously in 
January 2011. M1 = one-month futures contract, M3 = three-month futures contract, M6 = six-month futures contract. The sample period runs from January 1993 to December 
2016. 
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Table 3.3: Bai-Perron breakpoint test 
Panel A – SFP M1 
Breaks F-statistic Weighted F-statistic Critical value 
1* 365.9492 365.9492 8.58 
2* 329.5632 391.6415 7.22 
3* 269.1704 387.4970 5.96 
4* 220.5981 379.3050 4.99 
5* 156.4944 343.4072 3.91 
Break dates:  
1. January 2011 
2. February 2005, January 2011 
3. June 1999, March 2005, January 2011 
4. August 1996, April 2000, March 2005, January 2011 
5. August 1996, March 2000, October 2003, May 2007, January 2011 
Panel B – SFP M3 
Break Test F-statistic Weighted F-statistic Critical value 
1* 399.9585 399.9585 8.58 
2* 472.4084 561.3940 7.22 
3* 388.1757 558.8166 5.96 
4* 375.7220 646.0310 4.99 
5* 293.6514 644.3809 3.91 
Break dates:  
1. January 2011 
2. March 2005, January 2011 
3. August 1999, March 2005, January 2011 
4. August 1996, March 2000, March 2005, January 2011 
5. August 1996, March 2000, October 2003, May 2007, January 2011 
Panel C – SFP M6 
Break Test F-statistic Weighted F-statistic Critical value 
1* 462.1309 462.1309 8.58 
2* 559.0958 664.4103 7.22 
3* 557.4351 802.4821 5.96 
4* 501.4236 862.1673 4.99 
5* 360.8139 791.7605 3.91 
Break dates:  
1. January 2011 
2. April 2005, January 2011 
3. August 1999, April 2006, January 2011 
4. August 1996, March 2000, April 2006, January 2011 
5. August 1996, March 2000, October 2003, May 2007, January 2011 
Note: This Table shows the Bai-Perron test of Global L breaks vs. none breaks in the WTI/Brent oil futures 
differential (SFP), Trimming 0.15, Max. breaks 5. M1 = one-month futures contract, M3 = three-month futures 
contract, M6 = six-month futures contract. Asterisk * denotes the 5% level of significance. The sample period 
runs from January 1993 to December 2016. 
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Table 3.4: Coefficients of correlation 
 SFP M1 SFP M3 SFP M6 SCY M1 SCY M3 SCY M6 SCO DSPR SOI M1 SOI M3 SOI M6 STV M1 STV M3 STV M6 
SFP M1 1              
SFP M3 0.9803 1             
SFP M6 0.9564 0.9908 1            
SCY M1 -0.0056 0.0362 0.0498 1           
SCY M3 0.3038 0.2329 0.2015 0.7979 1          
SCY M6 0.4241 0.3350 0.2688 0.6659 0.9509 1         
SCO -0.6977 -0.7266 -0.7587 -0.0082 -0.1159 -0.1229 1        
DSPR -0.1369 -0.1340 -0.1333 -0.0076 -0.0527 -0.0597 0.1361 1       
SOI M1 0.4920 0.5020 0.5249 -0.1173 -0.0004 0.0149 -0.6890 -0.0963 1      
SOI M3 0.5294 0.5428 0.5657 -0.1185 0.0056 0.0144 -0.6922 -0.1036 0.7193 1     
SOI M6 0.5494 0.5573 0.5678 -0.1312 0.0094 0.0506 -0.7142 -0.1141 0.6437 0.7171 1    
STV M1 0.8186 0.8521 0.8700 0.0296 0.1503 0.1893 -0.7366 -0.1294 0.6419 0.6551 0.6142 1   
STV M3 0.7504 0.7816 0.8061 0.0092 0.1256 0.1467 -0.8828 -0.1597 0.7374 0.6812 0.6793 0.8663 1  
STV M6 0.6625 0.6743 0.6882 -0.1127 0.0384 0.0815 -0.7666 -0.0854 0.6701 0.6459 0.7153 0.7096 0.8278 1 
Note: This table summarises the Pearson coefficients of correlation among the WTI/Brent oil futures price differential (SFP), the WTI/Brent convenience yield spread (SCY), the 
WTI/Brent oil consumption spread (SCO), the WTI/Brent oil production spread in first difference (DSPR), the WTI/Brent open interest spread (SOI) and the WTI/Brent trading 
volume spread (STV). M1 = one-month futures contract, M3 = three-month futures contract, M6 = six-month futures contract. The sample period runs from January 1993 to 
December 2016. 
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3.4. Methodology 
This study builds upon a battery of single-equation multiple linear regression models. The 
dependent variable is the oil futures differential (SFP) between the WTI and Brent oil futures 
prices. We investigate the determinants of SFP by employing a set of explanatory variables, 
such as the convenience yield spread (SCY), the oil consumption spread (SCO), the oil 
production spread (SPR), the open interest spread (SOI) and the trading volume spread (STV). 
The following equation defines the general (i.e. least restrictive) model that is estimated by the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) method:  
𝑆𝐹𝑃𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝐹𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝑆𝐶𝑌𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑆𝑃𝑅𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑆𝑂𝐼𝑡 + 𝛼6𝑆𝑇𝑉𝑡 +
 𝛼7𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡, where 𝜀𝑡~𝑖𝑖𝑑. 𝑁(0, 𝜎
2)                               (8) 
 
It should be mentioned that our decision to employ a multiple linear regression model, rather 
than a cointegration framework, is based on the information extracted from the unit root tests 
which show that the WTI/Brent oil price differential is stationary in level, whereas the WTI 
and Brent oil prices feature a unit root. This is indicative of a long-run equilibrium relationship 
and consequently a cointegration between the two series, the WTI futures price and the Brent 
futures price. This suggests a globalised oil futures market in the long-run. It should be noted 
that authors such as Fattouh (2010) use standard unit root tests to examine the stationarity of 
various oil price differentials and Wilmot (2013) employs cointegration tests to investigate the 
long-run equilibrium relationship. In other words, there is no reason to perform a cointegration 
analysis since the long-run equilibrium relationship has been already addressed by these 
authors among others. 
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In principle, the unit root tests do not guarantee that the two oil futures prices move together in 
the short-run and hence there is no evidence of a short-run equilibrium relationship. Thus, we 
are seeking to examine short-run deviations from the long-run equilibrium. In this regard, we 
employ a multiple linear regression model which is characterised by three specifications with 
short-run futures contracts. Consequently, the F test allows us to ascertain whether physical oil 
market fundamental factors and oil futures market variables collectively drive a significant 
wedge between the WTI and Brent oil futures prices. If this holds, we are able to argue that 
there are short-run deviations from the long-run equilibrium and hence a regionalised oil 
futures market. 
 
In addition to the aforementioned determinants, we further include the first lag of the dependent 
variable to take into account serial correlation (𝑆𝐹𝑃𝑡−1 ). The inclusion of the lagged dependent 
variable captures dynamic effects in SFP behaviour, such as persistence, path dependencies 
and sluggish adjustment to a shock, and thus, contributes to an improved performance of our 
model. We also employ a dummy variable in order to capture the structural change in the level 
of the oil futures differential in the post-2010 period. It takes the value 0 from January 1993 to 
July 2010 and the value 1 from August 2010 to December 2016. Finally, 𝜀𝑡 is the random 
disturbance term, which is assumed to be independently and identically distributed with a 
normal distribution, with mean 0 and variance 𝜎2. In our regression models, firstly we examine 
individually the effects of each explanatory factor on the SFP. Secondly, we consider all 
explanatory variables collectively. This process is reiterated for maturities of 1, 3 and 6 months. 
 
Overall, we posit the following testable hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: A positive change in the SCY leads to a decrease in the SFP. 
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The convenience yield represents the benefits from holding a physical asset (i.e. a barrel of oil). 
It reflects market expectations about the future availability of crude oil. Futures prices will go 
down when the benefits of holding barrels of oil are high and vice versa. For example, the 
higher the level of inventories today, the lower the convenience yield and therefore the higher 
the energy trader’s expectation of scarcity to occur in the near future in the oil markets. This 
tends to put an upward pressure on oil futures prices. We suggest that a positive change in the 
SCY (i.e. an increase in the WTI convenience yield or a decrease in the Brent convenience 
yield) lowers the WTI futures price relative to the Brent futures price, leading to an overall 
decrease in the SFP and hence, 𝛼2 < 0. 
Hypothesis 2: A positive change in the SCO leads to an increase in the SFP.  
Crude oil consumption approximates the demand for oil. An increase in oil demand is followed 
by increases in oil prices. The higher the intensity of energy consumption, the higher the impact 
on oil prices (Maghyereh, 2004). We indicate that a positive change in the SCO (i.e. an increase 
in WTI consumption or a decrease in Brent consumption) increases the WTI futures price 
relative to the Brent futures price, leading to an overall increase in the SFP and hence, 𝛼3 > 0. 
Hypothesis 3: A positive change in the SPR leads to a decrease in the SFP.  
Crude oil production approximates the supply of oil. Oil supply increases lead to reductions in 
oil prices. Moreover, fears over capacity constraints are expected to put upwards pressure on 
futures prices. We consider that a positive change in the SPR (i.e. and increase in WTI 
production or a decrease in Brent production) decreases the WTI futures price relative to the 
Brent futures price, leading to an overall decrease in the SFP and hence, 𝛼4 < 0. 
Hypothesis 4: A positive change in the SOI affects positively (negatively) the SFP if there is 
excess demand for hedging from oil consumers (producers) in anticipation of higher economic 
activity. 
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We consider the open interest as a proxy for hedging demand in the oil futures market. 
According to Hong and Yogo (2012), open interest will have a positive (negative) effect on the 
futures price, if there is excess demand for hedging from oil consumers (producers) who wish 
to buy long (sell short) futures contracts in anticipation of higher economic activity. The sign 
of the open interest effect will depend on whether hedging consumers or hedging producers 
prevail in the market. We recommend that a positive change in the SOI, leading to an increase 
or a decrease in the SFP and hence, 𝛼5 > 0 or 𝛼5 < 0. 
Hypothesis 5:  A positive change in the STV leads to an increase in the SFP. 
Trading volume approximates the flow of information arriving in the futures market. Following 
Chordia and Swaminathan (2000), high-volume assets respond faster to market-wide 
information than low-volume assets. Therefore, a change in the trading volume spread should 
have a significant effect on the relative futures market valuation of WTI versus Brent.  A 
positive relation between the futures price differential and changes in the volume of trading is 
predicted by Jennings et al. (1981) who argue that short positions are possible, but are more 
costly than long positions. Therefore, an increase in the volume of trading is indicative of a 
bull market with long positions as opposed to a bear market with short sales. We propose that 
a positive change in the STV (i.e. an increase in the WTI trading volume or a decrease in the 
Brent trading volume) increases the WTI futures price relative to the Brent futures price, 
leading to an overall increase in the SFP and hence, 𝛼6 > 0. 
Hypothesis 6: If the coefficients of the model 𝛼2 − 𝛼6 are collectively significant (i.e., the 
corresponding determinants drive a significant wedge between WTI and Brent futures prices 
and therefore contribute to price disparities), then futures markets are said to be regionalised.  
WTI and Brent are the most extensively traded commodities futures contracts in the worldwide 
oil futures market. Deviation from the parity between WTI and Brent triggered by our 
comprehensive set of determinants confirms oil futures market regionalisation. We use a 
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standard F test to determine whether the selected determinants are jointly significant. If the 
coefficients are not significantly different from zero, then the futures markets are said to be 
globalised. 
 
3.5. Empirical analysis  
Section 3.5.1 provides an additional preliminary analysis based on the single-equation multiple 
linear regression models which are described extensively in the previous Section and associated 
with equation 8. Section 3.5.2 describes the estimation analysis based on the determinants of 
the oil futures differential. Section 3.5.3 summarises two robustness checks. For the first 
robustness check, we use the US Treasury bill rate as an alternative risk-free interest rate to 
compute the convenience yield. A data availability issue imposes a constraint on the sample 
period as the 1-month US Treasury bill rate is only available from August 2001. Thus, we 
investigate the period from August 2001 to December 2016 (185 monthly observations). 
However, for the 3-month and the 6-month US Treasury bill rates, we consider the main sample 
period of January 1993-December 2016.  
 
For the second robustness check, we employ a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) 
estimation approach (Zellner, 1962), in which we jointly estimate the oil futures differential 
for 1-month, 3-month, and 6-month futures contracts respectively. The SUR estimation 
approach conveniently takes into account the possible presence of correlations among the 
random disturbance terms from the three equations. Finally, in Section 3.5.4, the globalisation-
regionalisation hypothesis is tested. 
 
3.5.1 Additional preliminary analysis 
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In terms of additional preliminary analysis, a number of econometric tests will be provided in 
order to ensure the reliability and validity of our specifications which are used in the empirical 
analysis. In order to measure the degree of multicollinearity among the explanatory variables 
in each multiple linear regression model, we employ the Variance Inflation Factor approach, 
which indicates the increase in variance triggered by collinearity between one explanatory 
variable and the other predictors. The Variance Inflation Factors are presented in Table 3.5. 
The general rule of thumb denotes that if a variable’s Variance Inflation Factor exceeds 10, 
this may be considered as serious evidence of multicollinearity. Our findings show that each 
multiple linear regression model does not suffer from multicollinearity, since the centered 
Variance Inflation Factor for each variable and each specification is not greater than 10, and 
most of the values are lower than 5. 
 
Overall, we need to respect that the issue of multicollinearity is only of relevance if the concern 
is with the individual effects of the right-hand side variables. It needs to be understood that we 
are testing the determinants of the oil futures differential collectively or when we investigate 
the globalisation-regionalisation hypothesis, this represents a joint hypothesis. In other words, 
the interest is in the collective effect of five explanatory variables. Multicollinearity is an 
important factor in the context of examining individual influences on a dependent variable. It 
has the effect of inflating values of standard errors and suppressing values of t statistics.” 
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Table 3.5: Variance Inflation Factor 
Variable Centered VIF 
Panel A – Regression model – 1-month futures contract 
SCY M1 1.6301 
SCO 2.7438 
DSPR 1.0788 
SOI M1 2.5608 
STV M1 3.1062 
Panel B – Regression model – 3-month futures contract 
SCY M3 1.3133 
SCO 6.7419 
DSPR 1.1227 
SOI M3 4.1563 
STV M3 7.7588 
Panel C – Regression model – 6-month futures contract 
SCY M6 1.1599 
SCO 5.7493 
DSPR 1.2860 
SOI M6 2.6528 
STV M6 2.7724 
Note: This table presents the Variance Inflation Factor values among the 
WTI/Brent convenience yield spread (SCY), the WTI/Brent oil 
consumption spread (SCO), the WTI/Brent oil production spread in first 
difference (DSPR), the WTI/Brent open interest spread (SOI) and the 
WTI/Brent trading volume spread (STV). M1 = one-month futures 
contract, M3 = three-month futures contract, M6 = six-month futures 
contract. The sample period runs from January 1993 to December 2016. 
 
We continue our preliminary tests by checking the assumption of normality of the residuals 
(the difference between the actual value of the dependent value and the predicted value). The 
null hypothesis states that the residuals follow a normal distribution. Figure 3.4 reports the 
results of the normality tests for the three specifications which are used to evaluate this 
aforementioned assumption. It is evident that the probability values associated with the Jarque-
Bera statistic are lower than the significance level of five per cent. Consequently, we conclude 
that the residuals are not normally distributed. This could possibly suggest that at least one 
explanatory variable may have an incorrect functional form or may imply that at least one 
important explanatory variable is missing.  
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However, the case of incorrect functional form is not reinforced by the findings from the unit 
root tests which provide support to our chosen functional form for the variables under 
consideration. With reference to missing explanatory variables, this could be a case that 
required further investigation. Nevertheless, it was challenging to find additional differential 
forms as potential predictors of the oil futures differential which was purely dictated by the 
lack of readily available time series. Overall, even if the residuals do not have a normal 
distribution then the results may still be valid asymptotically. 
 
Figure 3.4: Normality tests 
Panel A – Regression model – 1-month futures contract 
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Panel B – Regression model – 3-month futures contract 
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Panel C – Regression model – 6-month futures contract 
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Note: This table presents the Normality tests among the three model specifications, under the null hypothesis 
that the residuals are normally distributed. The sample period runs from January 1993 to December 2016. 
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3.5.2 Determinants of the oil futures differential  
 
Tables 3.5 - 3.7 summarise the results for the oil futures differential for 1-month, 3-month and 
6-month futures contracts, respectively. We begin our analysis with the value of the R-squared 
statistic which measures the goodness of fit in a multiple regression model. R-squared has the 
interpretation of the proportion of the total variation in the dependent variable which can be 
explained by the variable(s) on the right-hand side of the regression equation. Tables 3.5 – 3.7 
demonstrate that the value of the R-squared is 0.9195 (0.9392, 0.9510) for the 1-month (3-
month, 6-month) specification models. It is apparent that changes in the potential predictors 
are capable of explaining a range between 91 per cent and 95 per cent of the total variation in 
oil futures differential. The remaining percentage can be explained by other differentials not 
included in our specifications. We argue that the values of the R-squared seem to be a 
promising finding in respect of the quality of the three regression models. Overall, the more 
variance that is explained by the regression models the closer the data points will fall to the 
fitted regression line and hence the predicted values would equal the actual values. The 
increasing value of the R-squared does not represent an issue since new variables have not been 
added to each specification and therefore there is no need to provide interpretations for the 
adjusted R-squared. 
 
We continue our preliminary analysis by concentrating on the correlation between the residuals 
and the explanatory variables from each specification model. It should be mentioned that the 
regression equation that reference is being made to has been estimated by OLS. Necessarily 
then there will be no correlation between the residuals and any of the right hand side variables. 
The findings are presented in Figure 3.5 and do not exhibit notable differences among the three 
regression models. Overall, the residuals are presented in a rectangular shape along the 
horizontal line which is indicative of a linear relationship. Data points appear to be randomly 
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scattered and the residuals seem to be relatively small in size. There is no evidence of any 
systematic pattern or clustering. It should be mentioned that a non-rectangular shape implies 
that the linearity is violated. Thus, a curved instead of rectangular shape is evident and the 
residuals are no longer random. Since the Figure 3.5 demonstrates a non-curvilinear 
relationship we are able to argue that the variance of the residuals does not depend on the level 
of an independent variable and consequently there is no evidence of heteroscedasticity.  
 
On a final note, in order to reinforce our empirical analysis, the Newey-West heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors method is used (Newey and West, 1987) 
in the three specifications. Specifically for the case of heteroscedasticity, although this method 
uses OLS inefficient estimators, at the same time computes an alternative or robust standard 
error that allows for the presence of heteroskedasticity. In a more detailed analysis, the 
coefficients in both the uncorrected OLS method and the HAC method they should be identical 
but the uncorrected OLS standard errors are smaller and the size of the t-statistics associated 
with the coefficients is smaller in HAC method. Overall, this method is carried out in the next 
paragraphs of this Section. 
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Table 3.5: Regression model estimated results – 1-month futures contract 
Predictors (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
C 0.0090 *** 0.0430 ** 0.0087 *** 0.0077 *** -0.0039  0.0216  
 (0.0020)  (0.0188)  (0.0021)  (0.0023)  (0.0050)  (0.0202)  
SFP(t-1) 0.8995 *** 0.7984 *** 0.8140 *** 0.8183 *** 0.7740 *** 0.8526 *** 
 (0.0353)  (0.0427)  (0.0334)  (0.0350)  (0.0405)  (0.0421)  
SCYt -0.5282 ***         -0.5249 *** 
 (0.0840)          (0.0889)  
SCOt   -0.0396 *       -0.0225  
   (0.0206)        (0.0209)  
DSPRt     -0.0862 ***     -0.0771 *** 
     (0.0292)      (0.0258)  
SOIt       -0.0049    -0.0090  
       (0.0059)    (0.0058)  
STVt         0.0213 ** 0.0149 ** 
         (0.0083)  (0.0074)  
Dt -0.0155 *** -0.0238 *** -0.0270 *** -0.0247 *** -0.0188 *** -0.0123 ** 
 (0.0058)  (0.0055)  (0.0054)  (0.0061)  (0.0060)  (0.0061)  
R2 0.9157  0.8916  0.8924  0.8908  0.8930  0.9195  
BG 2.4092  0.5235  0.3701  0.5651  0.7330  1.4486  
Note: This table reports estimation results for the 1-month futures contract. The dependent variable is the WTI/Brent oil futures price differential (SFP). The explanatory 
variables are the lagged WTI/Brent oil futures price differential (SFP(t-1)), the WTI/Brent convenience yield spread (SCYt), the WTI/Brent oil consumption spread (SCOt), 
the WTI/Brent oil production spread in first difference (DSPRt), the WTI/Brent open interest spread (SOIt), the WTI/Brent trading volume spread (STVt), and the dummy 
variable that takes on value 1 (0) after (before) August 2010 (Dt). Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. For the Breusch-Godfrey Serial 
Correlation (BG) test, the Wald statistic is reported. Asterisk * (**, ***) denotes the 10% (5%, 1%) level of significance. The sample period runs from January 1993 to 
December 2016. 
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Table 3.6: Regression model estimated results – 3-month futures contract 
Predictors (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
C 0.0054 *** 0.0302 ** 0.0057 *** 0.0077 *** 0.0018  0.0094  
 (0.0017)  (0.0154)  (0.0017)  (0.0021)  (0.0016)  (0.0201)  
SFP(t-1) 0.9007 *** 0.8606 *** 0.8753 *** 0.8826 *** 0.8323 *** 0.8359 *** 
 (0.0294)  (0.0399)  (0.0304)  (0.0307)  (0.0414)  (0.0338)  
SCYt -0.1185 **         -0.1203 ** 
 (0.0521)          (0.0536)  
SCOt   -0.0281 *       -0.0033  
   (0.0164)        (0.0213)  
DSPRt     -0.0474 **     -0.0434 * 
     (0.0222)      (0.0224)  
SOIt       -0.0046    -0.0126 *** 
       (0.0033)    (0.0037)  
STVt         0.0086 *** 0.0120 *** 
         (0.0029)  (0.0041)  
Dt -0.0152 *** -0.0150 *** -0.0170 *** -0.0195 *** -0.0159 *** -0.0214 *** 
 (0.0046)  (0.0047)  (0.0047)  (0.0049)  (0.0050)  (0.0044)  
R2 0.9346  0.9334  0.9336  0.9332  0.9344  0.9392  
BG 1.4810  1.5828  1.2203  1.2977  2.2549  1.2605  
Note: This table reports estimation results for the 3-month futures contract. The dependent variable is the WTI/Brent oil futures price differential (SFP). The explanatory 
variables are the lagged WTI/Brent oil futures price differential (SFP(t-1)), the WTI/Brent convenience yield spread (SCYt), the WTI/Brent oil consumption spread (SCOt), 
the WTI/Brent oil production spread in first difference (DSPRt), the WTI/Brent open interest spread (SOIt), the WTI/Brent trading volume spread (STVt), and the dummy 
variable that takes on value 1 (0) after (before) August 2010 (Dt). Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. For the Breusch-Godfrey Serial 
Correlation (BG) test, the Wald statistic is reported. Asterisk * (**, ***) denotes the 10% (5%, 1%) level of significance. The sample period runs from January 1993 to 
December 2016. 
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Table 3.7: Regression model estimated results – 6-month futures contract 
Predictors (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
C 0.0041 *** 0.0275 * 0.0042 *** 0.0047 *** 0.0036 ** 0.0408 *** 
 (0.0015)  (0.0145)  (0.0015)  (0.0017)  (0.0017)  (0.0148)  
SFP(t-1) 0.9088 *** 0.8835 *** 0.9028 *** 0.9086 *** 0.9030 *** 0.8810 *** 
 (0.0268)  (0.0385)  (0.0279)  (0.0300)  (0.0328)  (0.0375)  
SCYt -0.0169          -0.0155  
 (0.0349)          (0.0326)  
SCOt   -0.0264 *       -0.0380 ** 
   (0.0153)        (0.0151)  
DSPRt     -0.0327 *     -0.0315 * 
     (0.0174)      (0.0179)  
SOIt       -0.0009    -0.0038 * 
       (0.0021)    (0.0021)  
STVt         0.0006  0.0001  
         (0.0018)  (0.0019)  
Dt -0.0123 *** -0.0112 ** -0.0126 *** -0.0128 *** -0.0122 *** -0.0130 *** 
 (0.0043)  (0.0044)  (0.0043)  (0.0041)  (0.0043)  (0.0040)  
R2 0.9495  0.9501  0.9499  0.9495  0.9495  0.9510  
BG 1.9908  2.3453  1.8989  1.8549  2.0152   1.8586  
Note: This table reports estimation results for the 6-month futures contract. The dependent variable is the WTI/Brent oil futures price differential (SFP). The explanatory 
variables are the lagged WTI/Brent oil futures price differential (SFP(t-1)), the WTI/Brent convenience yield spread (SCYt), the WTI/Brent oil consumption spread (SCOt), 
the WTI/Brent oil production spread in first difference (DSPRt), the WTI/Brent open interest spread (SOIt), the WTI/Brent trading volume spread (STVt), and the dummy 
variable that takes on value 1 (0) after (before) August 2010 (Dt). Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. For the Breusch-Godfrey Serial 
Correlation (BG) test, the Wald statistic is reported. Asterisk * (**, ***) denotes the 10% (5%, 1%) level of significance. The sample period runs from January 1993 to 
December 2016. 
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Figure 3.5: Correlation between residuals and predictors 
Panel A – Regression model – 1-month futures contract 
 
Panel B – Regression model – 3-month futures contract 
 
Panel C – Regression model – 6-month futures contract 
 
Note: This figure shows the correlation between the residuals and the explanatory variables from each specification model. 
SCY = WTI/Brent convenience yield spread, SOI = WTI/Brent open interest spread, STV = WTI/Brent trading volume spread, 
SCO = WTI/Brent oil consumption spread, DSPR = WTI/Brent oil production spread in first difference, M1 = one-month 
futures contract, M3 = three-month futures contract, M6 = six-month futures contract. The sample period runs from January 
1993 to December 2016. 
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The lagged dependent variable and the dummy variable have a statistically significant effect in 
all specifications. The coefficient on the lagged dependent variable (dummy variable) has the 
expected positive (negative) sign. More specifically, the former indicates the degree of 
persistence in the oil futures differential, whereas the latter indicates the existence of a 
structural break. In specifications from 1 to 5, predictors of the oil futures differential enter 
regressions individually, whereas specification 6 employs the entire set of predictors. Our 
analysis primarily focuses on specification 6 since we seek to determine how additional 
predictors simultaneously affect the dependent variable. However, we do refer to the remaining 
specifications when required. 
 
Of particular interest is the relationship between the oil futures differential and the convenience 
yield spread. The convenience yield measures the increased gain that the trader receives from 
holding barrels of crude oil rather than holding futures contracts for crude oil. The results show 
that the convenience yield spread exerts a significant effect for the nearest to maturity month 
and the 3-month to maturity futures contracts, whereas the same does not hold true for the 6-
month to expiration futures contract. Furthermore, consistently with Gospodinov and Ng 
(2013), the convenience yield spread has the expected negative sign. 
  
This finding can be explained as follows. The convenience yield is negatively related to the 
inventory level in the oil spot market (Fama and French, 1998). More specifically, a decrease 
in the inventory level today is associated with a higher convenience yield and an increase in 
the spot price of oil. A higher convenience yield, net of storage cost, implies that traders are 
more willing to hold physical assets and are less willing to buy futures contracts of crude oil. 
As a result, traders will benefit from increasing the demand for barrels of oil in the spot market 
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(which contributes to increases in spot prices) and selling short oil futures contracts (which 
results in decreases in futures prices). 
 
Next, we focus on the empirical relationship between the oil futures differential and oil-market 
specific fundamental variables. The results show that the coefficient of the oil production 
spread is consistent with the initial expectation of a negative sign and also significant for all 
corresponding maturities of 1-month, 3-month and 6-month contracts. Moreover, the oil 
consumption spread has a negative and significant effect on the oil futures differential for the 
6-month contract, which disagrees with our initial expectation of a positive sign. The findings 
suggest weak evidence that the oil futures differential is influenced by the oil consumption 
spread and stronger evidence that the predictability of the oil futures differential can be ascribed 
to the oil production spread. 
 
A plausible explanation for the negative and significant effect of the oil consumption spread 
on the oil futures differential in the 6-month contract can be explained as follows. An increase 
in consumption today triggers an upward movement in oil spot prices. However, energy traders 
in the futures market would expect a commensurate increase in oil production in the future, 
which would subsequently drive spot oil prices to lower levels. Thus, even though today’s spot 
prices and possibly 1-month and 3-month futures prices may increase due to an increase in oil 
consumption, this effect is the reverse for the far maturity contracts months. This framework 
can potentially explain the significant findings for the 6-month contract and more precisely the 
unexpected negative sign. 
 
Turning our attention to the importance of the oil production spread on the oil futures 
differential, the effect is significant for all corresponding maturities. Hence, in light of the 
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events which took place and caused changes in the crude oil market, the analysis of the oil 
production effects is warranted. As aforementioned, the mismatch between US oil production 
and the existing infrastructure capacity that led to a disruption of oil supply provides a plausible 
explanation for the observed time-variation in the oil futures differential. Before this supply 
disruption, WTI traded at a small premium over Brent. The supply disruption in Cushing 
triggered WTI to trade lower than Brent. In addition, Brent oil production experienced a 
constant decline with no visible repercussion on the oil futures differential.  
 
Our findings further indicate that the open interest spread exerts a negative and significant 
effect on the oil futures differential for both 3-month and 6-month contracts. As 
aforementioned, the open interest measures hedging demand activity in the futures market 
(Hong and Yogo, 2012). This finding can be attributed to the excess hedging demand from 
producers in anticipation of higher economic activity. These producers sell short contracts and 
drive the open interest upwards, causing a lower number of contracts for hedging. This reduces 
the futures price since there is a limited arbitrage by speculators.  
 
Finally, the trading volume spread has a positive sign and appears as a statistically significant 
predictor of the oil futures differential for the 1-month and 3-month contracts. We consider that 
the trading volume measures the trading activity which reflects all market relevant information 
and exerts a positive impact on the futures price for maturities shorter than 6 months. A 
plausible explanation is that the contracts with shorter maturities (1-month and 3-month) are 
characterised by a greater amount of information, higher trading volume, greater liquidity and 
therefore a higher price movement. The nearby or front month contract is the most liquid 
contract. Furthermore, the 3-month oil futures contract of WTI trading on the NYMEX, has 
the largest market share in the world (see Hammoudeh and Li, 2005).  
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Overall, the above findings show that the oil futures differential is driven by the convenience 
yield, the fundamental factors of supply and demand and the financial indicators of open 
interest and trading volume. Our results suggest that the convenience yield spread provides a 
strongly significant predictive power for the nearby month contract and a moderately 
significant predictive power for the 3-month to maturity contract. In this regard, our results are 
in accordance with those reported by Milonas and Henker (2001). Specifically, Milonas and 
Henker (2001) find that for futures contracts with longer maturity, the oil futures differential is 
less responsive to the convenience yield than for shorter maturity futures contracts. 
 
With reference to the oil production spread, our findings suggest that the oil futures differential 
is strongly (weakly) and significantly affected by the oil production spread for the 1-month (3-
month and 6-month) contracts and therefore can be driven by supply imbalances. This is in 
agreement with the findings of Büyükşahin et al. (2013). They conclude that the North 
American oil supply variables trigger a statistically significant long-run relationship between 
the WTI/Brent crude oil nearby futures prices spread and the physical market fundamental 
variables, with a particular emphasis on the increasing supply of oil which depressed the WTI 
oil futures price. 
  
In addition, the oil consumption spread exhibits a significant and moderate effect on oil futures 
differential only for the 6-month futures contract. This evidence broadly shows the decreasing 
importance of the fundamental factor of demand as a driver of the oil futures differential. On 
general principles, petroleum consumption accounts for a 36 percent of all energy consumed 
in the US. However, petroleum consumption in North America and Europe shows a declining 
trend over the last decade, which can be attributed to the use of more environment-friendly 
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resources and the recent economic recession of 2007-2009.15 We suggest that the above 
discussion can be interpreted as a supplemental explanation regarding the aforementioned 
trading activity by energy traders concerning the relationship between the oil consumption 
spread and the oil futures differential.   
 
Concerning the open interest spread and the trading volume spread, we are able to document 
the importance of financial trading in the oil futures market by traders and investors who 
consider the oil futures differential as a financial asset. They invest in the oil futures market in 
order to hedge themselves or to make profits. Thus, we conclude that financial activity is 
important in explaining movements in the oil futures differential. Our results agree with 
Büyükşahin et al. (2013), who illustrate that the predictability of the WTI/Brent oil futures 
differential arises from both financial and physical traders’ activity. In addition, our findings 
partly agree with Heidorn et al. (2015), who emphasise the relative importance of financial 
traders relative to fundamental traders in predicting the oil futures differential.  
 
Finally, our results could support to some extent the importance of the US shale oil revolution 
and geopolitical turmoil to the oil futures differential. Although our empirical analysis does not 
explicitly focus on these two concepts and our attempt to capture their impact is not pronounced 
in targeting both concepts, we are able to provide a plausible explanation regarding the 
consideration to approximate the role of these two major events in the world crude oil market. 
In this regard, the former could be captured by the oil production spread, whereas the latter 
may be approximated by the convenience yield spread.   
 
                                                 
15 Information can be found on the EIA: 
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=oil_use 
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=12691 
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As previously stated, the variation in the oil futures differential can be attributed to these 
dynamics during the period 2011 onwards. Rising crude oil flows from tight (shale) oil 
formations (Bakken in North Dakota and Eagle Ford in Texas) played a key role in explaining 
transportation bottlenecks in Cushing, the storage hub for WTI which caused the price of WTI 
to trade at a significant discount relative to Brent. 
  
Furthermore, the continuous political instability in the Middle East plausibly caused an 
increased uncertainty about future oil supply shortfalls. This is considered a precautionary oil 
demand shock and signifies the convenience yield, which incorporates the need of insurance 
against unexpected disruptions of oil supply. Due to the fact that the Middle Eastern oil 
production is priced relative to Brent, the geopolitical tensions could have potentially 
contributed to the higher price level of Brent crude oil relative to WTI.  
 
3.5.3 Robustness checks 
 
To evaluate the stability of our findings, firstly we estimate our regression models using the 
US Treasury bill rate in the construction of the convenience yield instead of the LIBOR rate. It 
should be mentioned that a shorter period sample that runs from August 2001 to December 
2016 is employed only for the nearby month futures contract. The choice of this sample period 
is motivated by the data availability. However, the time period for the 3-month and 6-month 
futures contracts is similar to the main regression models (i.e., January 1993 – December 2016). 
Overall, the results are qualitatively similar to the study’s main findings for the 1-month, 3-
month and 6-month futures contracts. Robustness check results are summarised in Tables 3.8 
- 3.10.  
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In a more detailed analysis, the only noticeable difference is detected in the estimated findings 
for the nearby month futures contract and focused on the oil-futures market specific 
determinants of open interest and trading volume. Indeed, although open interest is not a 
significant determinant in the main findings, this has changed in the robustness check in which 
it appears to be strongly significant. Similarly, although trading volume contributes to 
significant variations in the oil future differential in the main model, this does not hold in the 
robustness check in which it seems to lose its significance power. 
 
Secondly, we employ the SUR approach proposed by Zellner (1962) in order to capture the 
contemporaneous correlation of the error terms among the three linear regression equations. 
Thus, we estimate a set of simultaneous equation coefficients by combining information among 
them. Our results in Table 3.11 generally appear to validate the single-equation approach, 
particularly for contracts near to maturity (1-month and 3-month). Importantly, the signs of the 
estimated coefficients remain unchanged.  
 
In addition, it seems that the oil futures differential is not affected by the aforementioned 
determinants to the same extent within different lengths to maturity. Indeed, our results in Table 
3.12 show that the effect of the convenience yield spread is statistically different across the 1-
month, 3-month and 6-month contracts. Notably, the convenience yield spread has a larger 
effect for shorter contracts. A plausible explanation is that oil inventories in the shorter-run can 
be regarded as more important by oil users (e.g. refineries) than in the longer-run. On the other 
hand, the effects of SCO, DSPR, SOI and STV do not seem to be significantly different across 
the three maturities. 
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The next step is to consider the difference between contemporaneous and dynamic models. In 
this regard, when we estimate a regression equation, we assume that the explanatory variables 
on the right-hand side of the regression equation may have a dynamic impact on the dependent 
variable and consequently a lagged relationship is estimated at time t-1. Turning to the 
estimated results, Table 3.13 illustrates the findings for each futures contract regression 
specification. By comparing the findings with those in Tables 3.5 – 3.7 related to the 
contemporaneous models at time t we are able to get some interesting empirical findings. 
Overall, it is evident that variables such as the WTI/Brent convenience yield spread appears to 
be insignificant, although it seems to have an instantaneous significant effect on the WTI/Brent 
oil futures price differential. However, this does not necessarily imply that this variable has no 
effect on the WTI/Brent oil futures price differential. Simply, the findings on the dynamic 
models indicate that this variable has a contemporaneous rather than a lagged effect. 
 
Finally, in order to examine if the previously documented coefficient estimates are not 
correlated with the effects of any omitted variables, we include a number of control variables 
as “other” additional explanatory variables which might affect the dependent variable and 
might be correlated with our set of potential determinants. Then, we conduct the regression 
analysis by running the regression employing all explanatory variables. More specifically, 
when we are able to “control” for these additional factors, we can get a more complete picture 
related to the effect of our potential determinants by holding the impact of the control variables 
constant. Nevertheless, by omitting the control variables, the empirical findings from the model 
could possibly provide misleading estimates regarding the causal effects of each potential 
determinant on the dependent variable. In general, on the one hand, the inclusion of control 
variables can be regarded as a beneficial tool to capture the omitted variable bias issue. On the 
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other hand, the control variables can be used incorrectly if they act as a channel through which 
the key potential determinants cause changes in the dependent variable. 
 
Overall, this process attempts to capture and remove the effect of the control variables from 
the model. The biggest issue in this process is the challenge of gathering and measuring 
information on targeted control variables. Indeed, our potential determinants have been 
constructed in differential form, which makes the collection of the control variables in 
differential form to be a challenging work. Thus, we decided to include information on three 
control variables, in order to assess the sensitivity of the results, namely, changes in US crude 
oil inventory (associated with the convenience yield), global economic activity index (related 
to the demand for oil) and changes in world oil production (linked with the supply of oil) which 
are all crude oil-market specific variables. Regarding the choice of these control variables, 
since WTI and Brent are the world references for crude oil, world oil production is used to 
evaluate unexpected changes in global oil supply (Kilian, 2009). Furthermore, global economic 
activity index is used to record shifts in the global demand for industrial commodities including 
oil (Kilian, 2009). Finally, the convenience yield summarises the information contained in 
changes in crude oil inventories (Alquist et al., 2014). Table 3.14 summarises the results for all 
futures contracts regression specifications. It is evident that there are no significant changes in 
the responses to our potential determinants in terms of sign and level of significance. Thus, we 
argue that the results remain qualitatively similar. 
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Table 3.8: Robustness model estimated results – 1-month futures contract  
Predictors (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
C 0.0057 *** 0.0430 ** 0.0087 *** 0.0077 *** 0.0039  -0.0526  
 (0.0020)  (0.0188)  (0.0021)  (0.0023)  (0.0050)  (0.0503)  
SFP(t-1) 0.9130 *** 0.7984 *** 0.8140 *** 0.8183 *** 0.7740 *** 0.8780 *** 
 (0.0464)  (0.0427)  (0.0334)  (0.0350)  (0.0405)  (0.0450)  
SCYt -0.6719 ***         -0.7056 *** 
 (0.0800)          (0.0856)  
SCOt   -0.0396 *       0.0613  
   (0.0206)        (0.0548)  
DSPRt     -0.0862 ***     -0.0715 ** 
     (0.0282)      (0.0294)  
SOIt       0.0049    -0.0197 *** 
       (0.0059)    (0.0072)  
STVt         0.0213 ** 0.0089  
         (0.0083)  (0.0087)  
Dt -0.0097  -0.0238 *** -0.0270 *** -0.0247 *** -0.0188 *** -0.0216 ** 
 (0.0064)  (0.0055)  (0.0054)  (0.0061)  (0.0060)  (0.0088)  
R2 0.9138  0.8916  0.8928  0.8908  0.8930  0.9208  
BG 2.0718  0.5235  0.3701  0.5651  0.7330  0.3617  
Note: This table reports estimation results for the 1-month futures contract. The dependent variable is the WTI/Brent oil futures price differential (SFP). The explanatory 
variables are the lagged WTI/Brent oil futures price differential (SFP(t-1)), the WTI/Brent convenience yield spread (SCYt), the WTI/Brent oil consumption spread (SCOt), 
the WTI/Brent oil production spread in first difference (DSPRt), the WTI/Brent open interest spread (SOIt), the WTI/Brent trading volume spread (STVt), and the dummy 
variable that takes on value 1 (0) after (before) August 2010 (Dt). Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. For the Breusch-Godfrey Serial 
Correlation (BG) test, the Wald statistic is reported. Asterisk * (**, ***) denotes the 10% (5%, 1%) level of significance. The sample period runs from August 2001 to 
December 2016. 
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Table 3.9: Robustness model estimated results – 3-month futures contract 
Predictors (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
C 0.0055 *** 0.0302 * 0.0057 *** 0.0077 *** 0.0018  0.0099  
 (0.0017)  (0.0154)  (0.0017)  (0.0021)  (0.0016)  (0.0201)  
SFP(t-1) 0.8995 *** 0.8606 *** 0.8753 *** 0.8826 *** 0.8323 *** 0.8348 *** 
 (0.0293)  (0.0399)  (0.0304)  (0.0307)  (0.0414)  (0.0336)  
SCYt -0.1150 **         -0.1185 ** 
 (0.0512)          (0.0527)  
SCOt   -0.0281 *       -0.0037  
   (0.0164)        (0.0214)  
DSPRt     -0.0474 **     -0.0432 * 
     (0.0222)      (0.0222)  
SOIt       -0.0046    -0.0128 *** 
       (0.0033)    (0.0037)  
STVt         0.0086 *** 0.0120 *** 
         (0.0029)  (0.0041)  
Dt -0.0153 *** -0.0150 *** -0.0170 *** -0.0195 *** -0.0159 *** -0.0216 *** 
 (0.0046)  (0.0047)  (0.0047)  (0.0049)  (0.0050)  (0.0044)  
R2 0.9345  0.9334  0.9336  0.9332  0.9344  0.9391  
BG 1.4778  1.5828  1.2203  1.2977  2.2549  1.2303  
Note: This table reports estimation results for the 3-month futures contract. The dependent variable is the WTI/Brent oil futures price differential (SFP). The explanatory 
variables are the lagged WTI/Brent oil futures price differential (SFP(t-1)), the WTI/Brent convenience yield spread (SCYt), the WTI/Brent oil consumption spread (SCOt), 
the WTI/Brent oil production spread in first difference (DSPRt), the WTI/Brent open interest spread (SOIt), the WTI/Brent trading volume spread (STVt), and the dummy 
variable that takes on value 1 (0) after (before) August 2010 (Dt). Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. For the Breusch-Godfrey Serial 
Correlation (BG) test, the Wald statistic is reported. Asterisk * (**, ***) denotes the 10% (5%, 1%) level of significance. The sample period runs from January 1993 to 
December 2016. 
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Table 3.10: Robustness model estimated results – 6-month futures contract 
Predictors (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
C 0.0041 *** 0.0275 * 0.0042 *** 0.0047 *** 0.0036 ** 0.0408 *** 
 (0.0015)  (0.0145)  (0.0015)  (0.0017)  (0.0017)  (0.0148)  
SFP(t-1) 0.9088 *** 0.8835 *** 0.9028 *** 0.9086 *** 0.9030 *** 0.8810 *** 
 (0.0268)  (0.0385)  (0.0279)  (0.0300)  (0.0328)  (0.0375)  
SCYt -0.0169          -0.0155  
 (0.0349)          (0.0326)  
SCOt   -0.0264 *       -0.0380 ** 
   (0.0153)        (0.0151)  
DSPRt     -0.0327 *     -0.0315 * 
     (0.0174)      (0.0179)  
SOIt       -0.0009    -0.0038 * 
       (0.0021)    (0.0021)  
STVt         0.0006  0.0001  
         (0.0018)  (0.0019)  
Dt -0.0123 *** -0.0112 ** -0.0126 *** -0.0128 *** -0.0122 *** -0.0130 *** 
 (0.0043)  (0.0044)  (0.0043)  (0.0041)  (0.0043)  (0.0040)  
R2 0.9495  0.9501  0.9499  0.9495  0.9495  0.9510  
BG 1.9908  2.3453  1.8989  1.8549  2.0152   1.8586  
Note: This table reports estimation results for the 6-month futures contract. The dependent variable is the WTI/Brent oil futures price differential (SFP). The explanatory 
variables are the lagged WTI/Brent oil futures price differential (SFP(t-1)), the WTI/Brent convenience yield spread (SCYt), the WTI/Brent oil consumption spread (SCOt), 
the WTI/Brent oil production spread in first difference (DSPRt), the WTI/Brent open interest spread (SOIt), the WTI/Brent trading volume spread (STVt), and the dummy 
variable that takes on value 1 (0) after (before) August 2010 (Dt). Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. For the Breusch-Godfrey Serial 
Correlation (BG) test, the Wald statistic is reported. Asterisk * (**, ***) denotes the 10% (5%, 1%) level of significance. The sample period runs from January 1993 to 
December 2016. 
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Table 3.11: SUR model estimated results 
Predictor 
Coefficient 
estimate Significance 
Standard 
error 
1-Month Futures Contract 
C 0.0487 ** (0.0191) 
SFP(t-1) 0.7119 *** (0.0281) 
SCYt  -0.4877 *** (0.0400) 
SCOt -0.0440 ** (0.0210) 
DSPRt -0.0812 *** (0.0301) 
SOIt -0.0013  (0.0033) 
STVt 0.0096 ** (0.0049) 
Dt -0.0295 *** (0.0055) 
R2  0.9117  
3-Month Futures Contract 
C 0.0427 *** (0.0157) 
SFP(t-1) 0.7640 *** (0.0236) 
SCYt  -0.2915 *** (0.0272) 
SCOt -0.0357 ** (0.0174) 
DSPRt -0.0535 ** (0.0239) 
SOIt -0.0024 * (0.0012) 
STVt 0.0033 * (0.0018) 
Dt -0.0286 *** (0.0041) 
R2  0.9274  
6-Month Futures Contract 
C 0.0450 *** (0.0130) 
SFP(t-1) 0.8128 *** (0.0222) 
SCYt  -0.2033 *** (0.0212) 
SCOt -0.0396 *** (0.0144) 
DSPRt -0.0404 ** (0.0203) 
SOIt -0.0016  (0.0010) 
STVt 0.0003  (0.0010) 
Dt -0.0226 *** (0.0036) 
R2  0.9405  
Note: This table reports estimation results for the Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression (SUR). The dependent variable is the WTI/Brent oil futures 
price differential (SFP). The explanatory variables are the lagged 
WTI/Brent oil futures price differential (SFP(t-1)), the WTI/Brent 
convenience yield spread (SCYt), the WTI/Brent oil consumption spread 
(SCOt), the WTI/Brent oil production spread in first difference (DSPRt), 
the WTI/Brent open interest spread (SOIt), the WTI/Brent trading volume 
spread (STVt), and the dummy variable that takes on value 1 (0) after 
(before) August 2010 (Dt). Asterisk * (**, ***) denotes the 10% (5%, 1%) 
level of significance. The sample period runs from January 1993 to 
December 2016. 
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Table 3.12: SUR model for coefficient differences 
 SCY SCO DSPR SOI STV 
Chi-sq 71.1255 0.4653 3.9663 0.4254 5.1287 
df 2 2 2 2 2 
Prob(Chi-sq) 0.0000*** 0.7924 0.1376 0.8084 0.0770* 
Note: This table reports the coefficients differences among the determinants of WTI/Brent convenience yield spread (SCY), WTI/Brent 
oil consumption spread (SCO), WTI/Brent oil production spread in first difference (DSPR), WTI/Brent open interest spread (SOI), and 
WTI/Brent trading volume spread (STV) under the null hypothesis of no significant difference among the coefficients. This test is 
measured by the Chi-square goodness-of-fit. Each variable (SCY, SCO, DSPR, SOI and STV) represents the equality of coefficients 
among the corresponding maturities of 1-month, 3-month, and 6-month contracts. For example, SCY denotes: SCY M1 = SCY M3 = SCY 
M6. M1 = one-month futures contract, M3 = three-month futures contract, M6 = six-month futures contract. Because we test for a 
significant difference among three coefficients, we impose two restrictions and therefore the degrees of freedom (df) equal to 2. The p-
value is associated to the Chi-square. Asterisk * (**, ***) denotes the 10% (5%, 1%) significance level. The sample period runs from 
January 1993 to December 2016. 
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Table 3.13: Dynamic regression 
Panel A – Regression model – 1-month futures contract 
Predictors Parameter value Probability 
C 0.0424 0.0821* 
SFPt-1 0.7323 0.0000*** 
SCYt-1 -0.1124 0.2076 
SCOt-1 -0.0527 0.0357** 
DSPRt-1 -0.0269 0.3603 
SOIt-1 -0.0177 0.0029*** 
STVt-1 0.0274 0.0128** 
Dt -0.0212 0.0005*** 
R2 0.8975  
Panel B – Regression model – 3-month futures contract 
Predictors Parameter value Probability 
C -0.0035 0.8760 
SFPt-1 0.8262 0.0000*** 
SCYt-1 -0.0014 0.9805 
SCOt-1 0.0002 0.9992 
DSPRt-1 -0.0266 0.2507 
SOIt-1 -0.0038 0.2575 
STVt-1 0.0094 0.0153** 
Dt -0.0184 0.0002*** 
R2 0.9344  
Panel C – Regression model – 6-month futures contract 
Predictors Parameter value Probability 
C 0.0364 0.0223** 
SFPt-1 0.8689 0.0000*** 
SCYt-1 0.0088 0.8157 
SCOt-1 -0.0341 0.0328** 
DSPRt-1 -0.0261 0.1716 
SOIt-1 -0.0050 0.0548* 
STVt-1 0.0023 0.1771 
Dt -0.0133 0.0021*** 
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R2 0.9509  
Note: This table reports the dynamic estimation results for the 1-month, the 3-month and the 6-month 
futures contracts. The dependent variable is the WTI/Brent oil futures price differential (SFP). The 
explanatory variables are the lagged WTI/Brent oil futures price differential SFP(t-1), the lagged 
WTI/Brent convenience yield spread (SCYt-1), the lagged WTI/Brent oil consumption spread 
(SCOt-1), the lagged WTI/Brent oil production spread in first difference (DSPRt-1), the lagged 
WTI/Brent open interest spread (SOIt-1), the lagged WTI/Brent trading volume spread (STVt-1), 
and the dummy variable that takes on value 1 (0) after (before) August 2010 (Dt). Heteroscedasticity 
robust standard errors are employed. Asterisk * (**, ***) denotes the 10% (5%, 1%) level of 
significance. The sample period runs from January 1993 to December 2016. 
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Table 3.14: Control variables – contemporaneous regression 
Panel A – Regression model – 1-month futures contract 
Predictors Parameter value Probability 
C -0.0116 0.5993 
SFPt-1 0.8553 0.0000*** 
SCYt -0.5437 0.0000*** 
SCOt 0.0191 0.4889 
DSPRt -0.0712 0.0042*** 
SOIt -0.0058 0.3047 
STVt 0.0145 0.0370 
DINVt -0.1764 0.2094 
GEAt -0.0082 0.0047*** 
DWOPt 0.1663 0.3753 
Dt -0.0231 0.0004*** 
R2 0.9224  
Panel B – Regression model – 3-month futures contract 
Predictors Parameter value Probability 
C -0.0056 0.7942 
SFPt-1 0.8389 0.0000*** 
SCYt -0.1197 0.0222** 
SCOt 0.0010 0.9652 
DSPRt -0.0342 0.0977* 
SOIt -0.0125 0.0008*** 
STVt 0.0118 0.0045*** 
DINVt -0.0796 0.4857 
GEAt -0.0010 0.5962 
DWOPt 0.3026 0.0489** 
Dt -0.0226 0.0000*** 
R2 0.9403  
Panel C – Regression model – 6-month futures contract 
Predictors Parameter value Probability 
C 0.0338 0.0466** 
SFPt-1 0.8772 0.0000*** 
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SCYt -0.0180 0.5705 
SCOt -0.0299 0.0951* 
DSPRt -0.0250 0.1174 
SOIt -0.0035 0.0789* 
STVt 0.0001 0.9362 
DINVt 0.0317 0.7585 
GEAt -0.0018 0.2966 
DWOPt 0.2757 0.0122 
Dt -0.0156 0.0001*** 
R2 0.9521  
Note: This table reports the contemporaneous estimation results for the 1-month, the 3-month and 
the 6-month futures contracts, having included three selected control variables. The dependent 
variable is the WTI/Brent oil futures price differential (SFP). The explanatory variables are the 
lagged WTI/Brent oil futures price differential SFP(t-1), the WTI/Brent convenience yield spread 
(SCYt), the US crude oil inventories in first difference (DINVt), the WTI/Brent oil consumption 
spread (SCOt), the global economic activity index (GEAt), the WTI/Brent oil production spread in 
first difference (DSPRt), the world oil production in first difference (DWOPt), the WTI/Brent open 
interest spread (SOIt), the WTI/Brent trading volume spread (STVt), and the dummy variable that 
takes on value 1 (0) after (before) August 2010 (Dt). Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are 
employed. Asterisk * (**, ***) denotes the 10% (5%, 1%) level of significance. The sample period 
runs from January 1993 to December 2016. 
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3.5.4. The Globalisation-regionalisation hypothesis 
 
Based on the aforementioned preliminary results, we report that the oil futures 
differential is stationary in level. It is evident that the oil futures prices of WTI and 
Brent are linked closely together with a structural break. This result is supported by 
Wilmot (2013) who finds that regional crude oil markets of different or similar grades 
are linked with a structural break. Since the two oil futures markets move together, the 
oil futures market is globalised in the long-run. Although evidence suggests that the 
two oil futures prices move together in the long-run, there is no evidence that the oil 
futures market is globalised in the short-run. In this respect, we employ a standard F 
test in order to test for joint significance of the determinants of the oil futures 
differentials for the 1-month, 3-month and 6-month contracts, which can be considered 
to belong in the short-run period. Specifically, we seek to ascertain to what extent oil 
market fundamentals and financial variables contribute to price disparities between 
WTI and Brent futures prices in the short-run. 
 
In order to test the globalisation-regionalisation hypothesis in the oil futures market, a 
standard F test has been employed.16 The choice of this test is justified by the fact that 
we seek to determine the extent to which the set of our oil-market specific and oil-
futures market specific determinants have predictive power to explain joint variations 
in the oil futures differential. The F test examines the null 𝛼2 = ⋯ = 𝛼6 = 0. Failure 
to reject the null endorses the globalisation hypothesis in the world oil futures market. 
If the null is rejected, the world oil futures market is then regionalised or segmented. 
 
                                                 
16 Technical details for the use of the standard F test are available in econometric analysis text books 
(see, for example, Brooks, 2014). 
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The F statistic reported in Table 3.15 always falls in the critical region of the null and 
therefore, the null is rejected regardless the maturity of the futures contract. Indeed, 
collectively the corresponding determinants can be regarded as significant predictors 
since they result in explaining a significant amount of variation between WTI and Brent 
futures prices, and consequently, they exercise a significant impact on the oil futures 
differential.  
 
Table 3.15: F test 
 
1-Month Futures 
Contract 
3-Month Futures 
Contract 
6-Month Futures 
Contract 
F-stat 13.5533 4.6238 2.4399 
Chi-sq 67.7667 23.1193 12.1995 
df 5 5 5 
Prob(F-stat) 0.0000*** 0.0005*** 0.0347** 
Prob(Chi-sq) 0.0000*** 0.0003*** 0.0322** 
Note: This table reports the finite sample F-statistic and the asymptotic Chi-square statistic with associated 
p-values regarding the 1-month, 3-month and 6-month futures contracts under the null hypothesis of 𝛼2 =
𝛼3 = 𝛼4 = 𝛼5 = 𝛼6 = 0. WTI/Brent convenience yield spread = 𝛼2 = SCY. WTI/Brent oil consumption 
spread = 𝛼3 = SCO. WTI/Brent oil production spread in first difference = 𝛼4 = DSPR. WTI/Brent open 
interest spread = 𝛼5 = SOI. WTI/Brent trading volume spread = 𝛼6 = STV. The degrees of freedom (df) 
associated equal to 5 (number of regressors estimated). Asterisk * (**, ***) denotes the 10% (5%, 1%) 
significance level. The sample period runs from January 1993 to December 2016. 
 
Therefore, our results are in line with Milonas and Henker (2001) who indicate that 
WTI and Brent oil futures prices are not fully integrated. Our results are also similar to 
Liu et al. (2015) who report a decreasing level of co-integration between Brent and WTI 
futures markets and Fattouh (2010) who reveals that oil markets are not necessarily 
integrated in every time period. We provide evidence supporting the hypothesis that the 
world oil futures market can be influenced by regional logistical bottlenecks, 
geopolitical turmoil and financial activity in the short-run which reduces the degree of 
integration and suggests that the oil futures market does not appear to be globalised in 
the short-run. However, these factors exhibit a relatively short-lived effect since the oil 
futures market adjusts and absorbs the temporary imbalances, reduces the uncertainty 
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about unexpected oil supply shortfalls and drives volatility between WTI and Bent oil 
futures prices at the lowest levels. 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we investigate the role of potential determinants of the WTI/Brent oil 
futures price differential for the two major benchmarks of crude oil (WTI and Brent). 
Subsequently, we also examine the globalisation-regionalisation hypothesis in the oil 
futures market based on the WTI/Brent oil futures price differential. A limited number 
of studies focus on macroeconomic indicators, oil market fundamentals and financial 
market variables (see Büyükşahin et al., 2013). Our research extends this strand of 
literature by investigating the effects of additional factors such as the spread of the 
WTI/Brent convenience yield, the spread of WTI/Brent oil consumption, the spread of 
WTI/Brent oil production, the spread of WTI/Brent open interest and the spread of 
WTI/Brent trading volume on the WTI/Brent oil futures price differential. The choice 
of WTI and Brent benchmarks is based on the fact that both are global dominants of 
crude oil futures trading markets. Moreover, we focus on the oil futures differential 
since futures prices are more informative than spot prices. We use monthly data 
covering the period from January 1993 to December 2016. 
  
Our findings are briefly summarised as follows. First, the convenience yield spread 
explains the variability in the oil futures differential for the nearest and the 3-month to 
maturity contracts. Second, the oil production spread affects the oil futures differential 
for the nearby month, 3-month and 6-month to maturity contracts, whereas the oil 
consumption spread acts as a driver of the oil futures differential only for the 6-month 
contract. Third, the open interest spread influences the oil futures differential for the 3-
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month and 6-month to maturity contracts. Fourth, the trading volume spread exercises 
a significant impact on the oil futures differential for the nearest to expiration and the 
3-month to maturity contracts. We conclude that the oil convenience yield, the physical 
oil market fundamental factors (oil production and oil consumption) and the oil futures 
market variables (open interest and trading volume) all drive a significant wedge 
between the WTI and Brent oil futures prices, which is indicative of a regionalised oil 
futures market in the short-run. These variables are significant determinants of the oil 
futures differential. 
 
As far as the globalisation-regionalisation hypothesis between WTI and Brent in the 
oil futures market is concerned, any deviation of WTI or Brent from the long-run co-
integration relationship would be interpreted as evidence of a regionalised oil futures 
market. Although WTI and Brent represent the two leading references for oil futures 
markets globally, the recent developments in crude oil market since late-2010, in 
particular the regional logistical bottlenecks, seem to have a significant impact on WTI 
as a leading global benchmark of the crude oil futures market. As a result, this makes 
WTI a less reliable indicator for pricing crude oil internationally.  
 
However, WTI futures contracts are the most liquid and actively traded contracts in the 
world oil futures market which clearly explains the adoption of WTI as a valuable 
financial asset by energy traders in financial markets. Thus, we consider the importance 
of WTI and suggest that any asymmetry on the part of WTI, which contributes to a 
significant divergence between the two benchmarks, signifies that the world oil futures 
market is indeed regionalised. The extent to which the international oil futures market 
is integrated and the deviation of WTI futures prices does not imply regionalisation but 
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simply reflect the deviation of the US oil futures market from the rest of the world 
would be an avenue for further research as it falls beyond the scope of this study.  
 
In the same line of reasoning, Brent is considered a leading crude oil benchmark 
because it serves as a reference for two-thirds of the world’s internationally traded crude 
oil. This can be attributed to the fact that it is a waterborne crude oil and does not 
affected by pipeline bottlenecks. This dynamic can be further endorsed by the 
increasing importance that Brent appears to play in the oil futures market during recent 
years. However, this potential dominance does not appear to be permanent. Indeed, oil 
production in the North Sea, (the field for Brent) continues to decline. Furthermore, the 
extent to which Brent could be replaced by an Asian based oil benchmark due to the 
growing demand for oil in Asian markets, raises concerns about Brent’s ability to serve 
as a leading benchmark. This provides evidence to support the argument that 
regionalisation in the international oil futures market will likely occur from Brent. 
 
In this regard, an interesting question that the future study might address is the 
consideration of additional crude oil benchmarks other than WTI and Brent, such as, 
the Dubai/Oman. This would suggest a more complete picture of the degree in which 
the state of the international oil futures market is globalised or regionalised. Since we 
examine WTI and Brent, we cannot argue that any significant divergence in their 
differential should be indicative of WTI or Brent’s separation from the rest of the world. 
Furthermore, it would be interesting for future research to employ time-varying 
parameter models in order to examine whether the oil futures differential is affected by 
physical market and financial market factors (for example, oil consumption, oil 
production, open interest) at different time periods. In addition, based on the findings 
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of this research, another interesting direction for future study is to test the ability of our 
significant determinants to forecast the deviations between the two crude oil 
benchmarks and consequently to evaluate the future state of the oil futures market 
(globalised or regionalised). 
 
In addition, it would be interesting to examine the impact of renewable energy sources 
in production and consumption (with a particular reference to the US and the European 
Union energy markets) on the total energy sources, including petroleum and therefore 
oil production and oil consumption. The increasing use of renewable energy sources 
could influence the use of fossil fuels and consequently lead to reduced levels of oil 
production and oil consumption and further affect the convenience yield. These factors 
are regarded as significant determinants of the oil futures differential. In addition, 
legislation, regulations and the political environment are likely to have significant 
implications regarding the subject field. 
 
By following recent or earlier studies such as Wang et al. (2017) and Nomikos and 
Pouliasis (2011), an interesting avenue for future research is to examine forecast 
combinations over single predictor regressions (one fundamental variable together with 
the intercept) with time-varying parameters in order to identify the predictability of oil 
prices. This is due to the fact that the impact of each oil price predictor is not of similar 
importance at each point in time due to different market developments. Indeed, time-
varying parameters have the effectiveness to capture such developments, which is not 
the case when models with constant parameters are employed. Overall, the use of oil 
price forecasts, instead of the readily available futures prices, in the convenience yield 
equation appears to offer an avenue for further study. 
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Overall, in this study we offer a better understanding of the globalisation-
regionalisation hypothesis in the oil futures market by examining the relationship 
between the oil futures differential, convenience yields and potential crude oil 
(fundamental and financial) predictors. Our findings are important for investors and 
traders in both WTI and Brent crude oil futures markets who are trading oil futures 
contracts, seeking to manage asset portfolios and protect themselves against adverse 
future price movements. In addition, our findings should be utilised by market 
participants when they are attempting to identify to what extent the oil futures market 
is affected by the physical oil market factors of supply and demand.  
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Chapter 4: Oil price shocks and EMU sovereign yield spreads 
4.1. Introduction 
The oil market is of fundamental importance for the global economy. It is thus 
unsurprising that developments in the oil market are monitored and reported by the 
media17 and they are at the core of debate among businesses, economists, governments, 
and financial market participants.18 
 
Since the seminal paper by Hamilton (1983), there is a wealth of literature on the effects 
of oil price changes on economic activity. Indeed, developments in the oil market and 
consequently oil price fluctuations generate responses from macroeconomic indicators 
since oil is an important input in industrial production. Specifically, an increase in oil 
prices results in higher production costs or higher income (depending on the status of 
the economy as oil-importer or oil-exporter), which drives inflation towards higher 
levels.19 Additionally, higher oil prices may have a significant direct impact on 
government budgets.20 For instance, oil-exporting countries, due to higher income, are 
expected to experience improvements in their macroeconomic balances, whereas oil-
                                                 
17 See, for instance, (i) Iyengar (2018) in CNN who highlights the impact of recent increases in oil prices 
in the Indian economy, (ii) the report by Mackenzie, Blitz and Scaggs (2018) in Financial Times which 
asks whether oil rises point to a tipping point for bond yields, or (iii) the report by Liesman (2018) in 
CNBC which shows both the positive and negatives effects of rising oil prices in the US economy. 
18 See, for example, IMF’s report by Arezki et al. (2017), IMF’s (2016) World Economic Outlook, ECB’s 
(2016) Economic Bulletin, the report by the UK’s Office of Budget Responsibility (2015) or the report 
by the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission (2015). 
19 In this regard, we argue that inflation is generated regardless of the status of the economy as oil-
importing or oil-exporting. For example, oil-importing countries experience cost-push inflation caused 
by rises in costs of production originated by higher oil prices. Similarly, oil-exporting countries also face 
increased inflation due to the higher income transferred from oil-importing countries. In this regard, the 
higher income allows the oil-exporting government to finance expansionary fiscal policies which 
stimulates aggregate demand and may lead to inflation. 
20 The impact of oil price changes on economic activity tends to be different when we consider the status 
of the country as oil-exporting or oil-importing. In this regard, economic activity of oil-exporting 
economies responds positively to higher oil prices. Specifically, an oil price increase is regarded as 
positive news through the higher government revenues (see, inter alia, Filis and Chatziantoniou, 2014; 
Wang et al., 2013; Arouri and Rault, 2012; Mohanty and Nandha, 2011). 
101 
 
importing countries are faced with uncertainty since increased oil prices could require 
government interventions, which could create budgetary risks.  
 
In recent years, empirical works by Hamilton (2009a,b), Kilian (2009) and Kilian and 
Park (2009) have recognised the importance of exploring the origin of oil price shocks21 
and consequently the reactions of financial markets to these shocks. In this regard, a 
growing number of studies have analysed how the stock market performance responds 
to different oil price shocks.22 In short, the existing literature shows that positive 
aggregate demand shocks are associated with increases in economic activity and can be 
regarded as positive news for stock markets, driving their prices towards higher levels. 
In contrast, positive precautionary demand shocks are associated with increasing 
concerns about future oil supply shortfalls and a fall in economic activity, which is 
transmitted to stock markets, pushing them to bearish territories. Finally, stock markets 
do not seem to be significantly impacted by supply-side shocks. 
 
Despite this wealth of evidence on the relationship between oil prices (and shocks) and 
the wider economy or financial markets, the literature has remained relatively distant 
from the effects of the former on the sovereign risk of a country. The interest in this 
relationship stems from the fact that oil prices and their shocks can be considered as 
                                                 
21 Since the seminal theoretical work by Barsky and Kilian (2002, 2004), the first structural analysis can 
be found to Kilian (2009), who argue that a supply-side shock is originated by changes in world oil 
production, an aggregate demand shock is attributed to changes in global demand for industrial 
commodities, and a precautionary demand shock is generated by concerns about the future availability 
of oil, arising from geopolitical unrest.  
22 Empirical evidence includes additional papers by Antonakakis et al. (2017), Kang et al. (2017), 
Angelidis et al. (2015), Kang et al. (2015), Antonakakis et al. (2014), Degiannakis et al. (2014), Filis 
(2014), Sadorsky (2014), Abhyankar et al. (2013), Antonakakis and Filis (2013), Baumeister and 
Peersman (2013), Chang et al. (2013), Gupta and Modise (2013), Wang et al. (2013), Basher et al. (2012), 
Broadstock et al. (2012), Filis et al. (2011), Kilian and Lewis (2011), Choi and Hammoudeh (2010), 
Apergis and Miller (2009), Kilian and Park (2009) and Hamilton (2009a,b). 
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sources of macroeconomic and financial uncertainty, given their aforementioned 
effects.  
 
We further argue that it is not only the oil price shocks that might exert an impact on 
sovereign risk. Additionally, allowance should be made for the reverse channel, through 
which sovereign risk impacts oil prices, which appears to hold as well. In particular, 
the widening of sovereign risk spreads signifies a greater degree of default risk, which 
could subsequently lead to a reduction in aggregate demand and thus lower demand for 
oil. In addition, higher sovereign risk might lead to lower uncertainty about future oil 
supply shortfalls, given the lower demand for oil. Finally, higher sovereign risk could 
lead oil producers to limit oil supply and therefore a decrease in oil production is 
somewhat expected. However, unexpected changes in oil supply (disruptions) could be 
also considered as exogenous, driven by political events in oil-producing countries (see 
Kilian and Murphy, 2014). Overall, oil prices are expected to decline in response to an 
economic downturn. 
 
The motivation for investigating the correlation between oil price shocks and sovereign 
yield spreads stems not only from the limited empirical research and the theoretical 
arguments, mentioned above, but also from reports by financial institutions23 and the 
anecdotal evidence presented in the financial press, which place emphasis on the 
relationship between oil prices (or their shocks) and sovereign yield spreads.24 
Similarly, it is no coincidence that the media suggest that lower oil prices present a 
serious challenge to US government debt and they are associated with a lower demand 
                                                 
23 See, for instance the report by KfW (2017) titled “Oil prices and bond yields – hand-in-hand again”. 
24 See for instance, the CNBC (2018) article titled “Treasury yields rise as surge in oil prices boost 
inflation outlook; jobs report misses expectations”. 
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for US government bonds (CNBC, 2014) and that lower oil prices trigger a reduction 
in euro zone sovereign bond yields for both core and periphery countries, given their 
beneficial effects on inflation (Oxford Economics, 2014). 
 
Nevertheless, the importance of the present study is also motivated by the EU’s 
dependency on imported crude oil. Figure 4.1 depicts the oil import dependency for all 
28 EU member states, revealing that European countries import more than 80%, on 
average, of their oil needs. Such a figure indicates the potential impact of oil price 
fluctuations on the import costs of these countries, exerting pressure on their trade 
balance and hence their economic performance.  
 
Figure 4.1: EU’s oil import dependency 
 
 
 
Note:  The figure shows the import dependency of crude oil in EU-28 during 2016. Values over 100 
percent denote a stock build. Source: Eurostat 
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To this end, the aim of this study is to contribute towards the limited investigation of 
the link between oil prices (or their shocks) and sovereign yield spreads. We attempt to 
satisfy this objective by assessing the relationship between sovereign risk and oil prices 
shocks using a time-varying framework. More specifically, this study employs the 
sovereign yield spreads as a numerical representation of sovereign risk. This choice is 
justified by the fact that sovereign yield spreads provide substantial information 
regarding a country’s creditworthiness (the ability to serve its debt) and they are 
affected by unexpected changes to the key macroeconomic indicators and unexpected 
developments in the financial markets.  
 
To date, there are only few studies that focus on this relationship, (see, for instance, 
Bouri et al., 2018, Bouri et al., 2017, Lee et al., 2017, Shahzad et al., 2017, Wegener et 
al., 2016, Aizenman et al., 2013, Alexandre and de Benoist, 2010). For example, 
Wegener et al. (2016) point out that higher oil prices contribute to reductions in the 
sovereign risk of oil-producing countries. Shahzad et al. (2017), on the other hand, show 
that higher oil price volatility triggers an increase in the sovereign risk of oil-exporting 
countries. By distinguishing between oil-exporting and oil-importing countries, Lee et 
al. (2017) document that increasing oil prices cause a reduction (increase) in the 
sovereign risk of oil-exporters (importers). In a similar fashion, Bouri et al. (2018) show 
that the sovereign risk of oil-exporters (importers) is more sensitive to positive 
(negative) shocks in oil volatility. Nevertheless, the existing literature: i) provides 
limited evidence on the relationship between oil price movements and sovereign risk; 
ii) does not fully consider the heterogeneous effects of the different oil price shocks; 
and iii) is mainly based on a static rather than a dynamic environment. 
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Specifically, our contribution to the existing literature is threefold. First, this study 
sheds new light on the relation between unanticipated changes in the oil price and 
sovereign yield spreads, measured as the difference in 10-year sovereign bond yields 
between a member of the European Monetary Union and Germany. Second, this study 
examines the role of the origin of the oil price shocks in the aforementioned relation. 
To this end, we disentangle three structural oil price shocks: i) shocks to world oil 
supply; ii) oil price shocks arising from changes in aggregate demand; and iii) 
precautionary (or oil-market specific) demand shocks. We then study the extent to 
which the relation between oil price shocks and sovereign yield spreads is driven by the 
origin of oil price shocks. Third, this study complements the existing literature by 
examining the relationship between oil price shocks and EMU sovereign yield spreads 
in a time-varying framework.25 To this end, we employ a set of core and periphery oil-
importing members of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). It is worth noting 
that EMU is on aggregate the largest oil-importer in the world.  
 
The distinction between core and periphery countries can be justified by the view that 
weaker periphery economies are expected to be more responsive to oil price 
fluctuations compared to stronger core economies (see Aizenman et al., 2013). Indeed, 
this could be the case for the periphery countries due to their: i) differences in terms of 
trade, compared to core countries (i.e. they run current account deficits); ii) slower 
adjustment to external shocks (see Celi et al., 2017); and iii) high dependence on 
imported energy (see Gibson et al., 2012). 
                                                 
25 We should notice that there is a recent evidence on the existing literature which indicates that the effect 
of oil prices on the economy and the stock market is likely time-varying (Boldanov et al., 2016; 
Broadstock and Filis, 2014; Filis, 2014; Antonakakis and Filis, 2013; Degiannakis et al., 2013; Filis et 
al., 2011; Bhar and Nikolova, 2010; Choi and Hammoudeh, 2010). 
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The empirical methodology proceeds in two steps. In the first step, we estimate a 
structural VAR model, which helps us uncover the three structural oil price shocks, as 
in Kilian (2009). In the second step, we interplay the structural oil price shocks with 
sovereign yield spreads in a multivariate GARCH (MGARCH) model.  By way of the 
MGARCH model, we estimate the time-varying correlations among oil price shocks 
and sovereign yield spreads.   
 
Our main findings reveal the following empirical regularities. First, correlations 
between sovereign yield spreads and different oil price shocks show a time-varying 
behaviour, which alternates between positive and negative values and exhibit 
heterogeneous patterns among the three shocks. Second, although correlations appear 
to fluctuate at relatively low values in the pre-2008 period, this pattern changes to 
relatively moderate and more volatile correlations in after 2008. Third, we do not 
produce noticeable evidence of differentiation in the correlation patterns of the 
sovereign yield spreads and different oil price shocks between core and periphery 
countries.  
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the existing 
literature in the field and presents the hypotheses under investigation. Section 4.3 
describes the data used and provides a preliminary analysis. Section 4.4 presents the 
econometric model employed in this study. The empirical findings are reported and 
analysed in Section 4.5. Finally, Section 4.6 concludes the study.  
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4.2. Brief review of the literature and hypotheses development 
As was mentioned in the introduction, oil price changes exert a significant impact on 
the economy and trigger responses from macroeconomic indicators. Indeed, Hamilton 
(1983) was among the first to concentrate the attention of researchers on the important 
role that oil prices play in determining economic activity. Furthermore, since the 
seminal paper by Jones and Kaul (1996), there has been a growing interest amongst 
researchers to investigate the link between oil markets and financial markets. 
Concerning the impact of oil price changes on stock market activity, the existing 
literature indicates that oil price increases cause firms’ profits and expected cash flows 
to decline. Therefore, oil price increases are associated with decreased stock market 
returns. Overall, there is a wealth of literature which provides empirical evidence that 
oil prices have significant effects on the economy and stock market activity.26 An in-
depth review of the related literature can be found in Degiannakis et al. (2018). 
 
In addition, since unexpected oil price changes appear to exert a significant impact on 
the economy and stock markets, it is reasonable to ask whether oil price fluctuations 
affect the risk level of the economy. The existing literature along this line of research 
attempts to explore the channel which suggests that oil price movements are of 
consequence for sovereign risk. Some related studies which have considered this 
relationship include papers by Bouri et al. (2018), Bouri et al. (2017), Lee et al. (2017), 
                                                 
26 Recent and earliest studies that confirm the important role of oil price changes on the economy and 
stock market returns include papers by Du and Zhao (2017), Li et al. (2017), Silvapulle et al. (2017), 
Wang and Ngene (2017), Basher et al. (2016), Reboredo and Ugolini (2016), Narayan and Gupta (2015), 
Phan et al. (2015), Filis and Chatziantoniou (2014), Baumeister and Peersman (2013), Lippi and Nobili 
(2012), Filis (2010), Tang et al. (2010), Miller and Ratti (2009), Cologni and Manera (2008), Driesprong 
et al. (2008), Lescaroux and Mignon (2008), Nandha and Faff (2008), O’ Neill et al. (2008), Park and 
Ratti (2008), Ciner (2001), Papapetrou (2001), Gjerde and Saettem (1999), Sadorsky (1999), Ferderer 
(1996), Hooker (1996), Lee et al. (1995), Mork (1989), Gisser and Goodwin (1986), Burbridge and 
Harrison (1984). 
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Shahzad et al. (2017), Wegener et al. (2016), Aizenman et al. (2013) and Alexandre 
and de Benoist (2010). 
 
In particular, Alexandre and de Benoist (2010) examine the effect of changes in oil 
prices on government bond risk premiums of emerging countries. They use the 
Emerging Market Bond Index Global (EMBIG) index as a measure of global risk. They 
employ a panel analysis and argue that the risk premium of government bonds is 
positively and significantly affected by higher oil prices. Concerning the EU market, 
Aizenman et al. (2013) employ a generalised method of moment approach and suggest 
that rises in world commodity prices and oil prices lead to lower sovereign CDS 
spreads. They argue that this could be explained by the fact that global economic 
conditions are largely strong when both prices are increasing. Furthermore, Wegener et 
al. (2016) use data from nine oil-producing countries to investigate the relationship 
between oil prices and sovereign CDS spreads. They employ bivariate VAR-GARCH-
in-mean models and document that positive oil price shocks lead to lower sovereign 
CDS spreads.  
 
Additionally, Bouri et al. (2017) investigate the volatility transmission from 
commodities markets (including oil) to sovereign CDS spreads for a sample of 
emerging and frontier markets. They employ a Lagrange Multiplier methodology and 
report that sovereign CDS spreads are significantly affected by commodity price 
volatility. Moreover, Shahzad et al. (2017) examine the predictability from oil market 
uncertainty to the sovereign CDS spreads by using data from oil-exporting countries. 
They employ a modified bootstrap-rolling window approach and find a directional 
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predictability from oil price volatility to sovereign CDS spreads. They conclude that 
higher oil price volatility contributes to increases in sovereign risk.  
 
In a similar vein, Lee et al. (2017) investigate the relationship between oil price shocks 
and sovereign risk using the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) data. They 
employ a Structural Vector Autoregressive model for a sample of oil-exporting and oil-
importing countries. Specifically, they indicate that oil price shocks exert a reduction 
(increase) in sovereign risk for oil-exporting (oil-importing) countries. The authors 
highlight the importance of supply-side (demand-side) oil price shocks to the sovereign 
risk of net oil-exporting (oil-importing) countries. Finally, Bouri et al. (2018) examine 
the connection between oil price volatility shocks and sovereign risk for BRICS oil-
exporting (Brazil and Russia) and oil-importing (China and India) countries. They 
employ a bivariate cross-quantilogram approach to measure the directional 
predictability and document that low (high) oil price volatility predicts low (high) 
sovereign risk. 
 
In general, there is limited evidence on the relationship between oil price movements 
and sovereign risk. It should be noted that the aforementioned studies employ static 
econometric approaches. One notable exception is the study by Shahzad et al. (2017) 
who employ a time-varying approach based on the modified bootstrap rolling-window 
procedure. However, rolling-window approaches suffer from the identification of the 
appropriate window size and from weak expression of test statistics. Indeed, the shorter 
(longer) the rolling-window, the higher (lower) the irregular trends regarding the 
estimation of the model parameters and therefore the less (more) accurate parameter 
estimation would be. Furthermore, adding (deleting) one observation at the end 
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(beginning) of the sample entails a loss of observations. In this regard, our time-varying 
framework does not suffer from these limitations. 
 
Overall, we examine the time-varying correlation between different oil price shocks 
based on their origin and the 10-year sovereign yield spread as a proxy of sovereign 
risk. We seek to expand the existing literature not only in terms of disaggregating the 
oil price shock impact on sovereign yield spreads but also in terms of investigating this 
relationship in a time-varying rather than a static econometric framework across EMU 
members. 
 
Given the aforementioned literature, we focus on the anticipated time-varying 
correlation between sovereign yield spreads of core and periphery countries and oil 
price shocks. Thus, we posit the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Negative correlations are anticipated between sovereign yield spreads 
and positive supply-side shocks. 
Since both EMU core and periphery countries are oil-importing, we argue that an oil 
price decrease, due to increased oil production, promotes a drop in the cost of imported 
oil, which improves the current account balance. As a consequence of a reduction in 
the current account deficit there is reduced concern for the country to raise funds in 
order to service the external debt. In the case of such developments, spreads are 
expected to decrease since countries are expected to be more responsive relative to the 
benchmark country (e.g. Germany for the EMU member states), given that the yield of 
the latter has narrower variability margins. 
Hypothesis 2: Negative correlations are anticipated between sovereign yield spreads 
and positive aggregate demand shocks.  
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A positive aggregate demand shock is associated with increases in economic activity 
and thus oil prices also increase. The higher economic activity, despite increased oil 
prices, contributes to a stable business and financial environment and reduces the 
uncertainty in the economy. Such developments are expected to have a greater positive 
impact on the least strong economies as opposed to the anchor country (e.g. Germany), 
leading to a decline in sovereign yield spreads.  
Hypothesis 3: Positive correlations are anticipated between sovereign yield spreads 
and positive precautionary demand shocks.  
More specifically, a positive precautionary demand shock represents fears about future 
oil supply shortfalls and therefore stimulates an increase in the oil price. This creates a 
weak business and financial environment, with a resultant fall in economic activity. 
This is expected to have negative impact to the least strong economies, with the 
consequence that the sovereign yield spread is expected to widen between the least 
strong economy and the benchmark country.  
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4.3. Data description and preliminary analysis 
In this study, we use monthly data, from January 1999 to January 2016, on world oil 
production, a global economic activity index and the crude oil spot price for the purpose 
of estimating the three oil price shocks, as suggested by Kilian (2009), related to the 
supply of oil, aggregate demand and precautionary demand. The data for the world oil 
production are obtained from Energy Information Administration (EIA). Following 
Kilian (2009), we employ the global economic activity index with the aim of 
representing the global business cycle. Kilian provides a thorough explanation on his 
personal website of how this index is constructed.27 In addition, we choose the Brent 
crude oil price to serve as the spot price, considering that the Brent price is a global 
crude oil benchmark. Specifically, Brent is used to price crude oil that is produced and 
traded in different parts of the world such as Europe, the Mediterranean, Africa, as well 
as Australia and some Asian countries.28 Our decision to employ the Brent oil price is 
strongly motivated by the fact that this type of crude oil is extracted from the North Sea 
and mainly used locally in Europe. Data for the Brent crude oil price are collected from 
Datastream and are expressed in dollar terms. The oil (nominal) spot price is deflated 
by the US Consumer Price Index (CPI) in order to get the real oil price. The data on the 
CPI are available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) of the United States.  
 
In addition, we collect monthly data for the 10-year benchmark bond yields for eleven 
European countries, namely, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
                                                 
27 The data for the global economic activity index are retrieved from Lutz Kilian’s personal website: 
http://www-personal.umich.edu/~lkilian/ 
28 The source of the information can be found on the EIA: 
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=18571 
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Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.29,30 The data are retrieved from 
Datastream. We construct the 10-year sovereign yield spreads as the difference between 
the 10-year government bond yield issued by an EMU member-country and the German 
(Bund) 10-year bond yield (both yields of equal maturity). This choice is attributed to 
the fact that Germany’s 10-year government bonds are considered to have the highest 
credit quality and liquidity (see Ejsing and Sihvonen, 2009).  
 
We use the 10-year sovereign yield spread due to data availability obtained by 
Datastream. Specifically, our study is motivated by the fact that all of the countries have 
been part of the EMU since January 1999. Therefore, it is essential to use this date as 
the beginning period of our sample. The existing literature under this line of research 
employs international country risk indices and CDS spreads. With reference to the 
international country risk indices, Lee et al. (2017) use the ICRG index which is 
constructed by the PRS Group, a private company and requires the purchase of the data. 
Furthermore, Alexandre and de Benoist (2010) use the EMBIG index published by JP 
Morgan. However, this index of the spread of government bonds is related to emerging 
countries, whereas our study use EMU countries.  
 
                                                 
29 In this study, we consider the countries joined the EMU since 1999 and 2001 (the case of Greece). We 
do not include Luxembourg given that the government bond market of this country is relatively small 
(see Afonso et al., 2015) and the lack of data (see Maltritz, 2012). Furthermore, we exclude countries 
that joined EMU since 2007 (Slovenia (2007), Cyprus (2008), Malta (2008), Slovakia (2009), Estonia 
(2011), Latvia (2014) and Lithuania (2015)) due to short sovereign yield spreads data period. Finally, 
Germany is also excluded because is used as a reference country to construct the sovereign yield spreads 
for the rest countries. 
30 It should be mentioned that CDS spreads are commonly used in the existing literature to measure the 
sovereign risk. Nevertheless, our decision to use the 10-year sovereign yield spread as a proxy for 
sovereign risk is justified by the fact that it allows us to use a longer study period. In particular, the CDS 
data are available from 2009, whereas the data on the 10-year government bond yields for our selected 
countries are available since the creation of the EMU in 1999 (with the exception of Greece, which joined 
EMU in 2001). It should also be mentioned that, due to fiscal imbalances and fragilities among the EMU 
economies, and the need for the European Central Bank (ECB) to provide rescue packages to reduce the 
sovereign risk pressure, the 10-year sovereign yield spread may better approximate different fiscal 
fundamentals and could well capture uncertainty levels in the EMU economies. 
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As far as the use of CDS spread is concerned, Bouri et al. (2018), Bouri et al. (2017), 
Shahzad et al. (2017), Wegener et al. (2016) use CDS spreads gathered from 
Datastream. Nevertheless, they employ the 5-year contract CDS spreads, since the CDS 
spreads for the 10-year maturity contracts are not available. This limits the time period 
in the above studies to begin from 2009. An exception is the study by Aizenman et al. 
(2013) who use the 5-year CDS spreads from 2005. However the data are purchased by 
Markit, a private company. 
 
Further to this information, there are disadvantages of using CDS spreads that the 
authors in the above studies do not mention. For example, the article by Carrick 
Mollenkamp and Serena Ng, which is published in Wall Street Journal (September 28, 
2011), with the title: “A Fear Gauge Comes Up Short – Analysis Shows Credit-Default 
Swaps, a Popular Indicator of Market Health, Are Thinly Traded”. The authors report 
that concerns are raised about the accuracy of the CDS spreads as a barometer for the 
financial health of sovereign entities due to the fact that CDS contracts are sparsely 
traded. Specifically, they claim that the price of a CDS may emerge from such thin 
trading that it does not represent a market judgment. Moreover, the Bank for 
International Settlements, 2010 (page 38), states that “the same CDS spread in 
numerical terms may not necessarily imply the same risk”. Finally, Tang and Yan 
(2017) indicate that the large trading loss at J.P. Morgan revealed in May 2012 also 
illustrates liquidity problems in the CDS market. 
 
The choice of the 10-year (long-term) sovereign yield spread is further justified by the 
fact that the longer the time to maturity, the larger the yield fluctuation (risk) and, 
consequently, the greater the uncertainty in the market. Overall, the convergence of 
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sovereign yield spreads is considered as a factor which reduces the uncertainty of 
allowing an immediate and less stressful access to debt financing by market participants 
in financial markets and motivates investment within converging countries (see Côté 
and Graham, 2004). This promotes the integration of the European bond markets and 
consequently endorses financial stability.   
 
In addition, in order to address a potential omitted variable bias31, we collect data on 
the European economic policy uncertainty index, the European monetary policy 
uncertainty index, the European stock market volatility index and the realised oil price 
volatility, which impact on both the bond yields and oil prices (see, for instance, Arora 
and Cerisola, 2001, Barsky and Kilian, 2002, Anzuini et al., 2012, Antonakakis et al., 
2014, Afonso et al., 2015, Bernal et al., 2016, Husted et al., 2017, Shahzad et al., 2017). 
Monthly data for the European economic policy uncertainty index and the European 
stock market volatility index32 have been extracted from Datastream, whereas monthly 
data for the European monetary policy uncertainty index have been retrieved from the 
Federal Reserve database.33 Furthermore, the monthly oil price realised volatility is 
constructed using the daily data on the Brent crude oil price during the study period, 
which are obtained from Datastream. Section 4.4.2 describes the method employed for 
the construction of the monthly oil price realised volatility. 
 
The issue of the omitted variable bias refers to any variable not incorporated as an 
explanatory variable in the econometric model that might affect the dependent variable 
and gives rise to bias findings. In order to gain a clearer perception of the time-varying 
                                                 
31 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out to this important issue. 
32 The European stock market volatility index (VSTOXX) represents the implied volatility of the EURO 
STOXX 50. 
33 Specifically, this index has been constructed by Husted et al. (2016b) for the ECB. 
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correlation between oil price shocks and sovereign yield spreads in the EMU, we 
proceed our analysis by including additional factors that potentially affect both oil price 
shocks and sovereign yield spreads. This analysis guarantees to circumvent the omitted 
variable bias issue and helps to trace and attain more in-depth information about their 
actual relationship at each point in time. In this regard, we employ the European 
economic policy uncertainty index, the European monetary policy uncertainty index, 
the European stock market volatility index and the realised oil price volatility. First, we 
need to explain how the additional variables are associated with changes in oil price 
shocks and sovereign yield spreads.  
 
Starting with the economic policy uncertainty, Pastor and Veronesi (2012) state that 
economic policy uncertainty refers to government actions that affect the economic 
environment. They claim that there are two types of such uncertainty, namely, the 
political uncertainty and the impact uncertainty. The former is associated with potential 
changes in the current government policy. The latter reflects concerns about the impact 
of a new government policy on the profitability of the private sector.  
 
Recent evidence shows that economic policy uncertainty influences oil price shocks 
and sovereign yield spreads. To this end, Antonakakis et al. (2014) examine spillover 
effects from economic policy uncertainty to oil price shocks by considering a sample 
of European oil-importing economies. They find that changes in economic policy 
uncertainty trigger negative responses from all oil price shocks. This can be attributed 
to the fact that uncertainty about economic policy decisions has a direct negative impact 
on a company’s investment and production decisions, negatively affecting the demand 
for oil and consequently lowering the price of oil.  
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The importance of economic policy uncertainty in the Eurozone has been reported by 
Bernal et al. (2016). They provide evidence that economic policy uncertainty from the 
main core and periphery countries contributes to increasing risk transmission within the 
Eurozone's sovereign bond market. The authors argue that this risk transmission is 
generated by abnormal developments of sovereign yield spreads and plays a key role in 
weakening the Eurozone sovereign bond market. 
 
By concentrating on the monetary policy uncertainty, Husted et al. (2017) claim that 
monetary policy uncertainty is associated with the perceptions that households and 
firms consider about Central Bank’s policy actions and consequences. They find that 
positive monetary policy uncertainty shocks contribute to weaker economic activity, 
lower output and increased borrowing costs. The earlier study by Arora and Cerisola 
(2001) examines the impact of the US monetary policy changes on sovereign yield 
spreads in emerging countries such as Latin America, Asia, and Eastern Europe. They 
indicate that changes in the US monetary policy trigger a direct positive effect on 
sovereign yield spreads.  
 
Pertaining to the monetary policy effect on oil prices, Barsky and Kilian (2002) suggest 
that changes in US monetary policy regimes caused the 1970s oil price increases. In 
addition, Anzuini et al. (2012) argue that US monetary policy shocks contributed to the 
oil price increase prior to the Great Recession and the effect reduced significantly in 
early-2008 and during the peak stage of the oil price increase. On the other hand, Kilian 
and Lewis (2011), document that there is no empirical evidence to support the role of 
the US monetary policy in reinforcing the influence of oil price shocks on the US 
economy after 1987. Overall, it should be mentioned that, regardless of the fact that the 
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uncertainty has originated from fiscal or monetary policy decisions, a negative impact 
on the financial markets and the macroeconomic activity is anticipated. 
 
Turning to the stock market volatility, the VIX index represents a measure of expected 
future volatility and is broadly used to capture international financial risk perceptions. 
As regards the impact of stock market volatility on sovereign yield spreads, Afonso et 
al. (2015), use the VIX volatility index to approximate the international risk factor for 
a panel of ten euro area countries, similar to our study. They claim that a higher value 
for the international risk factor causes a rise in sovereign yield spreads. They find that 
a positive and significant relationship has been indicated since the onset of the Great 
Recession. Nevertheless, our study is based on EMU countries and therefore we use the 
implied volatility in European Eurostoxx-50 index (VSTOXX) rather than the US 
Standard and Poor’s 500 implied volatility VIX index to measure financial market 
uncertainty in the EMU.  
 
Turning to the association between oil price shocks and the European stock market 
volatility, a pioneering study has been presented by Degiannakis et al. (2014) who 
report that supply-side shocks and precautionary demand shocks do not affect stock 
market volatility, while aggregate demand shocks have a significant impact by reducing 
stock market volatility. Although this study does not mention the influence on stock 
market volatility of different oil price shocks, it is indicative that the link between oil 
price shocks and the stock market volatility has been well established. 
 
Finally, we highlight the impact of oil price volatility on the performance of sovereign 
yield spreads. Surprisingly, the literature remains silent regarding this relationship. An 
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interesting study is by Shahzad et al. (2017), who use the implied oil volatility OVX 
index to test the responses from sovereign CDS spreads of oil-exporting countries. They 
conclude that higher oil price volatility caused increases in the credit risk of these 
countries during 2010–2011 and 2014–2015. However, we maintain that our study 
employs sovereign yield spreads, rather than sovereign CDS spreads or sovereign 
ratings, to measure sovereign risk. In addition to this, OVX data are only available from 
May 2007 and therefore to include this variable in our dataset not only reduces 
considerably our sample period but also makes us unable to capture the early period of 
the transition to the EMU. 
 
Thus, our sample consists of five EMU core countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France and Netherlands) and five EMU periphery countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain). Considering the EMU core countries, our sample ranges from 
January 1999 to January 2016. The choice of the data period is motivated by the fact 
that all countries have belonged to the EMU since January 1999. It is worth noting that 
the data for Greece extend from January 2001, onwards, as the country joined the 
Eurozone in that year. Thus, a shorter period from January 2001 to January 2016 is 
under consideration for the EMU periphery countries. The period of analysis runs until 
January 2016 due to data availability for the European monetary policy uncertainty 
index that was devised by Husted et al. (2016b).  
  
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 exhibit the evolution of the series under consideration and show 
some interesting regularities. With reference to oil-related variables, the global 
economic activity index shows a tendency to increase during the period 2004-2007, 
which is influenced by the rising global demand for industrial commodities from 
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emerging countries. Following this episode, we observe that it suffers a significant drop 
during the peak months of the Great Recession (i.e. late-2008), yet again reflecting the 
(negative) global economic conditions of this period. In addition, a significant trough 
is also observed during the period of 2014-2015, corresponding to the global economic 
slowdown. Furthermore, the graph of the real oil return features significant troughs and 
relatively high volatility within the years, 2001 (the terrorist attack of September 2001), 
2003 (the second Iraq war), 2007-09 (the Great Recession) and 2014-2015. World oil 
production growth does not seem to show similar patterns and exhibits a relatively low 
and stable volatility (with the exception of the period 1999-2004, which is characterised 
by abrupt changes). The latter can be attributed to several decisions by OPEC to cut or 
raise production quotas, which were associated with the early-2000 recession, the 
terrorist attack of 9/11 (2001), the political unrest in Nigeria and Venezuela (both in 
2003) and the second Iraq war (2003). 
 
Turning to the evolution of sovereign yield spreads, we observe a convergence in 
performance, which is similar for all core and periphery countries, until the early stages 
of the Great Recession. Since 2008, though, we observe an increasing trend in all 
spreads, signifying the effects of the financial crisis since the collapse of the Lehman 
Brothers. This increasing pattern becomes more prevalent in the post-2010 period, 
which reflects the start of the European debt crisis, when Greece requested financial aid 
from the International Monetary Fund. In most cases, the spreads tend to exhibit a 
declining pattern in the post-2012 period. This could be explained by the effectiveness 
of fiscal stimulus policies that were undertaken by European governments in order to 
promote economic and financial stability in response to the debt crisis. In addition, the 
decreasing divergence can be further explained by the ECB announcement in 2015 to 
121 
 
implement a quantitative easing (QE) programme, known as the Expanded Asset 
Purchase Programme (EAPP).34  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 The aim of the EAPP by the ECB was to purchase sovereign bonds by issuing new reserves and 
providing liquidity in the distressed countries and therefore to generate a reduction in long-term interest 
rates in order to control the recession and promote stability. 
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Figure 4.2: Time series employed in the study 
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Note: This Figure exhibits the evolution of the series during the sample period. In the first row, 10-year sovereign yield spreads 
over Germany of the core countries (Austria (saus), Belgium (sbel), Finland (sfin), France (sfra) and the Netherlands (snet)) are 
represented. In the second row, 10-year sovereign yield spreads over Germany of the periphery countries (Greece (sgre), Ireland 
(sire), Italy (sita), Portugal (spor) and Spain (sspa)) are depicted. In the third row, the European economic policy uncertainty 
index, the European monetary policy uncertainty index, the European stock market volatility index and the realised oil price 
volatility are shown. In the fourth row, world oil production growth, real oil returns and global economic activity index are 
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depicted. For the core countries, the time period spans from January 1999 to January 2016. For the periphery countries, the time 
period spans from January 2001 to January 2016.   
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Figure 4.3: Spreads of 10-year sovereign yields relative to Germany 
Panel A – Core countries 
 
Panel B – Periphery countries 
 
Note: This Figure depicts variation over time of 10-year sovereign yield spreads over Germany. For 
the core countries (Austria (saus), Belgium (sbel), Finland (sfin), France (sfra) and the Netherlands 
(snet)), the time period spans from January 1999 to January 2016. For the periphery countries (Greece 
(sgre), Ireland (sire), Italy (sita), Portugal (spor) and Spain (sspa)), the time period runs from January 
2001 to January 2016. 
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More specifically, the collapse of Lehman Brothers and especially the European debt 
crisis in post-2010 revealed the actual differences among the EMU countries that were 
not previously evident. In fact, differences in credit and liquidity risks influenced the 
government bond yields of the EMU countries and caused sovereign yield spreads to 
widen (see Dewachter et al., 2015). This confirms the argument that bonds that were 
issued by EMU countries should have never been considered as substitutes (see Favero, 
2013). Overall, the period after the Great Recession indicated the vulnerability of the 
Eurozone and raised concerns about the macroeconomic and financial stability of core 
and periphery countries.  
 
In this study, sovereign yield spreads reflect the differences between government bonds 
yields that were issued by EMU countries and the German Bund yield. The fact that 
sovereign yield spreads widened substantially during the peak months of the Great 
Recession emphasises the key role of Germany as the anchor country. Indeed, during 
this period of tightening financial conditions, the German Bund appeared to act as a 
‘flight-to-quality’ government security for the market participants who traded in the 
European government bond markets. Specifically, German government bonds are 
characterised by safety and liquidity which explains why the German yield experienced 
a decreasing trend.35  
 
                                                 
35 Ejsing and Sihvonen (2009) examine differences between German and French government bonds 
based on the fact that both bond markets are identical in terms of credit rating. They indicate that German 
bonds exhibited higher liquidity and a larger price premium which was more intense during the Great 
Recession. This can be explained by the fact that German bonds are deliverable into futures contracts in 
the very liquid German futures market, whereas French bonds are not delivered into futures contracts. 
Thus, significant liquidity spillovers from the German futures market to the German cash market could 
help to determine the differences between the two government bonds. 
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It should be mentioned that government bond yields of core countries experienced a 
similar decreasing trend, but to a lesser extent, compared with the German Bund. This 
can be attributed to the fact that the government bonds of core countries were also 
regarded as relatively safe and liquid assets, although not comparable to the German 
Bund. However, the yields for the periphery countries exhibited increasing trends and 
appeared to be more unstable. A plausible explanation is that these bonds are perceived 
to be of lower quality compared with those bonds issued by core countries. Therefore, 
differences in the quality possibly provide a plausible explanation for these unique 
asymmetric patterns of bond yields of core and periphery countries against the German 
Bund during the financial turmoil in the second half of 2008 and the European debt 
crisis in the post-2010 period. Figure 4.4 exhibits the differences in the evolution of 
sovereign bond yields in the EMU. 
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Figure 4.4: Evolution of 10-year sovereign bond yields  
Panel A – Core countries and Germany 
 
Panel B – Periphery countries and Germany 
 
Note: This Figure depicts variation over time of 10-year sovereign bond yields. For the core countries 
(Austria (aus), Belgium (bel), Finland (fin), France (fra) and the Netherlands (net)), the time period 
spans from January 1999 to January 2016. For the periphery countries (Greece (gre), Ireland (ire), 
Italy (ita), Portugal (por) and Spain (spa)), the time period runs from January 2001 to January 2016. 
Germany (ger) represents the anchor country. 
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Table 4.1 reports the descriptive statistics of the series. As expected, sovereign yield 
spreads of the periphery countries exhibit the highest volatility compared with those 
sovereign yield spreads of the core countries. This is indicated by their standard 
deviations. In addition, none of the series are normally distributed (with the exception 
of world oil production and the global economic activity index). This is clearly shown 
by values of the Jarque-Bera statistic, and standardised measures of skewness and 
kurtosis.  
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A – Core countries 
 Mean Median Max. Min. St.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis J-B Prob. 
saus 0.2666 0.2226 1.5390 -0.0589 0.2675 1.7477 6.8298 229.6466*** 0.0000 
sbel 0.4469 0.3065 2.6570 -0.0156 0.4961 2.1033 7.9199 357.8997*** 0.0000 
sfin 0.1639 0.1739 0.7845 -0.1593 0.1612 0.4830 3.6371 11.4377*** 0.0032 
sfra 0.2601 0.1462 1.5550 -0.0132 0.2901 1.8523 7.0080 254.4446*** 0.0000 
snet 0.1755 0.1483 0.6322 -0.0512 0.1498 1.0489 3.8293 43.4613*** 0.0000 
Panel B – Periphery countries 
 Mean Median Max. Min. St.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis J-B Prob. 
sgre 4.8634 0.6355 36.9890 0.0799 7.2359 2.1980 8.3443 361.1355*** 0.0000 
sire 1.3456 0.3180 10.2210 -0.2368 2.0364 1.8000 5.7016 152.7883*** 0.0000 
sita 1.0925 0.4991 4.7950 0.0805 1.1815 1.4621 4.3509 78.2523*** 0.0000 
spor 2.0178 0.4370 11.7670 -0.0355 2.8724 1.7381 5.1430 125.7706*** 0.0000 
sspa 1.0599 0.3406 5.5220 -0.0518 1.3362 1.3832 4.0842 66.5812*** 0.0000 
Panel C – Oil-market specific variables and control variables 
 Mean Median Max. Min. St.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis J-B Prob. 
PRO 72938.22 73448.49 81205.06 64798.05 3901.09 -0.1050 2.4700 2.7762 0.2495 
GEA 0.0811 0.0600 0.6636 -0.9557 0.3087 -0.1050 2.5183 2.7993 0.2467 
ROP 29.6913 27.5764 65.4427 6.0534 14.0001 0.3122 1.8856 13.9384*** 0.0009 
EPU 130.2943 119.9992 304.6002 47.6923 52.4946 0.6777 2.8061 16.0122*** 0.0003 
MPU 100.1870 92.9904 370.4282 15.2935 52.4935 1.6620 7.8087 291.8889*** 0.0000 
VOL 25.2468 23.1200 81.0300 11.9900 9.9416 1.8443 8.3227 358.2069*** 0.0000 
ROV 33.3037 32.1759 102.6001 9.3144 14.2368 1.5768 7.4579 254.6974*** 0.0000 
Note: This table summarises descriptive statistics (sample mean, median, maximum, minimum, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, the Jarque-Bera 
test statistic, and the p-value associated to the Jarque-Bera test statistic). Panel A shows 10-year sovereign yield spreads over Germany of core countries 
(Austria (saus), Belgium (sbel), Finland (sfin), France (sfra) and the Netherlands (snet)). Panel B displays 10-year sovereign yield spreads over Germany 
of periphery countries (Greece (sgre), Ireland (sire), Italy (sita), Portugal (spor) and Spain (sspa)). Panel C demonstrates the variables used for the estimation 
of the oil price shocks, world oil production (PRO), global economic activity index (GEA) and real oil price (ROP), as well as, the control variables 
European economic policy uncertainty index (EPU), the European monetary policy uncertainty index (MPU), the European stock market volatility index 
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(VOL) and the realised oil price volatility (ROV). Asterisk * (**, ***) denotes the 10% (5%, 1%) significance level. For the core countries, the time period 
spans from January 1999 to January 2016. For the periphery countries, the time period spans from January 2001 to January 2016. 
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Table 4.2 summarises the results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) (Dickey and 
Fuller, 1981) and Phillips-Perron (PP) (Phillips and Perron, 1988) unit root tests. 
According to Panels A and B, there is present a unit root for all core and periphery 
countries’ sovereign yield spreads. Applying a first-difference transformation, we 
achieve stationarity in these series. Similarly, world oil production and the oil spot price 
do not appear to be stationary in levels and thus the null hypothesis of unit root cannot 
be rejected. Thus, we proceed with the first difference transformation of these two 
variables. In contrast, the series on the global economic activity index is stationary by 
construction, since it reflects the global business cycle (Kilian and Murphy, 2014). 
Finally, the series on the control variables (European economic policy uncertainty 
index, the European monetary policy uncertainty index, the European stock market 
volatility index and the realised oil price volatility) are stationary, according to the 
results of the unit root tests. 
  
Table 4.2: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (1981) and Phillips-Perron (1988) 
unit root tests. 
                      Panel A – ADF test 
 C  C&T  N  
saus -2.7088 * -2.8710  -1.7652 * 
dsaus -8.9493 *** -8.9279 *** -8.9704 *** 
sbel -2.1969  -2.3790  -1.2960  
dsbel -8.7319 *** -8.7124 *** -8.7533 *** 
sfin -2.8028 * -3.0270  -1.8239 * 
dsfin -16.2675 *** -16.2329 *** -16.3079 *** 
sfra -1.6310  -2.2344  -0.8773  
dsfra -10.6033 *** -10.5759 *** -10.6243 *** 
snet -2.9372 ** -3.2860 * -1.6924 * 
dsnet -16.3071 *** -16.2648 *** -16.3470 *** 
sgre -1.7686  -2.0855  -1.2711  
dsgre -9.1172 *** -9.0916 *** -9.1355 *** 
sire -1.7243  -1.6850  -1.3778  
dsire -6.2504 *** -9.1809 *** -6.26856 *** 
sita -1.5794  -2.0051  -0.8458  
132 
 
dsita -6.0029 *** -6.0014 *** -6.0154 *** 
spor -2.0920  -2.6250  -1.4610  
dspor -3.2814 ** -3.2767 * -3.2856 *** 
sspa -1.2199  -1.5896  -0.7525  
dsspa -15.9153 *** -15.8773 *** -15.9523 *** 
PRO -0.5032  -2.6831  1.8974  
DPRO -14.9021 *** -14.8802 *** -14.6785 *** 
GEA -2.7226 * -3.0175  -2.6725 *** 
ROP -1.8713  -1.5807  -0.5179  
DROP -14.7486 *** -15.1536 *** -14.7706 *** 
EPU -4.2458 *** -5.4768 *** -0.9633  
MPU -9.7248 *** -9.7814 *** -1.9544 ** 
VOL -5.1159 *** -5.1084 *** -1.2408  
ROV -4.1911 *** -4.3059 *** -1.0974  
Panel B – PP test 
 C  C&T  N  
saus -2.9032 ** -3.1092  -1.8194 * 
dsaus -15.9998  -15.9623  -16.0356  
sbel -2.0776  -2.2072  -1.4210  
dsbel -13.1257 *** -13.0958 *** -13.1562 *** 
sfin -2.6528 * -2.8500  -1.5929  
dsfin -16.3711 *** -16.3363 *** -16.4130 *** 
sfra -2.0494  -2.9174  -1.1646  
dsfra -15.8530 *** -15.8108 *** -15.8879 *** 
snet -2.8441 * -3.2584 * -1.4514  
dsnet -16.4247 *** -16.3806 *** -16.4662 *** 
sgre -2.0743  -2.5055  -1.5425  
dsgre -12.6532 *** -12.6151 *** -12.6850 *** 
sire -1.4466  -1.3400  -1.1536  
dsire -14.0574 *** -14.0594 *** -14.0968 *** 
sita -1.5039  -1.9350  -0.7856  
dsita -14.3449 *** -14.3188 *** -14.3801 *** 
spor -1.5697  -1.8957  -1.0399  
dspor -14.5391 *** -14.5143 *** -14.5668 *** 
sspa -1.3098  -1.4360  -0.8224  
dsspa -15.8201 *** -15.7841 *** -15.9001 *** 
PRO -0.4121  -2.6459  2.0521  
DPRO -14.9939 *** -14.9702 *** -14.7027 *** 
GEA -2.6226 * -2.8973  -2.5606 ** 
ROP -2.0333  -1.9215  -0.6215  
DROP -14.7709 *** -15.1262 *** -14.7922 *** 
EPU -4.0246 *** -5.3311 *** -0.5459  
MPU -9.9827 *** -10.0272 *** -3.2933 *** 
VOL -4.9211 *** -4.9160 *** -1.3640  
ROV -7.0334 *** -7.4156 *** -1.6434 * 
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Note: The table reports the unit root tests of 10-year sovereign yield spreads over Germany 
of core and periphery countries (Austria (saus), Belgium (sbel), Finland (sfin), France (sfra), 
Netherlands (snet), Greece (sgre), Ireland (sire), Italy (sita), Portugal (spor) and Spain 
(sspa)). In addition, it reports the unit root tests of 10-year sovereign yield spreads over 
Germany of core and periphery countries in first differences (Austria (dsaus), Belgium 
(dsbel), Finland (dsfin), France (dsfra), Netherlands (dsnet), Greece (dsgre), Ireland (dsire), 
Italy (dsita), Portugal (dspor) and Spain (dsspa)). Furthermore, it shows the unit root tests 
of oil-market related variables of world oil production in levels (PRO) and first difference 
(DPRO), global economic activity index (GEA) and real oil price in level (ROP) and first 
difference (DROP), as well as, of the control variables European economic policy 
uncertainty index (EPU), the European monetary policy uncertainty index (MPU), the 
European stock market volatility index (VOL) and the realised oil price volatility (ROV) in 
levels. For the ADF and PP unit root tests the null hypothesis is that the series features a 
unit root. In both tests, C denotes constant term, C&T denotes constant and time trend, N 
indicates no deterministic component in the test equation. Asterisk * (**, ***) denotes the 
10% (5%, 1%) significance level. For the core countries, the time period spans from January 
1999 to January 2016. For the periphery countries, the time period spans from January 2001 
to January 2016.   
 
 
Table 4.3 reports the unconditional correlations among sovereign yield spreads (in first 
differences) and the three oil price shocks, based on a linear relationship. We notice 
that negative unconditional correlations are estimated between sovereign yield spreads 
and supply-side shocks (with the exception of Greece), as expected. In addition, 
contrary to our initial hypothesis, we observe positive unconditional correlations 
between sovereign yield spreads and aggregate demand shocks (with the exception of 
the Netherlands). It is also evident that the unconditional correlations between 
sovereign yield spreads and precautionary demand shocks are negative (with the 
exception of Ireland), which is also not anticipated. It should be noted that the findings 
from Table 4.3 hold for the whole period either for core or periphery countries.  
 
Furthermore, in Table 4.4 we report the unconditional correlations during the pre- and 
post-Great Recession periods, which clearly show a change in relationships, especially 
for the aggregate and precautionary demand shocks. These preliminary results motivate 
the use of a time-varying framework. Thus, in order to acquire a thorough picture about 
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the time-varying correlations of the said relationships, a more in-depth analysis is 
carried out in Section 5.36 
 
 
Table 4.3: Unconditional correlations between sovereign 
yield spreads and oil price shocks – whole sample 
 
Supply-side 
shock 
Aggregate 
demand shock 
Precautionary 
demand shock 
saus -0.0676 0.0982 -0.1294 
sbel -0.0721 0.1678 -0.1417 
sfin -0.0922 0.0454 -0.1135 
sfra -0.0596 0.1084 -0.1229 
snet -0.0243 -0.0162 -0.1475 
sgre 0.0110 0.0002 -0.1066 
sire -0.1486 0.0459 0.0803 
sita -0.0770 0.0684 -0.1189 
spor -0.0994 0.1071 -0.0002 
sspa -0.0105 0.0275 -0.0681 
Note: Unconditional correlations between 10-year sovereign yield spreads 
over Germany of core and periphery countries in first differences and 
different oil price shocks. Core countries: Austria (saus), Belgium (sbel), 
Finland (sfin), France (sfra) and the Netherlands (snet). Periphery countries:  
Greece (sgre), Ireland (sire), Italy (sita), Portugal (spor) and Spain (sspa). 
For the core countries, the time period spans from January 1999 to January 
2016. For the periphery countries, the time period spans from January 2001 
to January 2016.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36 The Granger-causality test also confirms the relationship (either bidirectional or unidirectional) 
between oil price shocks and the 10-year government bond yield spreads. For brevity we do not show 
the results here, but they are available upon request. 
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Table 4.4: Unconditional correlations among sovereign 
yield spreads and oil price shocks – divided sample                      
 
Supply-side 
shock 
Aggregate 
demand shock 
Precautionary 
demand shock 
Panel A – Pre-Great Recession 
saus -0.1971 -0.0886 0.1777 
sbel -0.0549 -0.0703 0.1240 
sfin -0.1921 -0.0387 0.1701 
sfra -0.0708 -0.0742 -0.0162 
snet 0.0296 -0.1111 0.0597 
sgre 0.1030 0.0374 0.1347 
sire 0.0857 -0.0700 0.0119 
sita 0.0771 -0.0630 0.0444 
spor 0.1414 0.0416 0.1389 
sspa 0.0823 0.0919 0.0441 
Panel B – Post-Great Recession 
saus -0.0689 0.1220 -0.2616 
sbel -0.1289 0.2018 -0.2778 
sfin -0.0284 0.0698 -0.3257 
sfra 0.0853 0.1428 -0.2032 
snet -0.0826 0.0059 -0.3069 
sgre 0.0130 0.0046 -0.1617 
sire -0.2318 0.0538 -0.1234 
sita 0.1289 0.0829 -0.1872 
spor -0.1616 0.1240 -0.0069 
sspa -0.0250 0.0324 -0.1049 
Note: Unconditional correlations between 10-year sovereign yield spreads 
over Germany of core and periphery countries in first differences and 
different oil price shocks. Core countries: Austria (saus), Belgium (sbel), 
Finland (sfin), France (sfra) and the Netherlands (snet). Periphery countries:  
Greece (sgre), Ireland (sire), Italy (sita), Portugal (spor) and Spain (sspa). 
For the core countries, the time period spans from January 1999 to January 
2016. For the periphery countries, the time period spans from January 2001 
to January 2016. The pre-Great Recession extends until August 2008, 
whereas the post-Great Recession begins in September 2008. 
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4.4. Methodology 
4.4.1 Structural VAR model and historical decomposition 
 
To disaggregate different oil price shocks based on their origin, a SVAR model inspired 
by Kilian (2009) is employed. As previously mentioned, we decompose the oil price 
into supply-side shocks identified by changes in world oil production (𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑡), 
aggregate demand shocks approximated by the global economic activity index (𝐺𝐸𝐴𝑡) 
and precautionary demand shocks represented by changes in the Brent real oil price 
(𝐷𝑅𝑂𝑃𝑡). We highlight that D represents the first difference between the values in 
month t and month t-i.  
 
The use of the SVAR requires imposing restrictions on the parameters which are 
indicating the contemporaneous relationships among the endogenous variables. These 
restrictions are used to identify the structural innovations of the model and are dictated 
by the economic theory. Moreover, the impulse response analysis helps us ascertain the 
impact of an unexpected innovation in one endogenous variable on the other variables 
in the system. Expressed differently, we examine the response of an endogenous 
variable to a one standard deviation shock, to either itself or another variable entering 
the system. 
 
The representation of the SVAR model of order k (where the order k denotes the 
maximum number of lag length reflected in the model) takes the following form: 
 
 𝐴0  𝑍𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝐴𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1 𝑍𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡, (1) 
 
where 𝑍𝑡 is the (3x1) vector of the three aforementioned endogenous variables, i.e. 𝑍𝑡= 
(𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑡, 𝐺𝐸𝐴𝑡 , 𝐷𝑅𝑂𝑃𝑡,), 𝐴0 represents the (3x3) matrix which includes the 
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contemporaneous relations among the variables, 𝛼0 is the (3x1) vector of intercept 
(constant) terms, 𝐴𝑖 is the (3x3) matrix of coefficient parameters which need to be 
estimated for ί = 1,2,3....k , 𝑍𝑡−𝑖 is the vector of lagged endogenous variables and 𝜀𝑡 is 
a (3x1) vector of serially and mutually uncorrelated structural shocks (disturbances) 
which are assumed to have zero covariance.  
 
Our decision to select the AIC is justified by the formal analysis about the lag order 
selection for VAR models provided by Ivanov and Kilian (2005). They document that 
the AIC tends to produce the most accurate impulse response estimates for all realistic 
sample sizes for structural and semi-structural impulse responses in monthly VAR 
models. In a more detailed analysis, they employ six information criteria, namely, the 
Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC), the Hannan-Quinn Criterion (HQC), the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC), the general-to-specific sequential Likelihood Ratio test 
(LR), a small-sample correction to that test (SLR) proposed by Sims (1980), and the 
specific-to-general sequential Portmanteau test interpreted as a Lagrange Multiplier 
(LM) test of a given VAR model for zero coefficient restrictions at higher-order lags 
(see, for example, Lütkepohl, 1993). The authors argue about the accuracy of the AIC 
whose average reduction in mean-squared error can be as high as 27% relative to the 
SIC and 6% relative to the HQC. 
 
In addition, the variance covariance matrix of the structural shocks can be illustrated as 
follows: 
E (𝜀𝑡𝜀𝑡
′)  = 𝐷 =  [
𝜎𝑆𝑆
2 0 0
0 𝜎𝐴𝐷
2 0
0 0 𝜎𝑃𝐷
2
]. (2) 
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We emphasise that the variance covariance matrix of the structural shocks is diagonal, 
given that the structural shocks are assumed to be orthogonal and therefore mutually 
uncorrelated. In Equation 2, E is the unconditional expectations operation, σ2 is the 
variance of a random disturbance term and D is a diagonal matrix. 
 
To estimate the SVAR model, a reduced form representation is required to be 
implemented. Therefore, a reduced form representation of the SVAR model is indicated 
as: 
𝑍𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝐵𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1 𝑍𝑡−𝑖 + 𝑒𝑡. (3) 
 
This process implies that we multiply all parts of the equation (1) by 𝐴0
−1. This process 
implies that 𝛽0 = 𝐴0
−1𝛼0 , 𝐵𝑖 = 𝐴0
−1𝐴𝑖 , and 𝑒𝑡 = 𝐴0
−1𝜀𝑡. We notice that the reduced 
form errors (disturbance terms) 𝑒𝑡 are linear combinations of the structural shocks 𝜀𝑡 . 
In line with the previous analysis, the variance covariance matrix of the reduced form 
errors can be represented as: 
 
𝐸(𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑡
′) = 𝐸[(𝐴0
−1𝜀𝑡)(𝐴0
−1𝜀𝑡)′] = 𝐸(𝐴0
−1𝜀𝑡𝜀𝑡
′𝐴0
−1′) = 𝐴0
−1𝐸(𝜀𝑡𝜀𝑡
′)𝐴0
−1′ =
𝐴0
−1𝐷𝐴0
−1′ = 𝛺. 
(4) 
 
It is worth noting that the reduced form errors are correlated across equations, which is 
in contrast with the structural shocks, and are assumed to be orthogonal and therefore 
mutually uncorrelated. A symmetric positive definite matrix Ω denotes that the entries 
above or below the principal diagonal are non-zero. In this regard, it is necessary to 
orthogonalise the reduced form errors by imposing a structural decomposition. 
Equation (5) shows how the vector of reduced form errors (𝑒𝑡) can be decomposed into 
structural disturbances (𝜀𝑡): 
 
139 
 
𝑒𝑡 = [
𝑒𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂,𝑡
𝑒𝐺𝐸𝐴,𝑡
𝑒𝐷𝑅𝑂𝑃,𝑡
] = 𝐴0
−1𝜀𝑡 = [
𝛼11 0 0
𝛼21 𝛼22 0
𝛼31 𝛼32 𝛼33
] × [
𝜀𝑆𝑆,𝑡
𝜀𝐴𝐷,𝑡
𝜀𝑃𝐷,𝑡
], (5) 
 
where, 𝜀𝑆𝑆,𝑡 denotes the supply-side shocks originated from the world oil production, 
𝜀𝐴𝐷,𝑡 represents the aggregate demand shocks related to the global economic activity 
and 𝜀𝑃𝐷,𝑡 indicates the precautionary demand shocks associated with the real oil price. 
Following Kilian (2009), we impose short-run restrictions on the lower triangular 
matrix 𝐴0
−1 with the aim of detecting the structural shocks of the model. These short-
run restrictions allow us to set all entries located above the principal diagonal to zero. 
It must be mentioned that these short-run restrictions have been well demonstrated, 
explained and verified in Kilian’s (2009) structural analysis. 
 
The short-run restrictions which are imposed in Equation (5) are rationalised as follows. 
First, world oil production may not react contemporaneously to changes in global 
demand for industrial commodities and changes in oil prices. For this reason it takes 
time for the world oil production to adjust to these changes and consequently involves 
high adjustment costs. Nevertheless, world oil production responds contemporaneously 
to supply-side shocks. These short-run restrictions are observed in the first row as: 
𝛼12 = 0, 𝛼13 = 0, and a non-zero 𝛼11. 
 
Second, global economic activity is not instantaneously influenced by changes in oil 
prices due to the sluggishness of global real economy to react to these changes. 
However, global economic activity is contemporaneously affected by supply-side 
shocks and aggregate demand shocks. Similarly, we observe these short-run restrictions 
in the second row as: 𝛼23 = 0, and a non-zero 𝛼21 and 𝛼22. Third, changes in oil prices 
are affected within the same month by supply-side shocks, aggregate demand shocks 
140 
 
and its own innovations. We summarise that all types of shocks are allowed to 
contemporaneously impact oil prices. This is demonstrated by non-zero coefficients in 
the third row.  
 
The ordering of the endogenous variables in the SVAR model is based on the empirical 
study by Kilian (2009). More specifically, Kilian uses three types of oil price shocks 
within the SVAR framework. The recursive identification scheme based on the 
Cholesky decomposition of the oil price shocks requires us to set the correct order 
which entails the first variable in the system to be the least endogenous, and the last 
variable to be the most endogenous. This process guarantees that the first variable is 
not influenced by the remaining two variables and responds only to its own innovations. 
The second variable is responsive to its own changes and innovations originating from 
the first variable but is not affected by shocks generated by the last variable. Finally, 
innovation to the last variable could be triggered by its own changes and events related 
to the first and the second variables.  
 
In a more detailed analysis, Kilian considers the world oil production at the top of the 
system due to high adjustment costs which prevent it from responding 
contemporaneously to changes in oil demand. Then, the global economic activity index 
is placed as the second variable due to its immediate response to oil production changes 
and its own shocks. The oil price as the third variable could be affected by shocks 
generated by the supply-side, the aggregate demand and the oil-specific demand 
innovations. Overall, this process indicates that an innovation to the higher ordering 
variable exercises an instantaneous impact on the lower ordering variable. However, an 
innovation to the lower ordering variable has a lagged instead of an instantaneous effect 
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on the higher ordering variable. Since the Cholesky identification scheme imposes 
causal assumptions, the ordering of the variables matters. According to Kilian (2009), 
the interpretation of SVAR models related to the contemporaneous restrictions of 
different oil price shocks is predetermined by the economic theory. Therefore, any 
alternative identification scheme, such as to allow a delay in responses or a scheme 
unrelated to the Cholesky identification would not be compatible with the economic 
theory and hence we do not consider any other ordering in the set of our variables in 
the SVAR framework. 
 
Next, we proceed to the historical decomposition in order to test the effects of the three 
oil price shocks on real oil price returns at each point in time. Given that the SVAR is 
already estimated, we follow Burbidge and Harrison (1985) who indicate that this 
technique involves three stages. Initially, a SVAR model is utilised to allow the 
identification of the three oil price shocks. Next, we forecast the endogenous variables. 
Finally, we decompose the forecast errors into the cumulative contributions of the 
structural oil price shocks. Thus, the cumulative effects from the three structural oil 
price shocks on the real oil returns are used as explanatory variables and allow 
identifying the importance of each shock at each point in time. To this end, Kilian and 
Park (2009) suggest that the computation of the historical decomposition is important 
in order to gain a clearer understanding of the cumulative effect of these shocks on the 
real oil returns.  
 
4.4.2 Scalar-BEKK model 
 
In order to investigate the dynamic correlation between different oil price shocks and 
the 10-year sovereign yield spread, a time-varying framework is adopted. The Baba-
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Engle-Kraft-Kroner (BEKK) model described in Engle and Kroner (1995) and the 
dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) model introduced by Engle (2002) can be 
viewed as the most commonly used time-varying frameworks that successfully estimate 
dynamic conditional correlations between time series. Both models are considered as 
multivariate generalised autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (MGARCH) 
specifications. However, empirical evidence that has been supplied by Caporin and 
McAleer (2008, 2012) indicates the superiority of BEKK for estimating conditional 
correlations. Filis (2014) and Broadstock and Filis (2013) show respect for the 
empirical findings of Caporin and McAleer (2008, 2012) in their research regarding the 
use of time-varying models and underline the advantages of employing a BEKK model. 
Thus, we adopt a BEKK framework instead of using the DCC framework. 
 
Turning our attention to the BEKK framework, we should not lose sight of the fact that 
a standard (general) BEKK contains a large number of parameters and computational 
problems. For example, a standard BEKK requires the estimation of (n(n + 1) / 2) + 
2n2 parameters. These issues are improved with the use of a scalar-BEKK in which the 
number of estimated parameters is significantly smaller as (n(n + 1) / 2) + 2 parameters 
require estimation. 
 
The structure of the scalar-BEKK can be presented as: 
 
𝒚𝑡 = + 𝜹 𝑿𝑡−1 + 𝑡 
𝑡 = 𝑯𝑡
1/2
𝒛𝑡 
𝒛𝑡 𝑁𝐼𝐷(𝟎, 𝑰𝑁) 
𝑯𝑡 = 𝑯𝑡
1/2
(𝑯𝑡
1/2
)′ 
(6) 
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In this context, the (n x 1) vector 𝑦𝑡 relates to the multivariate stochastic process to be 
predicted and contains the variables of interest. Specifically, 𝒚𝑡 = (𝑦1,𝑡, 𝑦2,𝑡)′, where 
𝑦1,𝑡 denotes each one of the oil price shocks and 𝑦2,𝑡 represents the 10-year sovereign 
yield spread, at time t. Similarly, 𝑡 = (1,𝑡, 2,𝑡)′ is the vector of unexpected random 
shocks (errors) and reflects the innovations (news) for each variable at time t. Thus, the 
innovations are shocks to the variables of interest. Furthermore, the vector  represents 
the constant vector of means, 𝑯𝑡
1/2
 is a (n x n) matrix, which is obtained by a Cholesky 
decomposition, 𝒛𝑡 is a (n x 1) vector process which is assumed to follow a standard 
normal distribution such that 𝐸(𝒛𝑡) = 𝟎 and 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝒛𝑡) = 𝐸(𝒛𝑡𝒛𝑡
′) = 𝑰𝑁 with the latter 
(𝑰𝑁) to express an (n x n) identity matrix.
37 38 
 
In the spirit of Degiannakis et al. (2016), a set of control variables (𝑿) are also included 
in the mean equation, in order to accommodate any omitted variable bias. In particular, 
vector 𝑿 includes the European Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU), European 
Monetary Policy Uncertainty (MPU), as well as stock market and oil price volatilities 
(VOL and ROV, respectively). Their use is motivated by the fact that previous research 
has convincingly shown their impact on both bond yields and oil prices (see, for 
instance, Arora and Cerisola, 2001, Barsky and Kilian, 2002, Anzuini et al., 2012, 
                                                 
37 In this study, our empirical analysis based on the equation 𝐲t = (y1,t, y2,t)′, where y1,t denotes each 
one of the oil price shocks and y2,t represents the 10-year sovereign yield spread, at time t. However, an 
alternative approach implies the modelling of all oil shock components and sovereign risk spread 
component as a complete system. In this regard, the equation has been changes and presented as: 𝐲t =
(y1,t, y2,t, y3,t, y4,t)′, where y1,t denotes the supply-side shock, y2,t denotes the aggregate demand shock, 
y3,t denotes the precautionary demand shock and y4,t represents the 10-year sovereign yield spread, at 
time t. Overall, our results appear to be qualitatively similar for both approaches. 
38 In the analysis of our scalar-BEKK, the error term is allowed to follow a t distribution. Hence, 
allowance is made for the error term in order to follow a t distribution which has fatter tails than the 
normal. In this regard, we expect a greater chance to obtain extreme patterns that fall far from their mean. 
By modelling all oil shock components and sovereign risk spread components as a complete system and 
further having allowed a t distribution with fatter tails within this system, we document that our results 
appear to be qualitatively similar. 
144 
 
Antonakakis et al., 2014, Afonso et al., 2015, Bernal et al., 2016, Husted et al., 2017, 
Shahzad et al., 2017). Hence, their inclusion allows us to separate any impact of the 
aforementioned variables on the time-varying relationship between oil price shocks and 
bond yield spreads.39 Finally, 𝜹 denotes vector of coefficients to be estimated for each 
control variable. We also estimate the scalar-BEKK model excluding the vector of the 
control variables (𝑿) from the mean equation so to allow relevant comparisons. 
 
The variance-covariance matrix, 𝑯𝑡, is estimated assuming a first-order GARCH 
process, such as that: 
 
𝑯𝑡 = 𝑪𝑪
′ + 𝑨𝑡−1 𝑡−1
′ 𝑨′ + 𝑩𝑯𝑡−1𝑩
′, (7) 
 
where C is an (n x n) lower triangular matrix, whereas the A and B are (n x n) square 
parameter matrices. Specifically, matrix A reflects the news shock and matrix B 
represents the persistence in conditional volatility.  
 
In addition, as proposed by Ding and Engle (2001) the scalar-BEKK representation 
implies that A =  𝑰𝑁  and B =  𝑰𝑁, where  and  are positive scalars. Hence, A and B 
are matrices of ones and proportional to the 𝐼𝑁 and the scalar-BEKK can be written as: 
 
𝑯𝑡 = 𝑪𝑪
′ + 𝛼2(
𝑡−1
 𝑡−1
′ ) + 𝛽2𝑯𝑡−1 (8) 
 
which in turn indicates a single parameter in each of the two matrices and consequently 
suggests the scalar-BEKK as the most restricted version of BEKK models. The matrix 
                                                 
39 Despite the fact that the EPU, MPU and VOL are readily available, the ROV is constructed as 
follows: 𝑅𝑂𝑉𝑡 = 100√12∑ (𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑅𝑂𝑃𝑡𝑘 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑅𝑂𝑃𝑡𝑘−1)
2𝜏
𝑘=1 , where 𝑅𝑂𝑃𝑡𝑘  denotes the real oil prices of 
day k at month t. 
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of constants is decomposed into two triangular matrices, 𝑪 and 𝑪′, to ensure that 𝑪𝑪′ is 
a positive definite matrix. Consequently, 𝑯𝑡 is also positive definite.   
 
Finally, the time-varying correlation at time t (
𝑡
) between two series i (10-year 
sovereign yield spread) and j (each of the oil price shocks) is expressed as: 
 

𝑖𝑗,𝑡
=
ℎ𝑖𝑗,𝑡
√ℎ𝑖𝑖,𝑡√ℎ𝑗𝑗,𝑡
 (9) 
 
where the numerator expresses the non-diagonal element of 𝑯𝑡 (the time-varying 
conditional covariance term between i and j) and the denominator states the square roots 
of the diagonal elements of 𝑯𝑡 (the time-varying conditional volatilities of i and j). 
Overall, technical details for the estimation process of the scalar-BEKK40 are available 
in Xekalaki and Degiannakis (2010). Having explained the empirical framework, we 
further proceed to investigate the time-varying correlation between the variables under 
consideration. 
 
In considering the differences between the BEKK and the DCC models, we make 
reference to the empirical analysis by Caporin and McAleer (2008, 2010) who examine 
the suitability of the two models. They document a number of similarities, such as the 
ability to forecast conditional correlations, conditional variances, covariances and 
consequently VAR thresholds. The authors indicate that the asymptotic properties of 
                                                 
40 The asymmetric BEKK has been proposed by Kroner and Ng (1998) and represents an extension of 
the BEKK in which the variance-covariance matrix is not only dependent on the magnitude of past 
squared return innovations but also on the sign of the past squared return innovations. To this end, the 
BEKK model includes the elements of an additional matrix which reflects the potential asymmetric 
volatility transmission between oil price shock and sovereign yield spreads. The results show that the 
asymmetric coefficient (denoted as D1 is significant at the five per cent significance level only in the 
cases of Greece and Portugal. Although there is some evidence of asymmetry, this does not change the 
overall findings of this chapter. This supports our decision to employ a scalar-BEKK than the asymmetric 
BEKK.” 
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BEKK have been specified under a set of untestable moment conditions while DCC 
possessed asymptotic properties under a set of untestable regularity conditions. More 
specifically, they argue that the scalar BEKK restricted specification is the model in 
which the number of parameters can be reduced considerably. This is because in the 
unrestricted version of both models, the number of parameters increases quite rapidly 
with the model dimensionality which is associated with the number of financial assets 
in a portfolio. Therefore, the authors consider the superiority of BEKK model for 
estimating either conditional correlations or conditional covariances. In turn, this 
reinforces our decision to employ a scalar BEKK rather than a DCC econometric 
framework. 
 
On the other hand, turning to the differences between the BEKK and the Copula 
models, Lee and Long (2009) attempt to model MGARCH for non-normal multivariate 
distributions. They propose an innovative model named a Copula-based Multivariate 
GARCH model which allows modelling conditional correlation (by DCC, BEKK and 
varying correlation (VC)) as well as dependence structure (by a Copula) separately and 
simultaneously. By employing three foreign exchange rates, their empirical analysis 
provide evidence that the Copula is the optimal model in terms of out-of-sample 
multivariate density forecast and in-sample model selection compared with DCC, 
BEKK and VC. Overall, they claim that the choice of Copula functions instead of 
volatility models is preferable when correlation and dependence are employed at the 
same time. Thus, Copula functions can be a tool regarding avenues for future study in 
terms of multivariate modelling in order to designate the dependence between two or 
more random variables. 
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On a final note, it should be mentioned that the scalar-BEKK model is regarded as a 
more parsimonious model among complex MGARCH specifications. This is due to the 
fewer number of parameters to be estimated which makes the scalar-BEKK as the 
MGARCH with lowest complexity. This warrants that parsimonious models are more 
persuasive and provide more reasonable interpretations. 
 
4.5. Empirical analysis 
4.5.1 Historical decomposition of oil price shocks and the time-line of major events 
 
The historical decomposition of the real oil returns and consequently the cumulative 
effect of supply-side shocks, aggregate demand shocks and precautionary demand 
shocks on the real oil returns are presented in Figure 4.5. It is evident that precautionary 
demand shocks have a higher historical contribution, followed by aggregate demand 
shocks and then supply-side shocks. It is worth noting that the historical contribution 
of precautionary demand shocks has mainly fluctuated between -20% and 20%. 
Similarly, the percentage level of aggregate demand shocks has mostly ranged between 
-5% and 5%. Finally, the percentage contribution of supply-side shocks has not 
exceeded the level of 0.5%. Overall, real oil returns appear to be more responsive to 
geopolitical events and generally fears about the future availability of oil. 
 
The higher magnitude of precautionary demand shocks at each point in time can be 
explained by the fact that geopolitical risk includes a broad range of interrelated events, 
such as political instability, military conflicts, terrorist attacks, civil wars, embargos, 
financial and macroeconomic uncertainty, supply constraints on commodities and other 
globally trade assets. On the other hand, aggregate demand shocks do not seem to 
influence significantly real oil returns until the onset of the Great Recession. These 
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shocks appear to have a greater impact on the sharp fall in oil price during the period 
2007-2009 and the period 2014-2015. Finally, supply-side shocks do not seem to 
contribute significantly to real oil returns since the magnitude is very small. 
 
Figure 4.5: Historical decomposition of real oil price returns 
 
Note: This Figure exhibits the historical decomposition of the real oil price returns at each point in time based on the origin 
of the oil price shock. SS denotes the supply-side shock, AD represents the aggregate demand shock and PD reflects the 
precautionary demand shock. The sample period runs from January 1999 to January 2016. 
 
 
Next, we concentrate on specific events during which significant oil price movements 
(peaks and troughs) took place and generated either supply-side or demand-side oil 
price shocks.41 Through a time-line, we pay particular attention to the early-2000 
                                                 
41 Previous studies based on a time-line of major events in the oil market that investigate time-varying 
correlations between oil markets and stock markets include papers by Antonakakis et al. (2017), 
Boldanov et al. (2016), Broadstock and Filis (2014), Antonakakis and Filis (2013), Degiannakis et al. 
(2013) and Filis et al. (2011). A common feature of the aforementioned studies reveals that the 
correlations are time-varying, and the magnitude of the correlations differs at different events.  
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recession, the terrorist attack of 9/11 (2001), the second Iraq war (2003), the Atlantic 
hurricanes (late-2005), the increased demand for oil from emerging market countries 
such as China (2006-2007), the Great Recession (2007-2009), the European debt crisis 
(2010-2013), the Arab Spring together with continuing geopolitical turmoil in the 
Middle East (2011-2014) and finally the oil price crash (mid-2014 - early-2015).  
 
Linking these episodes with the oil price shocks, we note that supply-side shocks are 
typically associated with OPEC’s decisions to cut or increase production quotas and 
natural disasters which cause a physical disruption in oil supply. On the other hand, 
aggregate demand shocks originate during turbulent economic periods, whereas 
precautionary demand shocks are linked with episodes of geopolitical uncertainty.  
 
4.5.2 Time-varying correlation between oil price shocks and sovereign yield spreads 
 
4.5.2.1 Key research findings 
 
Figures 4.6 – 4.10 exhibit the time-varying correlations between each of the three oil 
price shocks and the 10-year sovereign yield spread of each core country, while Figures 
4.11 – 4.15 display the time-varying correlations between each of the three oil price 
shocks and the 10-year sovereign yield spread of each periphery country. It should be 
mentioned that we observe the time-varying correlations having included the control 
variables to capture the omitted variable bias issue (solid line). Also, we provide the 
time-varying correlations having excluded the control variables (dashed line).42 
                                                 
42 Although our analysis is mainly relies upon visual illustrations about the correlation patterns between 
different oil shocks and sovereign yield spreads, an additional analysis provides lower and upper bounds 
in order to test the significance of the correlation patterns within a time-line of major events in the oil 
market. The diagrams that are been provided show clearly the fluctuations which occur in the correlation 
coefficients and the extent to which these are distributed about the mean. Overall, it is evident that the 
correlation patterns show a significant response to events that played a significant role and affected the 
oil market. 
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Figure 4.6: Time-varying correlations between oil price shocks and the 10-year sovereign yield spread 
of Austria 
 
Note: This Figure depicts the time-varying correlation between supply-side shocks, aggregate demand shocks, precautionary 
demand shocks and the 10-year Austrian sovereign yield spread (the difference between the Austrian sovereign bond yield and the 
yield on the German Bund). The solid line (dashed line) shows the correlation that includes (excludes) the control variables related 
to the omitted variable bias issue. The time period spans from January 1999 to January 2016. 
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Figure 4.7: Time-varying correlations between oil price shocks and the 10-year sovereign yield spread 
of Belgium 
 
Note: This Figure depicts the time-varying correlation between supply-side shocks, aggregate demand shocks, precautionary demand 
shocks and the 10-year Belgian sovereign yield spread (the difference between the Belgian sovereign bond yield and the yield on the 
German Bund). The solid line (dashed line) shows the correlation that includes (excludes) the control variables related to the omitted 
variable bias issue. The time period spans from January 1999 to January 2016. 
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Figure 4.8: Time-varying correlations between oil price shocks and the 10-year sovereign yield spread 
of Finland 
 
Note: This Figure depicts the time-varying correlation between supply-side shocks, aggregate demand shocks, precautionary 
demand shocks and the 10-year Finish sovereign yield spread (the difference between the Finish sovereign bond yield and the yield 
on the German Bund). The solid line (dashed line) shows the correlation that includes (excludes) the control variables related to the 
omitted variable bias issue. The time period spans from January 1999 to January 2016. 
 
 
153 
 
Figure 4.9: Time-varying correlations between oil price shocks and the 10-year sovereign yield spread 
of France 
 
Note: This Figure depicts the time-varying correlation between supply-side shocks, aggregate demand shocks, precautionary 
demand shocks and the 10-year French sovereign yield spread (the difference between the French sovereign bond yield and the 
yield on the German Bund). The solid line (dashed line) shows the correlation that includes (excludes) the control variables related 
to the omitted variable bias issue. The time period spans from January 1999 to January 2016. 
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Figure 4.10: Time-varying correlations between oil price shocks and the 10-year sovereign yield 
spread of the Netherlands 
 
Note: This Figure depicts the time-varying correlation between supply-side shocks, aggregate demand shocks, precautionary 
demand shocks and the 10-year Dutch sovereign yield spread (the difference between the Dutch sovereign bond yield and the 
yield on the German Bund). The solid line (dashed line) shows the correlation that includes (excludes) the control variables 
related to the omitted variable bias issue. The time period spans from January 1999 to January 2016. 
 
155 
 
Figure 4.11: Time-varying correlations between oil price shocks and the 10-year sovereign yield spread 
of Greece 
 
Note: This Figure depicts the time-varying correlation between supply-side shocks, aggregate demand shocks, precautionary demand 
shocks and the 10-year Greek sovereign yield spread (the difference between the Greek sovereign bond yield and the yield on the 
German Bund). The solid line (dashed line) shows the correlation that includes (excludes) the control variables related to the omitted 
variable bias issue. The time period spans from January 2001 to January 2016. 
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Figure 4.12: Time-varying correlations between oil price shocks and the 10-year sovereign yield spread 
of Ireland 
 
Note: This Figure depicts the time-varying correlation between supply-side shocks, aggregate demand shocks, precautionary demand 
shocks and the 10-year Irish sovereign yield spread (the difference between the Irish sovereign bond yield and the yield on the 
German Bund). The solid line (dashed line) shows the correlation that includes (excludes) the control variables related to the omitted 
variable bias issue. The time period spans from January 2001 to January 2016. 
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Figure 4.13: Time-varying correlations between oil price shocks and the 10-year sovereign yield 
spread of Italy 
 
Note: This Figure depicts the time-varying correlation between supply-side shocks, aggregate demand shocks, precautionary 
demand shocks and the 10-year Italian sovereign yield spread (the difference between the Italian sovereign bond yield and the 
yield on the German Bund). The solid line (dashed line) shows the correlation that includes (excludes) the control variables related 
to the omitted variable bias issue. The time period spans from January 2001 to January 2016. 
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Figure 4.14: Time-varying correlations between oil price shocks and the 10-year sovereign yield spread 
of Portugal 
 
Note: This Figure depicts the time-varying correlation between supply-side shocks, aggregate demand shocks, precautionary demand 
shocks and the 10-year Portuguese sovereign yield spread (the difference between the Portuguese sovereign bond yield and the yield 
on the German Bund). The solid line (dashed line) shows the correlation that includes (excludes) the control variables related to the 
omitted variable bias issue. The time period spans from January 2001 to January 2016. 
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Figure 4.15: Time-varying correlations between oil price shocks and the 10-year sovereign yield 
spread of Spain 
 
Note: This Figure depicts the time-varying correlation between supply-side shocks, aggregate demand shocks, precautionary 
demand shocks and the 10-year Spanish sovereign yield spread (the difference between the Spanish sovereign bond yield and the 
yield on the German Bund). The solid line (dashed line) shows the correlation that includes (excludes) the control variables related 
to the omitted variable bias issue. The time period spans from January 2001 to January 2016. 
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Primarily, we focus our attention on some noteworthy features in order to paint an initial 
picture of the aforementioned relationship. It is evident that the correlations of both 
core and periphery countries are time-varying, which justifies the use of a dynamic 
rather than a static approach. Furthermore, we observe that the correlation patterns 
fluctuate and contain both positive and negative values. It is also apparent that 
correlations are influenced by the origin of the oil price shock and hence the trend of 
the correlations exhibits heterogeneous behaviour with respect to different oil price 
shocks during different time periods. More importantly, the differences in the two time-
varying correlation lines suggest that the control variables are, on the whole, 
fundamental to determining the relationship between oil prices shocks and yield 
spreads. Therefore, these first observations provide support for the choice of our 
econometric framework and confirm that the origin of the oil price shock significantly 
matters to the correlation patterns and requires particular attention when we examine 
the link between oil prices and sovereign risk. 
 
Turning our attention to country-specific time-varying correlations (focusing on the 
solid lines), it would seem that they do not provide support for our first hypothesis. In 
particular, the correlations are fluctuating very close to zero for all countries, except in 
the cases of France and Belgium (positive in the post-Great Recession period), as well 
as a clear negative correlation during 2001-2005, which is evident for all core countries. 
As far as the aggregate demand shocks are concerned, the results reveal that the second 
hypothesis seems to hold as on the whole, the correlations are negative. The only 
exception of substance is the 2009-2011 period, over which the correlations between 
aggregate demand shocks and yield spreads are positive. Finally, we maintain that our 
third hypothesis is largely confirmed since a positive correlation pattern is clearly 
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exhibited for all countries, with very few exceptions (e.g., in France and Belgium during 
2014-2015 and 2009, as well as in France, alone, during 2005-2006. Therefore, we 
document that the correlation patterns broadly show more conformity to our 
expectations regarding aggregate demand shocks and precautionary demand shocks, 
which reinforces our decision to construct and test three hypotheses. 
 
It is interesting to observe that correlation levels are relatively close to zero until the 
beginning of the Great Recession, which primarily holds for the EMU periphery 
countries. This can be attributed to the fact that this period is closely related to the first 
years of transition to EMU and coincides with the convergence of sovereign bond yields 
(especially for the EMU periphery) and thus the minimisation of spreads (see, for 
example, Baele et al., 2004, Pagano and Von Thadden 2004, Codogno et al., 2003, 
Hartmann et al., 2003, Adam et al., 2002). Indeed, since the beginning of the transition 
until the early stage of the Great Recession, the difference between the 10-year bond 
yield issued by an EMU member-country and the German 10-year bond yield fluctuated 
within a very narrow range. In this regard, macroeconomic imbalances between core 
and periphery countries seemed to be ignored by the bond markets, which explains our 
findings of low or nearly zero correlation patterns between sovereign yield spreads and 
oil price shocks. 
 
Furthermore, our results interestingly suggest that since the mid-2008 (which coincides 
with the most severe stage of the Great Recession) onwards, our correlations do not 
exhibit this low or almost zero patterns but instead they reveal moderate correlation 
levels with more volatile behaviour. Indeed, the deterioration of the macroeconomic 
fundamentals raised questions regarding the degree of financial integration of the 
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European government bond markets and shed more light into the actual relationship 
between sovereign yield spreads and oil price shocks. 
 
4.5.2.2 Pre-Great Recession period 
 
We continue our analysis by investigating the time-varying correlations between the 
sovereign yield spreads of core and periphery countries and different oil price shocks 
during specific episodes that were identified in the previous section. Initially, we refer 
to the pre-Great Recession period.  
 
The early-2000 period is characterised by a recession in the world’s largest developed 
economies (US and EMU) and is primarily associated with a negative aggregate 
demand shock, pushing oil prices to lower levels. The negative correlations of the bond 
yield spreads with the latter shock are justified by the fact that German bond market 
was perceived as a safe heaven, relative to the other European bonds. This implies that 
bond yields exhibited an increasing trend. However, the German Bund was less 
responsive to this event in comparison with the bond yields of the rest of the countries. 
Since this period does not imply important supply-side or precautionary demand events, 
our findings mostly reveal evidence of no correlation between sovereign yield spreads 
and supply-side or precautionary demand shocks. 
 
Next, we focus on the terrorist attack of September (9/11) 2001 in the US, which exerted 
a strong negative impact on not only economic activity in the US but also output in the 
global economy, and caused, primarily, a precautionary demand shock, driving the oil 
prices towards higher levels. Our findings indicate, on the whole, a positive correlation 
between sovereign yield spreads and precautionary demand shocks, which is, as has 
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been mentioned, in line with our initial expectations. Such behaviour is expected given 
that European countries, which are among the most prominent trade partners with the 
US, are expected to be impacted by the geopolitical uncertainty caused by the terrorist 
attacks. Once again, though, it is anticipated that Germany’s economy, and hence its 
bond, would be less sensitive than the remaining European government bonds, leading 
the bond yield spreads to higher levels. 
 
The next period covers the second war in Iraq that occurred in 2003, which is indicative 
of geopolitical uncertainty related to concerns about oil supply disruptions and 
consequently has the interpretation of a precautionary demand shock. Our results 
illustrate the expected correlations between sovereign yield spreads and the three oil 
price shocks. Interestingly, though, the largest peaks in the correlations between yield 
spreads and precautionary demand shocks are observed for the core EMU countries. 
This might suggest that the specific event caused more turbulence to the economies of 
these countries rather than the EMU periphery.  
 
Continuing our analysis, we concentrate on the late-2005 period which featured the 
impact of the three Atlantic hurricanes, Katrina (August), Rita (September) and Wilma 
(October), and triggered supply-side shocks. We observe that, even though the 
anticipated correlations between sovereign yield spreads and the two demand-side oil 
price shocks are evident, the correlations with the supply-side shocks are mainly very 
close to zero. A plausible explanation for such a finding can be traced to the empirical 
evidence which suggests that supply-side shocks do not seem to trigger any responses 
from the financial markets. This is in line with previous studies which have confirmed 
the insignificant effects of supply-side shocks on stock markets (see, inter alia, 
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Degiannakis et al., 2014, Filis et al., 2011). Therefore, oil supply disruptions during this 
period does not appear to raise concerns in the European government bond markets.  
 
Finally, the period 2006-2007 is largely associated with the Chinese economic growth 
(rising demand for oil) and more generally the growth of emerging economies, which 
caused positive aggregate demand shocks. Our findings mainly confirm the anticipated 
negative correlations between sovereign yield spreads and aggregate demand shocks, 
although it is apparent that the correlations of the periphery countries are closer to zero. 
In fact, during this period the bond yields of core EMU countries, vis-a-vis the German 
Bund, are decreasing, while a flat yield spread is evident for the periphery countries. 
Hence, we maintain that this behaviour explains the higher magnitude of the 
correlations of the core countries, relative to the almost zero correlation level of the 
periphery countries. Furthermore, such a finding may be also explained by the fact that 
the Chinese economy is engaging more with the core EMU countries. 
 
4.5.2.3 During and after the Great Recession 
 
As far as the Great Recession (2007-2009) is concerned, we observe that during the 
second half of this period (i.e. late-2008 to 2009) a strong positive correlation 
(especially with the supply-side and aggregate demand shocks) between sovereign yield 
spreads and the three oil price shocks for all countries (with the exception of Belgium 
and France). This is a period when we experienced the collapse of the global oil prices 
from a peak of about $145 to $30 in less than a year, while at the same time bond yield 
spreads were also decreasing (particularly between German Bund and the bonds of the 
core EMU countries) in recognition that the Great Recession was coming to an end. 
The observed peak in most correlation figures during 2008-2009, while accommodating 
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the effects of economic-related variables, provides further evidence of the close 
relationship between oil price shocks and bond yield spreads. 
 
Continuing with the European debt crisis period that covers the remaining part of our 
sample period (2010-2016), we observe the considerable widening of the bond yield 
spreads, which coincided with several geopolitical events in the Middle East, as well 
as, the oil price slump in 2014-2015, when oil prices dropped by almost 75%. Having 
removed the potential effects of the economic-related variables (such as EPU, MPU 
and VOL), our findings reveal that the EMU bond yield spreads are strongly positively 
related to the precautionary demand shocks caused by the Middle East unrest. At the 
same time, given that this period also triggered negative aggregate demand shocks in 
the oil market, we further observe the anticipated negative correlations between 
sovereign yield spreads and aggregate demand shocks, which is particularly evident for 
the EMU periphery, possibly due to the fact that these economies are more vulnerable 
to abrupt changes in the oil market.  
 
In addition, our findings suggest that the correlations between sovereign yield spreads 
and supply-side shocks during 2010-2016 are virtually zero for all countries, with the 
exceptions of the positive correlations in the cases of Belgium and France. The Arab 
Spring caused precautionary demand oil price shocks, as was mentioned earlier, while 
at the same time the real oil disruptions of the period also triggered some supply-side 
shocks. The fact that only Belgium and the French bond yield spreads are associated 
with the supply-side shocks can be explained by the fact that these are the two countries 
within our sample that have the strongest links with the Arab world. For instance, in 
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2015, about 34 million tons of crude oil which were imported to France came from the 
North Africa and the Middle East.43 
 
Finally, with reference to the oil price slump of 2014-2015, it should be underlined that 
this period is dominated by aggregate demand shocks, as well as supply-side shocks. It 
is evident that during this period the correlation between bond yield spreads and 
precautionary demand shocks are reverting to zero, while the expected negative 
correlation with the aggregate demand shocks is mostly confirmed. Once again, the lack 
of strong correlations between the bond yield spreads and the supply-side shocks during 
2014-2015 reveals the lack of importance of such shocks to the financial markets.  
 
4.5.2.4 Some further remarks 
 
Summarising our findings, we are able to point out one additional interesting feature. 
In particular, we do not observe noticeable differences in the correlation patterns 
between core and periphery countries, although more persistent positive or negative 
relationships are reported for the EMU periphery countries. A plausible explanation 
regarding the very little evidence of differentiation is that periphery countries appeared 
to be more dependent on oil imports (see, for instance, Gibson et al., 2012). In contrast, 
core countries might be less dependent on oil imports since they also use other sources 
of energy such as renewable or nuclear energy.44 Reasonably, core countries will also 
be affected by oil price fluctuations. However, the magnitude of these responses is 
expected to be somewhat lower compared with those of periphery countries.  
                                                 
43 For more information, see: https://www.statista.com/statistics/745580/france-crude-oil-imported-by-
region/ 
44 The source of the information can be found on the Our Finite World site: 
https://ourfiniteworld.com/2012/03/05/why-high-oil-prices-are-now-affecting-europe-more-than-the-
us/#comments 
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Hence, we provide support for a link between the oil market and sovereign risk. These 
new insights contribute greatly to the existing literature. For example, a number of 
recent studies which examine the link between oil and sovereign risk (i) do not 
concentrate their attention on the substantial European market which is, on aggregate, 
the largest oil-importer in the world, (ii) have not considered the disaggregation of oil 
prices to the different oil price shocks and (iii) have underplayed the importance of the 
time-varying approach. However, we have convincingly shown in this study that the 
aforementioned relationship is dependent on not only the different oil price shocks but 
also the different time periods when key economic and geopolitical events have taken 
place. 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
The aim of this study is to investigate the time-varying correlation between different 
shocks originating from the oil market and the 10-year sovereign yield spread of core 
and periphery countries in the EMU. We employ a set of five core countries (Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France and Netherlands) and five periphery countries (Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain). In addition, we employ a set of control variables that 
impacts both the oil prices and sovereign yields, in order to capture the omitted variable 
bias issue. We use monthly data over the period from January 1999 to January 2016 for 
the core countries, whereas the sample period spans from January 2001 to January 2016 
for the periphery countries. A scalar-BEKK time-varying framework is employed to 
explore the above relationship. Overall, this study expands the existing literature not 
only in examining the origin of the oil price change to test the aforementioned 
relationship but also in terms of introducing a time-varying rather than a static 
framework. 
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Our findings suggest some interesting empirical regularities. First, we cannot offer 
support to our first hypothesis regarding the negative correlation patterns between 
supply-side shocks and sovereign yield spreads. By contrast, our hypotheses regarding 
the two demand side shocks are generally supported by the evidence provided in this 
study. Second, the relationship between the different oil price shocks and sovereign 
yield spreads is indeed time-varying and depends on specific economic and geopolitical 
events that took place during the study period. Third, the correlation patterns appear to 
be less volatile in the pre-2008 period and passed into moderate and more volatile 
patterns in the post-2008 period. Finally, we do not observe important evidence of 
differentiation in the correlation patterns regarding the behaviour of core and periphery 
countries to different oil price shocks.  
 
Our findings have important implications for financial market participants, in 
particular. For instance, it is worth noting that the time-varying correlations among oil 
price shocks and sovereign yield spreads could inform their dynamic asset allocation 
and portfolio diversification strategies. Therefore, although (high quality) sovereign 
bonds can act as a hedging instrument in periods of economic and geopolitical turmoil 
(see Bessler and Wolff, 2014), when bonds gain value, the degree to which they can be 
used to hedge risky investments will also depend on the oil price shocks over the period 
when such hedging is required. In addition, when contemplating investing in both oil 
and bond markets, consideration should be given to oil price developments, since 
aggregate demand shocks may serve in favour of great diversification opportunities 
(due to the negative correlations), whereas precautionary demand shocks could result 
in diminishing such opportunities (due to the positive correlations).  
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Further research may examine the time-varying relationship between oil prices (or their 
shocks) and the 10-year sovereign yield spread for economies that are not included in 
this study, such as Eastern European, North America, Asian and Latin America 
countries, as well as, for both oil-importing (i.e., China, Japan and the US) and oil-
exporting countries (i.e., Norway, Russia, Canada and Mexico). The use of CDS 
spreads as an alternative proxy to measure sovereign risk is another promising area for 
further research. Finally, another avenue for future research may be to consider the 
examination of the time-varying correlation between oil prices changes and short-term 
sovereign yield spreads.  
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Chapter 5: Financial effects of precautionary demand for oil  
5.1. Introduction 
Since the seminal theoretical work by Barsky and Kilian (2002, 2004), and 
subsequently the quantitative analysis by Kilian (2009) followed by Hamilton 
(2009a,b) and Kilian and Park (2009), the origin of oil price shocks has become subject 
to intense debate in academic research and has further spurred a growing interest in the 
theme. Kilian (2009) disentangles three different types of oil price shocks, namely, 
supply-side shocks, aggregate demand-induced shocks and precautionary demand 
shocks. More specifically, supply-side shocks occur due to changes in world oil 
production, aggregate demand-side shocks arise from fluctuations in the global 
business cycle, while precautionary demand shocks are driven by concerns about the 
future availability of oil.  
 
Although Kilian (2009) associates the precautionary demand shock with the 
convenience yield, he does not explicitly use the latter in his structural vector 
autoregressive model (SVAR). The convenience yield measures the benefits of holding 
barrels of oil. Brennan and Schwartz (1985) argue that the convenience yield refers to 
the benefits that accrue to the owner of the physical spot commodity (barrels of oil) but 
not to the owner of a future delivery of the commodity (oil futures contracts). In 
addition, Schwartz (1997) explains that the convenience yield depends on the scarcity 
of the barrels of oil and the changes in the inventory levels of the oil sector.  
 
In this chapter, we evaluate the financial effects of a precautionary demand shock 
driven by the convenience yield. To this end, we build upon and extend Kilian’s (2009) 
model that studies variation over time in precautionary demand shocks, along with 
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supply-side and aggregate demand shocks. As aforementioned, precautionary demand 
shocks can be attributed to the uncertainty about the future availability of oil, which is 
generated by geopolitical unrest, primarily in the Middle East (e.g., the Arab Spring), 
but also elsewhere. Political tensions, conflicts and civil wars, not only in the Middle 
Eastern countries but also in North African region countries are only a few examples 
of severe concerns about shortages in future oil supply. Such events can cause an 
instantaneous increase in precautionary demand for oil, lead to greater demand for 
inventories and consequently trigger an immediate rise in the price of oil. 
 
In particular, holders of barrels of oil (inventories) gain the value of the convenience 
yield (access to inventory holdings) which serves as an insurance premium against the 
aforementioned unexpected changes in the oil market. This allows oil producers to 
successfully overcome interruption or suspension of oil production, or to benefit from 
unanticipated variation in oil demand. The convenience yield makes the storage of oil 
more (less) valuable if market participants anticipate lower (higher) availability of oil 
in the future. Put it differently, the higher the uncertainty about the future availability 
of oil, the higher the oil convenience yield would be. As previously mentioned, 
precautionary demand for oil arises because of the uncertainty about the future 
availability of oil. Since the convenience yield measures the benefits associated with 
increasing expectations about future oil supply shortfalls and hence higher uncertainty 
in the oil market, it can be used to measure precautionary demand.45 
 
                                                 
45Alquist and Kilian (2010) employ a general equilibrium model to justify the extent to which shifts in 
expectations about future oil supply shortfalls can be explained by fluctuations in the convenience yield.  
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While research into the economic and financial effects of the oil price shocks on the 
economy is growing46, the origins of precautionary demand and its economic and 
financial effects have received less attention. Specifically, our research is primarily 
motivated by Alquist and Kilian (2010) and Kilian (2009) who substantially clarify the 
nature of the precautionary demand shock in the oil market. As previously stated, Kilian 
(2009) associates shifts in precautionary demand with changes in the convenience yield, 
whereas Alquist and Kilian (2010) use the convenience yield in an empirical 
framework. In addition, our research is also related to Kilian and Murphy (2014) who 
disaggregate the precautionary demand into two components, namely the speculative 
demand shock and the idiosyncratic oil price shock. They introduce oil inventories in 
Kilian’s (2009) framework in order to capture shifts in speculative demand, which are 
driven by speculative trading. The study by Kilian and Murphy (2014) is based on 
arguments which were presented by Alquist and Kilian (2010) arguments which 
indicate that speculative purchases may also be precautionary since they could represent 
increased uncertainty about future oil supply shortfalls. Furthermore, our study is 
influenced by Kilian and Park (2009), who include the US stock market block in their 
SVAR. Finally, our research is conceptually similar to Anzuini et al. (2015), who 
evaluate the macroeconomic effects of the precautionary demand for oil. Specifically, 
they use changes in the future-spot price spread to approximate for precautionary 
demand shocks. 
 
                                                 
46 Several authors have considered the origin of the oil price shock to explain the impact of oil price 
shocks on the economy (see, among others, Antonakakis et al., 2017; Kang et al., 2017; Angelidis et al., 
2015; Kang et al., 2015; Degiannakis et al., 2014; Abhyankar et al., 2013; Baumeister and Peersman, 
2013; Wang et al., 2013; Basher et al., 2012; Broadstock et al., 2012; Filis et al., 2011; Kilian and Lewis, 
2011 and Apergis and Miller, 2009). 
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Overall, the objectives of this chapter can be described as follows. First, we maintain 
that the convenience yield can approximate the precautionary demand shock and thus 
we disaggregate the Kilian’s (2009) precautionary demand shock into two components, 
namely, the new precautionary demand shock (driven by changes in the convenience 
yield) and the idiosyncratic oil price shock. As previously noted, the convenience yield 
is used in order to capture shifts in precautionary demand which is not fully mentioned 
so far by the oil existing literature. Second, we use this innovation in order to test the 
responses of the US stock market returns and volatility to the new precautionary 
demand and idiosyncratic oil price shocks.  
 
The choice of the US stock market block is influenced by the Kilian and Park (2009) 
empirical study which documents the distinct effects of different oil price shocks on US 
macroeconomic aggregates. Specifically, we employ the Standard and Poor’s 500 and 
the Dow Jones Industrial Average index as the most commonly used benchmarks to 
measure the market capitalisation of the US stock market. Consequently, we employ 
their implied volatility indices to reflect investors' consensus view of expected stock 
market volatility. Thus, we also examine whether the responses of aggregate stock 
returns and volatility may differ greatly depending on the nature of the precautionary 
demand shock in the global oil market. 
 
In the present study, we introduce the convenience yield which is thought of to capture 
uncertainty about the future scarcity of barrels of oil. For this purpose, we build on the 
recent study of Kilian (2009) and Kilian and Park (2009) by employing a SVAR model. 
We employ the 1-month, 2-month and 3-month futures contracts in order to estimate 
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the convenience yield.47 We use monthly data from January 1986 to December 2016. 
The chosen period is based on data availability. 
 
The theoretical background and the contributions of this chapter can be described as 
follows. First, we disaggregate Kilian’s (2009) precautionary demand shock into two 
components, namely, the new precautionary demand shock (driven by changes in the 
convenience yield) and the idiosyncratic oil price shock (caused by shocks to the real 
oil price). Second, we test how the US stock market returns and stock market volatility 
respond to precautionary demand and idiosyncratic oil price shocks. Third, our 
empirical models accommodate potentially large and disruptive effects of the global 
economic downturn of 2007-2009 (henceforth “Great Recession”) on the status of the 
oil market as well as on the relationship between oil-market specific demand shocks 
and the US stock market performance. Thus, we investigate whether this decomposition 
causes changes in the crude oil market and whether the US stock market response to 
precautionary demand and idiosyncratic oil price shocks is qualitatively similar before 
and after the Great Recession. 
 
The main findings are summarised as follows. First, a precautionary demand shock has 
a positive and significant effect on real oil returns for the 1-month, 2-month and 3-
month futures contracts. Second, the convenience yield has significant information 
content about precautionary demand for oil. Third, both precautionary demand and 
                                                 
47 This is due to the fact that the convenience yield is more responsive for supply/demand conditions and 
market price behaviour for shorter maturity futures contracts (see Milonas and Henker, 2001). Our choice 
for the selected contracts can be also attributed to the fact that futures contracts with shorter maturities 
(1-month, 2-month and 3-month) have significant information contents in predicting future movements 
and volatility in the spot price of oil (see Hammoudeh et. al., 2003). In addition, the selected contracts 
present higher trading volume and thus generate greater liquidity (see Hammoudeh and Yuan, 2008; 
Hammoudeh and Li, 2005) compared with futures contracts for other maturities. 
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idiosyncratic oil price shocks appear to have qualitatively different effects on stock 
market returns and volatility before and after the Great Recession. In fact, in the post-
Great Recession, precautionary demand and idiosyncratic oil price shocks exert a 
positive effect on stock market returns, and a negative effect on stock market volatility, 
consistent with the financialisation hypothesis in the oil market. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.2 provides the review 
of the related literature. Section 5.3 presents the data and provides a preliminary 
analysis of variables used. The methodology is presented in Section 5.4. The empirical 
results are displayed in Section 5.5, while an in-depth discussion of the findings is 
provided in Section 5.6. Conclusions and points for further research are drawn in 
Section 5.7. 
 
5.2. Literature review 
5.2.1 The origins of oil price shocks 
 
The seminal theoretical work by Barsky and Kilian (2002, 2004) which led to the first 
empirical structural analysis by Kilian (2009), as well as further empirical work by 
Hamilton (2009a,b) and Kilian and Park (2009), demonstrate that oil price fluctuations 
do not originate from the same source. Since then, the origin of the oil price shock, i.e. 
supply-side or demand-side shocks, has become a key research theme in energy 
economics. Indeed, fluctuations in the price of oil can originate either in the demand-
side or in the supply-side of the economy.  
 
Specifically, Kilian (2009) argues that supply-side and demand-side oil price shocks 
would generate different responses from the economy and the stock markets. 
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Industrialisation of the major emerging economies like China or India (see, for 
example, Kilian and Hicks, 2013)48 – which reflect higher consumer spending and thus 
an increase in aggregate demand – illustrates the demand-side component of the crude 
oil price. By contrast, an oil supply disruption by global producers originated from 
geopolitical turmoil in the Middle East is an example of the supply-side component of 
the crude oil price.  
 
In addition, Kilian (2009) identifies a third source of oil price shocks by further 
disentangling the demand-side oil price shock into the oil-market specific 
(precautionary or idiosyncratic) demand shock and the aggregate demand-induced oil 
price shock. The former occurs due to the uncertainty of future crude oil availability. 
The latter is driven by real economic activity. Kilian (2009) maintains further that oil 
price fluctuation during geopolitical events such as the Iranian Revolution and the time-
line thereafter were caused by increased uncertainty of future oil availability 
(precautionary demand shocks) rather than physical supply disruptions (supply-side 
shocks).  
 
Both Kilian (2009) and Hamilton (2009a,b) suggest that positive aggregate demand 
shocks are good news, despite the oil price increase, whereas Kilian (2009) posits that 
positive precautionary demand shocks tend to exercise a negative effect on economic 
activity. Furthermore, the magnitude of supply-side shocks appears to influence the 
economy less than the demand-side oil price shock. More specifically, Kilian (2009) 
                                                 
48 Kilian and Hicks (2013) provide evidence that the unexpected increase in industrial commodity 
markets between 2003 and 2008 was mainly attributed to unexpected growth of Asian emerging 
economies such as China and India. 
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shows that demand-side driven oil price shocks tend to exercise more significant effects 
on oil prices than changes driven by shocks to the supply of crude oil.  
 
5.2.2 The economic and financial effects of oil price shocks  
 
Baumeister and Peersman (2013) and Kilian and Lewis (2011) illustrate the impact of 
oil price shocks on the economy. For example, Kilian and Lewis (2011) use a SVAR 
model to examine the effect of the real oil price fluctuations on US economic activity 
and inflation. They suggest that the US monetary policy does not receive any impact 
from oil price shocks since late 1980s and thus there is no effect on US real output and 
inflation. Along similar lines, Baumeister and Peersman, (2013) apply a time-varying 
parameter VAR to identify the effects of oil supply shocks on the US economy. They 
show that the variability in real oil prices since 1974 is better explained by the oil 
demand shocks, whereas oil supply shocks seem to impact the real oil prices in a smaller 
fraction. Furthermore, Filis and Chatziantoniou (2014) investigate oil-exporting 
countries (Norway and Russia) and oil-importing countries (UK, Germany, 
Netherlands, France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal) by employing a SVAR model. They 
indicate that the level of inflation is positively influenced by oil price changes in both 
oil-exporting and oil-importing countries. Studies related to the relationship between 
oil price shocks and the economy include papers by Degiannakis et al. (2014), Chen et 
al. (2014), Antonakakis and Filis (2013), Lippi and Nobili (2012), Kilian (2008a,b), 
Lescaroux and Mignon (2008) and Barsky and Kilian (2004).  
 
Turning to the relationship between oil price shocks and stock markets, several authors 
utilise a SVAR model to study the effects of the various types of oil price shocks on 
stock market returns (see, among others, Abhyankar et al., 2013; Basher et al., 2012; 
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Apergis and Miller, 2009; Kilian and Park, 2009). They find that demand-side and 
supply-side oil price shocks have different effects on the stock market. Specifically, 
Kilian and Park (2009) show that demand-side oil price shocks cause a positive impact 
on the US stock market returns whereas supply-side shocks tend to provide a lower 
impact on stock returns. In addition, Basher et al. (2012) provide evidence of a positive 
(negative) effect of aggregate (precautionary) demand shocks on emerging market 
stock returns, whereas supply-side shocks do not have any influence on stock market 
returns. Furthermore, Abhyankar et al. (2013) find that oil price shocks driven by 
changes in aggregate demand have a positive effect on the Japanese stock market returns, 
whereas the stock market returns tend to react negatively to precautionary demand 
shocks.  
 
By contrast, Apergis and Miller (2009) report that the stock market returns in eight 
developed countries do not respond significantly to aggregate demand, precautionary 
demand and supply-side oil price shocks. Authors such as Reboredo and Rivera-Castro 
(2014) investigate the relationship between oil markets and stock markets in Europe 
and the US by employing a wavelet multi-resolution analysis. They opine that stock 
market returns do not respond to oil price changes in the pre-financial crisis period 
(until June 2008) whereas a positive interdependence between oil and stock markets 
exists in the post-financial crisis period. 
 
Wang et al. (2013), Filis et al. (2011) and Park and Ratti (2008) also illustrate the impact 
of oil price shocks on real stock returns by considering the country’s position in the 
world crude oil market (i.e. oil-importing or oil-exporting). More specifically, Park and 
Ratti (2008) use a multivariate VAR and report that oil price shocks have a negative 
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effect on stock market returns in the US and 12 European countries while oil price 
increases affect positively the stock market returns in Norway as an oil-exporting 
country. Furthermore, Wang et al. (2013) apply a SVAR and find that oil supply shocks 
depress stock market returns in both oil-importing and oil-exporting countries, whereas 
the impact of aggregate demand shocks on stock returns is negative and more persistent 
in oil-exporting countries than in oil-importing countries. With reference to the 
relationship between the oil price shocks and the stock market returns in a dynamic 
environment, Filis et al. (2011) employ a Dynamic Conditional Correlation asymmetric 
GARCH, or DCC-GARCH-GJR (Glosten, Jagannathan, and Runkle, 1993) model and 
find that the time-varying correlation does not differ between oil-exporting countries 
and oil-importing countries and further point out that demand-driven shocks exert a 
stronger influence on the correlation between oil and stock market returns than supply-
side shocks.  
 
Research on the relation between the various types of oil price shocks and stock market 
volatility is pioneered by Degiannakis et al. (2014). They employ a SVAR model and 
report that oil price shocks driven by aggregate demand tend to reduce stock market 
volatility of European stock markets whereas the precautionary demand and supply-
side oil price shocks do not influence upon stock market volatility. Furthermore, 
Angelidis et al. (2015) use a SVAR model and suggest that when oil price shocks are 
disentangled they have the incremental power to forecast the state of the US stock 
market returns and the stock market volatility.  
 
Moreover, Kang et al. (2015) use a SVAR model to test the effects of oil price shocks 
on the covariance of US stock market returns and volatility and suggest that positive 
180 
 
aggregate demand and precautionary demand shocks affect negatively the covariance 
of return and volatility, whereas a disruption in oil production exercises a positive effect 
on the covariance of return and volatility. In a more recent study, Antonakakis et al. 
(2017) employing a SVAR model and focusing on 11 stock markets in either oil-
importing and oil-exporting countries to examine the dynamic relationship between oil 
price shocks and stock market returns and volatility. They show that aggregate demand 
shocks (precautionary demand shocks, supply-side shocks) appear to be net transmitters 
of shocks to stock markets during economic recessions (geopolitical turbulence). 
 
Furthermore, some studies closely related to our area of interest include papers by 
Anzuini et al. (2015) and Kilian and Murphy (2014). For example, Kilian and Murphy 
(2014) examine the role of speculative (inventory demand) shocks in order to capture 
shifts in expectations about future oil supply and demand. They use data for total US 
crude oil inventories scaled by the ratio of OECD petroleum stocks to US petroleum 
stocks as a proxy of speculative demand. The study by Kilian and Murphy (2014) is 
based on Alquist and Kilian (2010) arguments which indicate that speculative 
purchases may also be precautionary since they could represent increased uncertainty 
about future oil supply shortfalls. By employing a SVAR model they reveal that the oil 
price increase between 2004 and 2008 is driven by unexpected global demand shocks, 
whereas speculative shocks play an important role in the oil price fluctuations of 1979, 
1986 and 1990.  
 
Furthermore, Anzuini et al. (2015) examine the impact of precautionary demand shocks 
approximated by changes in the futures-spot price spread on US economic activity and 
inflation. They employ a two-stage identification procedure of a regression equation 
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and a SVAR and use daily data over the period 1986-2008. They find that an 
unanticipated oil price increase driven by higher precautionary demand leads to a 
decrease in US economic activity 6 months after the impact and an immediate increase 
in CPI. In addition, they show that this shock raises oil inventories, depresses the stock 
market returns and increases stock market volatility.  
 
Overall, we provide an alternative decomposition approach by including the 
convenience yield to approximate the precautionary demand shock in oil markets. 
Moreover, we expand the effect of precautionary demand shocks on the US stock 
market activity not only in the period before and during the peak of the Great Recession 
(e.g., the second half of 2008) as indicated by Anzuini et al. (2015) but also in the post-
Great Recession. We seek to examine the consequences that the turmoil generated by 
the Great Recession brought to the US stock market. Thus, our research builds in this 
gap in order to provide some detailed evidence which have not been investigated so far 
in oil literature.  
 
5.3. Data description and preliminary analysis 
In this chapter, we collect monthly data for world oil production, global economic 
activity index, the crude oil spot price, the S&P500 index, the Dow Jones index, the 
VIX index and the VXD index. The sample runs from 1986:1 to 2016:12 a total of 372 
observations. It is worth noting that the VIX index data series ranges from 1990:1 to 
2016:12, whereas the VXD index data series ranges from 1998:1 to 2016:12 and this 
choice is driven by data availability. World oil production is used to identify oil supply 
shocks. Data on world oil production are obtained from the Energy Information 
Administration (EIA). Global economic activity index is constructed by Kilian 
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(2009).49 We use this index to identify the aggregate demand-induced oil price shock. 
In the same spirit with Kilian (2009), we employ the refiner's acquisition cost of 
imported crude oil in the US as a proxy for oil spot price. Data on the spot price are 
extracted from EIA. We calculate the real oil price as the nominal oil spot price deflated 
by the US Consumer Price Index (CPI). Data on the US CPI is available from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States.  
 
The Standard and Poor’s 500 (S&P500) index represents the performance of 500 stocks 
across all major industries in the US stock market, whereas the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average index represents the performance of 30 leading (“blue-chip”) in their industry 
companies in the US stock market, including technology, financial services, retail, 
industrial and consumer goods. Both indices are considered as the most commonly 
basic benchmarks to measure the market capitalisation of the US stock market. Both 
series are retrieved from Datastream. The VIX index and the VXD index serve as key 
measures of the implied volatility of the S&P500 and the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average, respectively. Both indices are designed to reflect investors' consensus view of 
future (30-day) expected stock market volatility and considered as forward-looking 
variables. Data on VIX index and VXD index are retrieved from Datastream.  
 
The convenience yield is chosen due to its information contents about future availability 
of the crude oil, which classifies the convenience yield as a forward-looking variable. 
Therefore, we use the convenience yield as a proxy of precautionary demand shocks 
(due to concerns about future availability of crude oil). The convenience yield is 
                                                 
49 Kilian (2009) provides a detailed description of how the global economic activity index is constructed. 
The data can be found in Kilian’s personal website (http://www-personal.umich.edu/~lkilian/). 
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computed from the oil spot price, the oil futures price and the risk-free interest rate. To 
this end, we retrieve the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) oil futures 
contracts of 1, 2 and 3 months to expiration as well the ICE LIBOR (Intercontinental 
Exchange, London Interbank Offered Rate) at 1, 2 and 3 months as a risk-free interest 
rate. Specifically, we follow Alquist et al. (2014) who argue that the LIBOR denotes a 
superior estimation of the borrowing costs experienced by firms in oil industry. Data 
on the oil futures prices and the interest rate are collected from Datastream. Finally, 
world oil production is seasonally adjusted and expressed in log-returns. Similarly, the 
oil spot price, the S&P500 index and the Dow Jones index are converted to real values 
and expressed in log-returns. In addition, the VIX index and the VXD index are 
expressed in natural logarithms. 
 
To calculate the convenience yield (CY) in crude oil markets we adopt the recent 
approach proposed by Gospodinov and Ng (2013). This approach consists of 
calculating the net (of warehouse costs) percentage convenience yield as follows: 
𝐶𝑌𝑡,𝑛 =
(1 + it,n)St − Ft,n
St
                                                                                                    (1) 
where 𝑖𝑡,𝑛 is the risk-free interest rate set at time t with maturity n, 𝑆𝑡 denotes the spot 
price of crude oil for delivery at time t, and 𝐹𝑡,𝑛 denotes the futures price of crude oil 
set at time t for delivery at time t+n. Based on Fama and French (1988), the formulation 
of the convenience yield based on the assumption that the warehouse (storage space, 
insurance, transport, etc) costs are constant over time. This can be possibly attributed 
to the fact that warehouse costs are small in value and therefore inconsiderable, or data 
collection is hard to obtain due to the different types of warehouse costs.  
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Initially, we test the degree of integration of the variables by means of unit root tests. 
Results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), (Dickey and Fuller, 1981) and 
Phillips-Perron (PP), (Phillips and Perron, 1988) unit root tests are reported in Table 
5.1 (Panels A and B). It is evident that the presence of a unit root for world oil 
production, real oil price, S&P500 index and Dow Jones index cannot be rejected. Both 
tests decisively reject the null of a unit root in the convenience yield, irrespectively of 
the maturity of a futures contract, in VIX index, in VXD index and in global economic 
activity index. Kilian and Murphy (2014) argue that the global economic activity index 
as a business cycle index is stationary by construction. This is because business cycles 
are deviations from the trend line and therefore stationary. Finally, the ADF and PP unit 
root tests show that the log-differences in world oil production, real oil price, S&P500 
index and Dow Jones index are stationary. 
 
Table 5.1: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (1981) and Philips Perron (1988) 
unit root tests. 
                      Panel A – ADF test 
 C  C&T  N  
PRO -0.7501  -4.5001 ** 2.0794  
ROP -2.7242  -3.4659 ** -1.1875  
SP -0.8971  -1.7887  1.1189  
DJ -0.9254  -2.1900  1.3981  
DPRO -20.5628 *** -20.5362 *** -20.3484 *** 
DROP -11.9317 *** -11.9138 *** -11.9495 *** 
GEA -3.5016 *** -3.4699 ** -3.5077 *** 
CYM1 -6.6748 *** -6.6636 *** -4.4464 *** 
CYM2 -5.9000 *** -5.9261 *** -4.8516 *** 
CYM3 -5.4718 *** -5.5333 *** -4.6493 *** 
RETSP -21.0203 *** -21.0046 *** -20.8752 *** 
VOLVIX -5.5524 *** -5.5415 *** -1.3737  
RETDJ -20.9472 *** -20.9467 *** -20.7554 *** 
VOLVXD -4.8114 *** -5.0750 *** -1.8705 * 
Panel B – PP test 
 C  C&T  N  
PRO -0.3971  -4.2871  3.6002  
ROP -2.1598  -2.9033  -1.1312  
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SP -0.9345  -1.8888  1.0892  
DJ -0.8026  -2.0659  1.3919  
DPRO -24.4754 *** -24.4608 *** -20.9779 *** 
DROP -10.9617 *** -10.9341 *** -10.9879 *** 
GEA -3.1386 ** -3.1192  -3.1442 *** 
CYM1 -9.2808 *** -9.2922 *** -7.3951 *** 
CYM2 -7.8473 *** -7.9271 *** -6.3782 *** 
CYM3 -6.8712 *** -6.9933 *** -5.6952 *** 
RETSP -20.9710 *** -20.9572 *** -20.8089 *** 
VOLVIX -5.3320 *** -5.3203 *** -1.4974  
RETDJ -20.9738 *** -20.9764 *** -20.7399 *** 
VOLVXD -4.5747 *** -4.8743 *** -1.4372  
Note: Unit root tests of world oil production (PRO), real oil price (ROP), S&P500 stock 
market index (SP), Dow Jones stock market index (DJ), world oil production growth 
(DPRO), real oil returns (DROP), global economic activity (GEA), convenience yield 
(CYM1, CYM2, CYM3), returns on the S&P500 stock market index (RETSP), VIX 
volatility index (VOLVIX), returns on the Dow Jones stock market index (RETDJ), and 
VXD volatility index (VOLVXD). M1 = one-month futures contract, M2 = two-month 
futures contract, M3 = three-month futures contract. For the ADF and PP unit root tests the 
null hypothesis is that the series features a unit root. In both tests, C denotes constant term, 
C&T denotes constant and time trend, N indicates no deterministic component in the test 
equation. Asterisk * (**, ***) denotes the 10% (5%, 1%) significance level. The sample 
period runs from January 1986 to December 2016. However, for VOLVIX (VOLVXD) 
index the period runs from January 1990 (1998) to December 2016. 
 
 
Descriptive statistics are summarised in Table 5.2. With regard to S&P500 returns and 
Dow Jones returns, we observe a positive mean value which is indicative of the fact 
that both indices earn positive monthly returns on average. Real oil price changes are 
also have positive monthly average returns. The global economic activity index as a 
macroeconomic variable exhibits the highest volatility compared with the oil-market 
related variables and the financial variables. This is evident by the standard deviation, 
the minimum and maximum values. Furthermore, the convenience yield for the 3-
month to maturity futures contract is more volatile than for the 1-month and 2-month 
to maturity contracts.  
 
Our preliminary analysis suggests that the convenience yield is more volatile for longer 
maturity futures contracts, which is indicative of greater uncertainty about the future 
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availability of crude oil. In addition, real oil returns, S&P500 returns and Dow Jones 
returns are negatively skewed, whereas similar results are observed for the convenience 
yield for the 1-month, 2-month and the 3-month to maturity. This can be possibly 
attributed to their frequent small gains and a few extreme losses. Skewness and Kurtosis 
statistics collectively indicate that the series are non-normally distributed. The 
observation of non-normality is confirmed by the Jarque-Bera statistic. 
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Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics of the series under investigation  
 DPRO DROP CYM1 CYM2 CYM3 RETSP VOLVIX RETDJ VOLVXD GEA 
Mean 0.0010 0.0004 -0.0542 -0.0539 -0.0526 0.0043 19.7830 0.0047 19.7737 -0.0049 
Median 0.0012 0.0086 -0.0525 -0.0502 -0.0457 0.0082 17.5000 0.0083 17.8150 -0.0281 
Maximum 0.0434 0.3747 0.2415 0.2399 0.2386 0.2349 63.6800 0.1667 52.9500 0.6636 
Minimum -0.0707 -0.3487 -0.3437 -0.3839 -0.4178 -0.2883 10.3200 -0.2539 9.8400 -1.3365 
Std. Dev. 0.0098 0.0839 0.0871 0.0943 0.1023 0.0484 7.8008 0.0468 7.8881 0.2777 
Skewness -1.5648 -0.5918 -0.1088 -0.3359 -0.4836 -1.1713 1.9795 -0.9164 1.5205 -0.0738 
Kurtosis 15.6886 5.6874 3.5058 3.4605 3.5387 11.2395 8.9877 8.0604 5.9392 4.3588 
Jarque-Bera 2640.20*** 133.30*** 4.6982* 10.28*** 18.99*** 1134.29*** 695.59*** 447.77*** 169.92*** 33.32*** 
Probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0955 0.0059 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: This table summarises descriptive statistics (sample mean, median, maximum, minimum, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, the Jarque-Bera test statistic, and the p-value 
associated to the Jarque-Bera test statistic) of world oil production growth (DPRO), real oil returns (DROP), convenience yield (CYM1, CYM2, CYM3), returns on the S&P500 stock 
market index (RETSP), VIX volatility index (VOLVIX), returns on the Dow Jones stock market index (RETDJ), VXD volatility index (VOLVXD) and global economic activity (GEA). 
M1 = one-month futures contract, M2 = two-month futures contract, M3 = three-month futures contract. Asterisk * (**, ***) denotes the 10% (5%, 1%) significance level. The sample 
period runs from January 1986 to December 2016. However, for VOLVIX (VOLVXD) index the period runs from January 1990 (1998) to December 2016. 
188 
 
As aforementioned, the sample period runs from January 1986 to December 2016 and 
covers all major events that played an important role and caused changes in oil 
markets.50 Figure 5.1 exhibits the time variation in the series in the sample period. It is 
evident that during the Great Recession, oil-market related variables (the convenience 
yield for all corresponding maturities and the real oil returns, apart from the world oil 
production changes) exhibit the highest volatility and extreme negative returns, the 
macroeconomic variable of the global economic activity index suffers a significant 
drop, the financial variables of the S&P500 returns and the Dow Jones returns are 
negative, highly volatile and exhibit significant troughs, whereas a peak is observed for 
the VIX index and the VXD index.  
 
This preliminary analysis may suggest that during periods of severe recession oil 
markets move in the same directions with the financial markets (specifically, the 
relationship between real oil returns and stock market returns), which underlines the 
significant impact of the Great Recession in both markets. Having provided some 
preliminary findings, we proceed to the estimation of the empirical model. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
50 Oil price movements with important peaks and troughs are occurred due to the Persian Gulf Crisis of 
1990-1991, the collapse of the Soviet Union, one of the three largest oil producers in the world in 1991, 
the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, the terrorist attack of September 2001, the second Iraq war 
(2003), the rising demand of oil from China (2006-2007), the Great Recession of 2007-2009, the OPEC’s 
decision to cut its production quotas by 4.2 million barrels per day (2009), the Eurozone sovereign debt 
crisis in 2010, the increased supply of oil in North America (2010), the political instability in the Middle 
East of 2011, the continuing geopolitical unrest until 2014 and the appreciation of a US dollar by 10 
percent together with the oil price collapse due to the decrease in global oil demand, both in the second 
half of 2014. 
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Figure 5.1: Time series employed in the study 
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Note: This Figure exhibits the evolution of the series during the sample period. In the first row, oil convenience yield 
(CY) is represented. In the second row, world oil production growth (DPRO), real oil returns (DROP) and global 
economic activity index (GEA) are depicted. In the third row, S&P500 stock market returns (RETSP) and implied 
volatility index (VOLVIX) are shown. In the fourth row, Dow Jones stock market returns (RETDJ) and implied volatility 
index (VOLVXD) are represented. M1 = one-month futures contract, M2 = two-month futures contract, M3 = three-
month futures contract. The sample period runs from January 1986 to December 2016. However, for VOLVIX 
(VOLVXD) index the period runs from January 1990 (1998) to December 2016. 
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5.4. Methodology 
To investigate the dynamic effects of the various types of oil price shocks, a SVAR 
framework motivated by Kilian (2009) is utilised. The SVAR approach is used to 
identify how the dependent variables in the system response to structural disturbances 
of the model. An advantage of the SVAR approach states on the need to impose 
restrictions required to the reduced form equation in order to control the structural 
parameters (innovations) of the model. These restrictions are related to 
contemporaneous relationships among the system’s variables. The impulse response 
analysis detects the response of a variable to innovations in other variables or else the 
response of our variables to one standard deviation shock. 
 
At this point, it is worth noting to provide the Kilian’s (2009) framework in order to 
gain a clearer picture of our econometric approach. This framework features three 
dependent variables: changes in world oil production (𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑡), global economic 
activity index (𝐺𝐸𝐴𝑡) and the real oil price (𝑅𝑂𝑃𝑡). Therefore, we have the following 
representation: 
𝑒𝑡 = [
𝑒𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂,𝑡
𝑒𝐺𝐸𝐴,𝑡
𝑒𝑅𝑂𝑃,𝑡
] = 𝐴0
−1𝜀𝑡 = [
𝛼11 0 0
𝛼21 𝛼22 0
𝛼31 𝛼32 𝛼33
] ∗  [
𝜀𝑆𝑆,𝑡
𝜀𝐴𝐷,𝑡
𝜀𝑃𝐷,𝑡
]                                                 (2) 
where,𝜀𝑆𝑆,𝑡 is the supply-side shock originated from the world oil production, 𝜀𝐴𝐷,𝑡 is 
the aggregate demand shock caused by the global economic activity and 𝜀𝑃𝐷,𝑡 
represents the precautionary demand shock influenced by the real oil price.  
 
Our SVAR model features four dependent variables: changes in world oil production 
(𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑡), global economic activity index (𝐺𝐸𝐴𝑡), convenience yield (𝐶𝑌𝑡) and changes 
in the real price of oil (𝐷𝑅𝑂𝑃𝑡). It should be mentioned that D represents the first 
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difference between the values in month t-1 and month t. Our SVAR differs from Kilian 
(2009) in using the convenience yield to identify the precautionary demand shock. In 
addition, we include the real oil returns instead of real oil price levels.  
 
The SVAR form of order k (where the order k represents the appropriate number of lag 
length considered in the model) is given as follows: 
 𝐴0  𝑍𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑𝐴𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1
𝑍𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡                                                                                        (3) 
where 𝐴0 represents the (4x4) matrix which contains the contemporaneous relations 
among the coefficients, 𝑍𝑡 is the (4x1) vector of the four endogenous variables entering 
the SVAR model, i.e. 𝑍𝑡= (𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑡, 𝐺𝐸𝐴𝑡 , 𝐶𝑌𝑡, 𝐷𝑅𝑂𝑃𝑡), 𝛼0 is the (4x1) vector for 
constants, 𝐴𝑖 is the (4x4) matrix of coefficients to be estimated for ί = 1,2,3....k , 𝑍𝑡−𝑖 
is the vector of lagged endogenous variables and 𝜀𝑡 is a (4x1) vector of the structural 
shocks (similarly, errors or innovations or disturbances) which are assumed to have 
zero covariance and be serially and mutually uncorrelated.  
 
A reduced form representation of the structural model (2) is specified as: 
𝑍𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑𝐵𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1
𝑍𝑡−𝑖 + 𝑒𝑡                                                                                                (4) 
In order to get the equation (3) we require to pre-multiply all parts of the equation (2) 
by 𝐴0
−1. This process implies that 𝛽0 = 𝐴0
−1𝛼0 , 𝐵𝑖 = 𝐴0
−1𝐴𝑖 , and 𝑒𝑡 = 𝐴0
−1𝜀𝑡 
The latter describes the relationship between the structural shocks (𝜀𝑡 ) and the reduced 
form errors (𝑒𝑡). The reduced form errors are linear combination of the structural 
shocks. Because the structural shocks are assumed to be orthogonal and therefore 
mutually uncorrelated, the variance covariance matrix of the structural shocks is 
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required to be diagonal (each entry in the principal diagonal has the same variance of 
sigma square and the off-diagonal entries are zero). Overall, the matrix D is a diagonal 
matrix, 𝜎2denotes the variance and E is the unconditional expectations operation. 
E (𝜀𝑡𝜀𝑡
′)  = 𝜎2 = 
[
 
 
 
 
𝜎𝑆𝑆
2 0 0 0
0 𝜎𝐴𝐷
2 0 0
0 0 𝜎𝑃𝐷
2 0
0 0 0 𝜎𝐼𝐷
2 ]
 
 
 
 
= 𝐷                                                                     (5) 
 
Similarly, the variance covariance matrix of the reduced form errors is: 
     𝐸(𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑡
′) = 𝐸[(𝐴0
−1𝜀𝑡)
′(𝐴0
−1𝜀𝑡)] = 𝐸(𝐴0
−1′𝜀𝑡
′𝐴0
−1𝜀𝑡) = 𝐴0
−1𝐸(𝜀𝑡𝜀𝑡
′)𝐴0
−1′
= 𝐴0
−1𝐷𝐴0
−1′ =  𝛺                                                                                         (6) 
 
Although in the SVAR approach the structural shocks are assumed to be orthogonal 
and therefore mutually uncorrelated, this does not hold for the reduced form errors 
which are mutually correlated. This indicated by the matrix Ω which is a symmetric 
positive definite matrix (the entries above or below the principal diagonal are non-zero). 
Therefore, we impose a structural decomposition with aim to orthogonalise the reduced 
form errors. Equation (7) shows how the vector of reduced form errors (𝑒𝑡) can be 
decomposed into structural disturbances (𝜀𝑡): 
𝑒𝑡 = [
𝑒𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂,𝑡
𝑒𝐺𝐸𝐴,𝑡
𝑒𝐶𝑌,𝑡
𝑒𝐷𝑅𝑂𝑃,𝑡
] = 𝐴0
−1𝜀𝑡 = [
𝛼11 0 0 0
𝛼21 𝛼22 0 0
𝛼31 𝛼32 𝛼33 0
𝛼41 𝛼42 𝛼43 𝛼44
] ∗  [
𝜀𝑆𝑆,𝑡
𝜀𝐴𝐷,𝑡
𝜀𝑃𝐷,𝑡
𝜀𝐼𝐷,𝑡
]                                     (7) 
where,𝜀𝑆𝑆,𝑡 maps the supply-side shocks originated from the world oil production, 𝜀𝐴𝐷,𝑡 
represents the aggregate demand shocks caused by the global economic activity, 𝜀𝑃𝐷,𝑡 
denotes the precautionary demand shocks derived from the convenience yield and 𝜀𝐼𝐷,𝑡 
reflects the idiosyncratic oil price shocks caused by the real oil price. 
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Regarding our SVAR with convenience yield, the lower triangular matrix 𝐴0
−1 
encompasses short-run restrictions that allow exactly identifying the structural shocks. 
Specifically, we identify these short-run restrictions by setting all entries located above 
the principal diagonal to zero. The restrictions are of recursive nature and may be 
explained as follows. First, due to the high adjustment costs and the unpredictability of 
the crude oil market, world oil production may not respond contemporaneously to 
aggregate demand shocks, precautionary demand shocks and idiosyncratic oil price 
shocks. World oil production is only instantaneously affected by supply-side shocks. 
The above recursive structure can be translated into the following restrictions: 𝛼12 = 0, 
𝛼13 = 0, and 𝛼14 = 0. 
 
Second, global economic activity may not contemporaneously respond to precautionary 
demand shocks and idiosyncratic oil price shocks. The real economy requires time to 
react in uncertainty about the future oil supply shortfalls and real oil price changes. 
However, global economic activity is affected within the month by supply-side shocks 
and aggregate demand shocks. The ensuing restrictions are 𝛼23 = 0 and 𝛼24 = 0. 
 
Third, the convenience yield is contemporaneously affected by supply-side shocks, 
aggregate demand shocks and precautionary demand shocks (own innovations), but not 
by idiosyncratic oil price shocks (real oil price changes). The convenience yield does 
not respond contemporaneously to oil price changes as it takes time for the market 
participants to adjust expectations about the future availability of oil based on the 
prevailing oil prices. The resulting restriction is 𝛼34 = 0. 
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Finally, real oil price changes can be driven by supply-side shocks together with 
aggregate demand shocks, precautionary demand shocks and idiosyncratic oil price 
shocks (own innovations). For example, changes in global economic activity affect the 
real oil price due to the instantaneous response of the commodity markets. Thus, all 
types of shocks are allowed to contemporaneously impact on real oil returns. This is 
illustrated by non-zero coefficients in the fourth row.  
 
At the next step of our analysis, we follow Kilian and Park (2009) to include the US 
stock market block. This SVAR allows the inclusion of stock market returns (measured 
by the S&P500 index or the Dow Jones index) or stock market volatility (measured by 
the VIX index or the VXD index) as a fifth variable in our SVAR model. This choice 
is justified by the fact that we want to test how the stock market returns and the stock 
market volatility respond to a precautionary demand shock and an idiosyncratic oil 
price shock. 
𝑒𝑡 =
[
 
 
 
 
𝑒𝐷𝑃𝑅𝑂,𝑡
𝑒𝐺𝐸𝐴,𝑡
𝑒𝐶𝑌,𝑡
𝑒𝐷𝑅𝑂𝑃,𝑡
𝑒𝑅𝐸𝑇(𝑉𝑂𝐿),𝑡]
 
 
 
 
= 𝐴0
−1𝜀𝑡 =
[
 
 
 
 
𝛼11 0 0 0 0
𝛼21 𝛼22 0 0 0
𝛼31 𝛼32 𝛼33 0 0
𝛼41 𝛼42 𝛼43 𝛼44 0
𝛼51 𝛼52 𝛼53 𝛼54 𝛼55]
 
 
 
 
[
 
 
 
 
𝜀𝑆𝑆,𝑡
𝜀𝐴𝐷,𝑡
𝜀𝑃𝐷,𝑡
𝜀𝐼𝐷,𝑡
𝜀𝑅𝐸𝑇(𝑉𝑂𝐿),𝑡]
 
 
 
 
                 (9) 
 
When we incorporate separately stock market returns and stock market volatility in our 
SVAR model, the restrictions in the lower triangular matrix 𝐴0
−1 (equation 9), can be 
explained as follows. In the first fourth rows, innovations in oil supply (supply-side 
shocks), global economic activity (aggregate demand shocks), inventory policies of the 
oil sector (precautionary demand shocks) and real oil prices (idiosyncratic oil price 
shocks) are not influenced by the stock market activity within one month period. As 
suggested by Kilian and Park (2009), this short-run restriction is indicated by the given 
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aspect of considering innovations to the price of oil as predetermined with respect to 
US macroeconomic aggregates (including stock market returns and stock market 
volatility). 
 
In the fifth row, stock market returns (RET) respond immediately to unexpected 
changes in all other variables. Stock market returns are contemporaneously influenced 
by macroeconomic news as well as innovations in the oil market (see Basher et al., 
2012; Bjørnland, 2009). Similarly, stock market volatility (VOL) is assumed to respond 
contemporaneously to unanticipated changes, since the US stock market is a highly 
liquid market (see Degiannakis et al., 2014). In both SVAR model specifications, the 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is employed to determine the lag order of the VAR 
model. We now turn to analyse our estimation results. 
 
5.5. Empirical results 
5.5.1 Benchmark SVAR 
 
At the first step of our analysis we examine whether we can use the convenience yield 
to separate between precautionary demand shocks and idiosyncratic oil price shocks. 
To this end, we first consider Kilian’s (2009) SVAR model with three endogenous 
variables, (the world oil production growth rate, the global economic activity index and 
the real oil returns) as our benchmark. It should be mentioned that we include the real 
oil price returns instead of the real oil price (levels) as suggested by Kilian (2009). 
Therefore, we adopt the term “benchmark” for this SVAR specification. Innovations to 
these three variables can be referred to as shocks to world oil production (supply-side 
shocks), to global economic activity (aggregate demand shocks) and to real oil returns 
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(precautionary demand or idiosyncratic demand shocks). The structural impulse 
response functions are presented in Figure 5.2. 
 
Figure 5.2: Structural VAR impulse responses based on benchmark SVAR 
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Note: The lines represent the accumulated impulse responses of the real oil returns (DROP) to a supply-side shock 
(EPSILON_SS), aggregate demand shock (EPSILON_AD) and precautionary demand shock (EPSILON_PD) 
respectively. Solid line represents the mean response. Dotted lines represent 95% confident interval (upper and 
lower quartiles). The sample period runs from January 1986 to December 2016. 
 
 
Figure 5.2 shows that a precautionary demand shock has a positive and significant 
effect on real oil returns. A more detailed scrutiny suggests that the variation of real oil 
returns varies from a low of 7.1% to a high of 11.7%. It is worth noting that Kilian 
(2009) uses real oil price levels and finds that a precautionary demand shock exerts a 
significant large and persistent positive impact on real oil prices and the variation in 
real oil price is consistent with our findings, although we use real oil returns. 
Consequently, we report that our results are qualitatively similar to those by Kilian 
(2009). We now extend our analysis by including the convenience yield, which is 
thought of to have information content that help disentangle the precautionary demand.  
 
5.5.2 SVAR with the convenience yield 
 
Figure 5.3 presents the response of real oil returns to a one standard deviation (one unit 
innovation) structural shock to world oil production (supply-side shocks), to global 
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economic activity index (aggregate demand shocks), to convenience yield 
(precautionary demand shocks) and to real oil returns (idiosyncratic oil price shocks). 
Two-standard error bands are shown by dotted lines. 
 
Figure 5.3: SVAR with the convenience yield 
Panel A – Structural VAR impulse responses of the 1-month futures contract 
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Panel B – Structural VAR impulse responses of the 2-month futures contract 
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Panel C – Structural VAR impulse responses of the 3-month futures contract 
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Note: The lines represent the accumulated impulse responses of the real oil returns (DROP) to a supply-side shock 
(EPSILON_SS), aggregate demand shock (EPSILON_AD), precautionary demand shock (EPSILON_PD) and 
idiosyncratic oil price shock (EPSILON_ID) respectively. Solid line represents the mean response. Dotted lines 
represent 95% confident interval (upper and lower quartiles). The sample period runs from January 1986 to 
December 2016.  
 
5.5.2.1 Responses to oil supply-side shocks  
 
Figure 5.3 shows a negative but insignificant response of real oil returns to an 
unanticipated positive oil supply shock, which represents technological advances to 
extract newly discovered reserves or the use of the existing reserves more efficiently. 
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This finding is consistent with the existing literature, which maintains that oil supply 
shocks do not inform changes in commodities and stock markets, and more generally 
changes in economic activity (see, for example, Antonakakis et al., 2014; Degiannakis 
et al., 2014; Baumeister and Peersman, 2013; Basher et al., 2012; Filis et al., 2011; 
Hamilton, 2009a,b; Kilian and Park, 2009).  
 
5.5.2.2 Responses to aggregate demand shocks  
 
We further observe from Figure 5.3 that an aggregate demand shock – possibly 
triggered by rising demand for crude oil due to the industrialisation of China and other 
emerging market economies during 2006-2007 – exerts a positive and significant (albeit 
in the short-term) effect on real oil returns. Increases in aggregate demand are regarded 
as positive news for the global economy, since they steer the economy through an 
economic expansion and give rise to a higher oil price. We therefore expect a positive 
response of real oil returns to an aggregate demand shock. This finding accords with 
the ex-ante expectation and is further supported by Kilian (2009) who also shows that 
an aggregate demand expansion triggers a positive, significant and persistent increase 
in the real price of oil. 
 
5.5.2.3 Responses to precautionary demand shocks  
 
Figure 5.3 also indicates that a precautionary demand shock – which signals increasing 
concerns about the future availability of oil – exerts a positive and significant effect on 
real oil returns. The response features a hump-shaped which peaks in the third month 
after a shock. An increase in the uncertainty about future oil supply shortfalls instigates 
a rise in the convenience yield, as oil market traders become more willing to pay for 
inventories (Anzuini et al., 2015). 
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Overall, a precautionary demand shock causes a positive and significant effect on real 
oil returns in both the SVAR with the convenience yield and benchmark SVAR. As 
earlier mentioned, the variation of real oil returns varies from a low of 7.1% to a high 
of 11.7% in benchmark SVAR, whereas the variability of real oil returns deviates 
between 3.7% - 8.2% (3.9% - 8.2%, 4.1% - 8.2%) for the 1-month (2-month, 3-month) 
futures contracts, regarding the SVAR with the convenience yield. It is worth pointing 
out that the largest response is attained three months after a shock, estimated at 11.7% 
(8.2%) for benchmark SVAR (SVAR with the convenience yield). It is worth 
mentioning that a precautionary demand shock has a stronger effect in benchmark 
SVAR than in the SVAR with the convenience yield.  
 
A plausible explanation of this result could lie on the fact that in benchmark SVAR it 
is not possible to separate out an idiosyncratic oil price component. As a result, 
precautionary demand and idiosyncratic oil price shocks (coined as “a precautionary 
demand shock” in benchmark SVAR) collectively have a larger effect on real oil 
returns. By contrast, underlying our SVAR with the convenience yield is an 
identification strategy that allows identifying an idiosyncratic oil price component. 
Importantly, the significance of an idiosyncratic oil price shock could be a 
manifestation of a growing trend towards increased financialisation of the oil market. 
  
In this regard, the financialisation of the oil market – which is allegedly triggered by 
the increased participation of hedge funds since 2003 – appears to alter the nature of 
the oil market. We provide an additional in-depth discussion on the financialisation of 
the oil market in Section 5.6. Since the idiosyncratic oil price component conveys 
200 
 
information about speculative activity in the oil market, it may drive a wedge between 
the oil price and oil market fundamentals. Therefore, a historical decomposition is 
performed in Section 5.5.3 in order to shed light on the degree to which financialisation 
can influence real oil returns. 
 
Overall, we should not lose sight of the fact that the convenience yield as a forward-
looking variable associated with scarcity of crude oil contains information about 
developments in the physical oil market. More specifically, since the convenience yield 
represents the value of access to inventory holdings, it seems to be informative of 
changes in the level of crude oil inventories and therefore to changes in crude oil 
production. Thus, we do expect changes in the real oil price and consequently the real 
oil returns. This suggests that the convenience yield has the incremental power not only 
to inform about changes in current market conditions but also to forecast future 
developments. In this regard, we notice that the convenience yield is able to forecast 
future real oil returns. This is in line with Alquist et al. (2014) who examine the ability 
of convenience yields to interpret developments in the crude oil market fundamentals. 
They conclude that convenience yields have predictive power to explain changes in 
future crude oil inventories, future crude oil production, global demand for industrial 
commodities and the price of oil. 
 
5.5.2.4 Reponses to an idiosyncratic oil price shock  
 
Figure 5.3 further reveals that an idiosyncratic oil price shock exercises a positive and 
significant effect on real oil returns for all futures contracts. Specifically, the response 
peaks at 8.5% (8.3%. 8.2%) three months after a shock for the 1-month (2-month, 3-
month) futures contracts and then the effect levels off. Overall, our findings indicate 
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that we are not able to capture the exact origin of precautionary demand, unless we 
disaggregate the precautionary demand into two components. As previously mentioned, 
the origin of the idiosyncratic oil price shock can be possibly attributed to the increased 
financialisation of the oil futures market and consequently to increased speculative 
activity. However, plausible explanations regarding the exact origin of this shock are 
required and need to be examined. At this stage, this information falls beyond the scope 
of this study. 
 
5.5.3 Historical decomposition 
 
In order to test the effect of all the oil price shocks (i.e. supply-side shocks, aggregate 
demand shocks, precautionary demand shocks and idiosyncratic oil price shocks) on 
real oil returns at each point in time a historical decomposition method is computed. 
Following Burbidge and Harrison (1985) and Kilian and Park (2009), this procedure 
requires three steps. First, we estimate a SVAR (see equation 3) which allows us to 
identify all oil price shocks. Second, based on the SVAR, we proceed to forecast the 
endogenous variables. Third, we decompose the forecast errors into the cumulative 
contribution of the aforementioned structural shocks. The cumulative effects from all 
oil structural shocks can be used to predict the behaviour of real oil returns. Therefore, 
the historical decomposition helps us to gather all relevant information regarding the 
above relationship. 
 
Figure 5.4 exhibits the historical decomposition of the precautionary demand (based on 
the SVAR with the convenience yield) shock for the 1-month futures contract and the 
precautionary demand shock based on the benchmark SVAR. Furthermore, the 
comparison between the historical decomposition of the idiosyncratic oil price shock 
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regarding the SVAR with the convenience yield and the precautionary demand shock 
considering the benchmark SVAR is illustrated in Figure 5.5. 
 
Figure 5.4: Historical decomposition of real oil returns  
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Note: This figure exhibits the precautionary demand component that results from a historical decomposition of real 
oil returns. The precautionary demand is estimated means of our SVAR with the convenience yield (solid blue line) 
and the benchmark SVAR (dashed red line). The convenience yield is constructed using data on the 1-month oil 
futures contract. The sample period runs from January 1986 to December 2016.  
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Figure 5.5: Historical decomposition of real oil returns  
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Note: This figure exhibits the precautionary demand and idiosyncratic demand components that result from a 
historical decomposition of real oil returns. The idiosyncratic demand is estimated means of our SVAR with 
convenience yield (solid blue line). The precautionary demand is estimated by means of the benchmark SVAR 
(dashed red line). The convenience yield is constructed using data on the 1-month oil futures contract. The sample 
period runs from January 1986 to December 2016.  
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Overall, our findings confirm that precautionary demand shocks based on the 
benchmark SVAR have a greater historical contribution to real oil returns compared to 
the precautionary demand shocks and idiosyncratic oil price shocks which are related 
to the SVAR with the convenience yield. The extent to which the SVAR with the 
convenience yield helps to identify precautionary demand shocks requires further 
attention. A comparison of our SVAR with the benchmark SVAR sheds light on the 
specific patterns, such as the period 1990-1991, the early-1999, the period late-2000 
until early-2003, the Great Recession of 2007-2009 and the period from the second half 
of 2014 to early-2015, in which the precautionary demand shock was larger if the 
benchmark SVAR was used.  
 
It should be noted that these patterns may not be influenced by Kilian’s precautionary 
demand shocks. For instance, the period 1990-1991 is mainly associated with the 
Persian Gulf War. In this regard, Kilian and Murphy (2014) suggest that oil price 
fluctuations (a sharp increase in price) are strongly driven by flow supply shocks and 
moderately by speculative demand shocks in the episode of the invasion in Kuwait. 
They partly support evidence provided by Hamilton (2009a) who suggest that the oil 
price fluctuation during this period was attributed to supply shocks. Considering that 
supply shocks and speculative demand shocks appeared to be the main drivers of this 
period, we argue that precautionary demand shocks do not exercise any major effect on 
real oil returns during this period.  
 
Moreover, an increase in oil price is observed in early-1999. This can be attributed to 
the agreement about a cut in oil production by OPEC and other oil-exporting countries 
during 1998. Overall, this agreement resulted in a decline in the world-wide oil 
205 
 
production by 3.1 million barrels per day. Oil price changes originated by OPEC’s 
production cuts are regarded as supply shocks. Thus, supply shocks seem to be a key 
driver of oil price fluctuations during this period. 
 
As far as the period from late-2000 until early-2003 is concerned, we notice that there 
are episodes in which a downward pressure on oil price is observed, which can be 
attributed to oil production increases by OPEC members and non-OPEC producers. In 
addition, the recession that the developed countries experienced during that period was 
associated with a decrease in global demand growth. Thus, the observed variation over 
time in real oil returns over the above period was arguably driven by a combination of 
supply-side and aggregate-demand-induced oil price shocks. By contrast, precautionary 
demand shocks do not seem to influence the variation over time in real oil returns, as 
implied by the SVAR with the convenience yield. 
 
Similarly, aggregate demand shocks appear to have a crucial role in explaining a sharp 
decline in oil prices around the peak of the Great Recession, which is also documented 
by Broadstock and Filis (2014). Moreover, we should not lose sight of the fact that the 
oil price trough is justified not only by changes in fundamentals but also by increased 
speculative activity51, as illustrated by larger idiosyncratic oil price shocks. 
We now turn the period from the second half of 2014 to the early-2015, which marks 
the end of a long period that began with the political instability in the Middle East in 
                                                 
51 In July 2008, the report by Commodity Futures Trading Commission's (CFTC) indicate that increases 
in oil price during the period from January 2003 to June 2008 is largely attributed to the fundamental 
factors of supply and demand rather than speculative activity. However, due to the oil price peak of $145 
per barrel and trough of $30 per barrel between July and December 2008, CFTC revised this report in 
2009 by supporting the suggestion that oil price changes may be driven by financialisation (speculative 
activity) which induces oil prices to fluctuate above fundamentals. In this respect, Singleton (2013) 
argues that oil prices might be affected by increasing flows of funds from financial traders during 2008. 
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2011 and the continuing geopolitical unrest until mid-2014. Overall, this period 
appeared to raise fears about the future availability of oil and hence caused 
precautionary demand shocks to drive real oil returns. However, aggregate demand and 
supply factors seem to contribute significantly to a collapse in oil prices in the second 
half of 2014. Kilian and Baumeister (2015) argue that low global demand and positive 
supply-side shocks are associated with this episode. This indicates that precautionary 
demand shocks did not appear to instigate changes in the oil price during this period. 
 
The above discussion prompts us to conjecture that precautionary demand shocks 
estimated by means of the SVAR with the convenience yield and the benchmark SVAR 
have different information contents. This conjecture can be verified by a more formal 
statistical test for equality of variances. First, we test for the equality of variances of 
precautionary demand shocks from the two aforementioned SVAR models. Second, we 
test if the idiosyncratic oil price shock in our SVAR and the precautionary demand 
shock in the benchmark SVAR have equal variances. A battery of tests we use 
comprises the F-test, the Bartlett test, the Levene test, and the Brown-Forsythe test. 
These tests assume homogeneous variance. Table 5.3 summarises the tests, which 
indicate that the null hypothesis is rejected. The tests provide evidence that 
precautionary demand and idiosyncratic oil price shocks estimated by means of our 
SVAR have different variation over time. 
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Table 5.3: Test for equality of variances 
Panel A - Precautionary demand shock (SVAR with the convenience yield) and 
precautionary demand shock (benchmark SVAR) 
Method df value Prob 
F-test (367, 367) 2.2563 0.0000*** 
Bartlett 1 59.0681 0.0000*** 
Levene (1, 734) 36.2832 0.0000*** 
Brow-Forsythe (1, 734) 33.9786 0.0000*** 
Panel B – Idiosyncratic oil price shock (SVAR with the convenience yield) and 
precautionary demand shock (benchmark SVAR) 
Method df value Prob 
F-test (367, 367) 1.8707 0.0000*** 
Bartlett 1 35.3696 0.0000*** 
Levene (1, 734) 20.5567 0.0000*** 
Brow-Forsythe (1, 734) 19.1700 0.0000*** 
Note: This table reports the results of testing for equality of variances. Panel A compares the variance 
between the precautionary demand shock in the SVAR with the convenience yield and the 
precautionary demand shock in the benchmark SVAR. Panel B compares the variance between the 
idiosyncratic oil price shock in the SVAR with the convenience yield and the precautionary demand 
shock in the benchmark SVAR. The test is measured by the F-test, the Bartlett test, the Levene test 
and the Brown-Forsythe test under the null hypothesis of variance homogeneity. If the null is rejected, 
there are significant differences in variances between the shocks. Degrees of freedom are denoted by 
(df). The p-value is associated to each test statistic. Asterisk * (**, ***) denotes the 10% (5%, 1%) 
significance level. The sample period runs from January 1986 to December 2016. 
 
 
In addition, Table 5.4 summarises the value of variances related to the aforementioned 
shocks. Specifically, precautionary demand shocks based on the benchmark SVAR 
exhibit a higher variance compared to precautionary demand shocks and idiosyncratic 
oil price shocks in our SVAR with the convenience yield. This can be possibly 
attributed to the information contained in the convenience yield regarding market’s 
valuation of holding oil inventories and generally market expectations about the 
physical oil market fundamentals including the price.  
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Table 5.4: Variance calculation of the oil price shocks 
 Precautionary demand  
(SVAR with 
convenience yield) 
Idiosyncratic demand 
(SVAR with the 
convenience yield) 
Precautionary demand 
(benchmark SVAR) 
Sum 0.4706 0.4549 0.4652 
Obs 368 368 368 
Mean 0.0013 0.0012 0.0013 
Variance 0.0028 0.0034 0.0063 
Std. Dev. 0.0530 0.0582 0.0796 
Note: This table summarises descriptive statistics (sum, number of observations, mean, variance and standard deviation) of precautionary 
demand shocks and idiosyncratic oil price shocks (both based on the SVAR with the convenience yield) and precautionary demand 
shocks (based on benchmark SVAR). The sample period runs from January 1986 to December 2016. 
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In summary, the historical decomposition of real oil returns sheds light on the role of 
convenience yield as a key driver of precautionary demand shocks. In addition, while 
controlling for precautionary demand shocks, our modelling strategy helps to identify 
yet another important source of the variation over time in the real oil returns – 
idiosyncratic oil price shocks – that can be thought of capture speculative demand for 
oil. In particular, we claim that fundamental factors of global supply and demand 
together with speculative activity in the oil market can explain the variation over time 
in real oil returns. Thus, our results justify our consideration to disaggregate the 
precautionary demand into two components. Indeed, precautionary demand shocks 
(captured by the convenience yield) and idiosyncratic oil price shocks appear to provide 
a plausible explanation regarding the origin of precautionary demand. 
 
5.5.4 Variance decomposition 
 
Forecast error variance decomposition results for the variables under investigation in 
the SVAR model of the 1-month futures contract are reported in Table 5.5. The selected 
forecast period is related to 1, 3, 6, 12, 18 and 24 months in an attempt to identify the 
short-run and the long-run variation in our variables caused by each of the 
aforementioned shocks. We observe that the variation in world oil production growth 
is driven by its own (oil supply) shocks either in the very short-run or the very long-
run. Specifically, this share remains above 96% for the overall selected forecast period. 
On the other hand, aggregate demand (precautionary demand, idiosyncratic oil price) 
shocks accounting for 0.43% (2.76%, 0.57%) for the last month of the selected forecast 
period.  
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In addition, fluctuations in global economic activity index are also attributed to its own 
(aggregate demand) shocks in shorter (1 month), medium (12 months) and longer (24 
months) horizons. Overall, precautionary demand shocks and idiosyncratic oil price 
shocks together appear to explain about 10% at medium and longer horizons, whereas 
oil supply shocks do not seem to account for any variability in global economic activity 
index. Moreover, changes in the oil convenience yield are associated with its own 
innovations (precautionary demand shocks) and this share does not fall below 95% for 
the overall selected forecast period. The remaining three shocks do not generate any 
noticeable variation in the oil convenience yield. 
 
Furthermore, the real oil price returns fluctuations are not totally attributed to their own 
shocks for the overall selected forecast period compared with the world oil production 
growth, global economic activity index and the oil convenience yield which are mostly 
explained by their own shocks in the same period. More specifically, own innovations 
account for a share of 68% in the first month which is the highest percentage whereas 
the same shocks generate up to 54% variation in each of the remaining selected months. 
We report that 28% of the variation in the real oil price returns is associated with the 
precautionary demand shocks approximated by the convenience yield in the first month 
only and then the effect remains constant around the share of 43% over the 24-month 
forecast period. Aggregate demand shocks and oil supply shocks do not generate any 
significant variability in the real oil price returns.  
 
Turning our attention to the relationship between the oil convenience yield and the oil 
price, it is worth noting that precautionary demand as oil-specific uncertainty shocks 
play an important role in accounting for fluctuations in the real oil price returns. 
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Specifically, this shock drives a 43% persistent movement in the real oil price returns 
independently of the time period. This finding is also in line with conclusions 
documented by Alquist and Kilian (2010) that the real oil price movements are driven 
by oil uncertainty shocks (for example, uncertainty of future oil supply availability). 
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Table 5.5: Forecast error variance decomposition tests of the series under investigation, 1-month futures contract  
Period Oil supply shock Aggregate demand shock Precautionary demand shock Idiosyncratic oil price shock 
Panel A: Variance decomposition of world oil production growth 
1 100.00 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
3 97.491 (1.729) 3.356 (0.776) 1.607 (1.421) 0.543 (0.867) 
6 96.267 (1.989) 0.489 (0.868) 2.671 (1.567) 0.572 (0.904) 
12 96.174 (2.029) 0.493 (0.887) 2.757 (1.599) 0.574 (0.905) 
18 96.163 (2.041) 0.493 (0.894) 2.768 (1.608) 0.574 (0.905) 
24 96.162 (2.046) 0.493 (0.900) 2.769 (1.609) 0.574 (0.905) 
Panel B: Variance decomposition of global economic activity index 
1 0.102 (0.535) 99.897 (0.535) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
3 0.038 (0.581) 92.505 (2.694) 4.903 (2.106) 2.553 (1.435) 
6 0.373 (1.068) 88.353 (4.758) 6.484 (3.433) 4.788 (2.725) 
12 0.434 (1.243) 88.759 (5.383) 5.346 (3.987) 5.459 (3.348) 
18 0.464 (1.299) 89.023 (5.590) 4.801 (4.259) 5.710 (3.526) 
24 0.477 (1.321) 89.140 (5.706) 4.563 (4.422) 5.819 (3.599) 
Panel C: Variance decomposition of the convenience yield M1 
1 0.446 (0.759) 1.576 (1.315) 97.977 (1.571) 0.000 (0.000) 
3 1.006 (1.136) 3.332 (3.023) 95.417 (2.532) 0.243 (0.510) 
6 0.869 (1.128) 2.829 (2.013) 96.047 (2.423) 0.252 (0.663) 
12 0.840 (1.153) 2.819 (2.056) 96.020 (2.516) 0.319 (0.776) 
18 0.838 (1.150) 3.072 (2.345) 95.728 (2.790) 0.360 (0.812) 
24 0.838 (1.146) 3.269 (2.612) 95.509 (3.045) 0.382 (0.826) 
Panel D: Variance decomposition of real oil returns 
1 1.070 (1.100) 1.326 (1.214) 28.920 (4.064) 68.682 (4.122) 
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3 1.426 (1.431) 1.934 (1.725) 42.063 (4.665) 54.539 (4.625) 
6 1.538 (1.548) 2.181 (1.805) 42.778 (4.540) 53.501 (4.543) 
12 1.529 (1.543) 2.173 (1.830) 43.118 (4.506) 53.178 (4.527) 
18 1.528 (1.541) 2.175 (1.839) 43.138 (4.502) 53.157 (5.524) 
24 1.528 (1.540) 2.178 (1.849) 43.138 (4.501) 53.154 (4.523) 
Note: The table reports the variation in world oil production growth, global economic activity index, convenience yield (M1) and the real oil returns driven 
by oil supply shocks, aggregate demand shocks, precautionary demand shocks and idiosyncratic oil price shocks. M1 = one-month futures contract. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and estimated by Monte Carlo simulations with 1,000 replications. The sample period runs from January 1986 
to December 2016. 
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5.5.5 Robustness check 
 
In order to evaluate the stability of our findings regarding the inclusion of the 
convenience yield as a measurement of the precautionary demand for oil, we consider 
the futures-spot basis (or spread) which is this price difference between futures price 
and spot price. Specifically, we consider the nearby or front month contract for the 
futures price. This proxy is similar to Anzuini et al. (2015), who use changes in the 
future-spot price spread to approximate for precautionary demand shocks. Robustness 
check results are summarised in Figure 5.6 and illustrate that a precautionary demand 
shock exerts a positive and significant impact on real oil returns. This is in line with our 
findings in Figure 5.3 regarding the SVAR with the convenience yield in which a 
precautionary demand shock causes a positive and significant effect on real oil returns. 
In a more detailed analysis, the SVAR with the convenience yield (futures-spot spread) 
leads to a rise of 4% (2.5%) on impact and 8% (6%) in month 3 to real oil returns. 
Thereafter, this impact staying permanently to 5% (6%) for the overall selected forecast 
period. Overall, we argue that our results are qualitatively similar for both SVARs. 
 
Figure 5.6: SVAR with futures-spot spread 
Structural VAR impulse responses of the 1-month futures contract 
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Note: The lines represent the accumulated impulse responses of the real oil returns (DROP) to a supply-side shock 
(EPSILON_SS), aggregate demand shock (EPSILON_AD), precautionary demand shock (EPSILON_PD) and 
idiosyncratic oil price shock (EPSILON_ID) respectively. Solid line represents the mean response. Dotted lines 
represent 95% confident interval (upper and lower quartiles). The sample period runs from January 1986 to 
December 2016.  
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5.5.6 The response of stock market returns 
 
We start with the response of stock market returns to a one standard deviation structural 
shock to convenience yield and real oil returns (see Figures 5.7 for the S&P500 and 5.8 
for the Dow Jones). We observe similar patterns which are suggestive of the fact that 
throughout the overall study period, there is not any notable difference between the 
indices regarding their response to precautionary demand shocks (captured by the 
convenience yield) and idiosyncratic oil price shocks. 
 
More specifically, for the 1-month, the 2-month and the 3-month futures contracts, 
precautionary demand shocks and idiosyncratic oil price shocks do not seem to exercise 
any significant effect on stock market returns for a time period up to 24 months. These 
findings are not in line with the existing literature (see, for example, Abhyankar et al., 
2013; Basher et al., 2012; Filis et al., 2011; Kilian and Park, 2009), which documents 
that stock market returns tend to respond negatively to increasing precautionary demand 
shocks, as this is measured by Kilian (2009).  
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Figure 5.7: SVAR impulse responses of returns on the S&P500 stock market index: 
1986:1 – 2016:12 
Panel A – Structural VAR impulse responses of the 1-month futures contract 
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Panel B – Structural VAR impulse responses of the 2-month futures contract 
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Panel C – Structural VAR impulse responses of the 3-month futures contract 
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Note: The lines represent the accumulated impulse responses of returns on the S&P500 stock market index 
(RETSP) to a supply-side shock (EPSILON_SS), aggregate demand shock (EPSILON_AD), precautionary 
demand shock (EPSILON_PD), idiosyncratic oil price shock (EPSILON_ID) and shock to returns on the S&P500 
index (EPSILON_RETSP) respectively. Solid line represents the mean response. Dotted lines represent 95% 
confident interval (upper and lower quartiles). 
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Figure 5.8: SVAR impulse responses of returns on the DJ stock market index: 1986:1 – 
2016:12 
Panel A – Structural VAR impulse responses of the 1-month futures contract 
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Panel B – Structural VAR impulse responses of the 2-month futures contract 
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Panel C – Structural VAR impulse responses of the 3-month futures contract 
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Note: The lines represent the accumulated impulse responses of returns on the Dow Jones stock market index 
(RETDJ) to a supply-side shock (EPSILON_SS), aggregate demand shock (EPSILON_AD), precautionary 
demand shock (EPSILON_PD), idiosyncratic oil price shock (EPSILON_ID) and shock to returns on the Dow 
Jones index (EPSILON_RETDJ) respectively. Solid line represents the mean response. Dotted lines represent 95% 
confident interval (upper and lower quartiles). 
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We now turn our focus on the Great Recession period. The choice of this period accords 
with our preliminary analysis which suggests that during periods of severe recession oil 
markets move in the same direction with the stock markets. Specifically, both markets 
are affected negatively due to increasing uncertainty caused by the Great Recession. 
We consider that this period is expected to paint a clear picture regarding the effects of 
precautionary demand shocks and idiosyncratic oil price shocks on stock market 
returns. As a result, our sample is divided into two sub-periods, the pre-Great Recession 
period from 1986:1 to 2008:8 and the post-Great Recession period from 2008:9 to 
2016:12.52 
 
The initial period of our interest is the pre-Great Recession period from 1986:1 to 
2008:8. The impulse response functions in Figures 5.9 (S&P500) and 5.10 (Dow Jones) 
indicate a negative and significant response of the stock market returns to an 
idiosyncratic oil price shock for all maturities, whereas the response of the 
precautionary demand shock is negative and significant in the short-term. Our findings 
are in line with the previously mentioned studies that support the general consensus 
which indicates a negative correlation between stock market returns and oil-market 
specific demand shocks (precautionary demand shocks and idiosyncratic oil price 
shocks). 
 
 
 
                                                 
52 According to the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), the Great Recession in the US 
lasted from December 2007 to June 2009. Although the financial crisis started in the US with the 
subprime mortgage crisis in July 2007, the most critical stage of the financial crisis began with the 
collapse of the investment bank Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and turned into a global financial 
crisis. This is in line with Reboredo and Ugolini (2016) who also suggest a similar date to distinguish 
between the period prior to and after the global financial crisis. 
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Figure 5.9: SVAR impulse responses of returns on the S&P500 stock market index: 
1986:1 – 2008:8 
Panel A – Structural VAR impulse responses of the 1-month futures contract 
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Panel B – Structural VAR impulse responses of the 2-month futures contract 
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Panel C – Structural VAR impulse responses of the 3-month futures contract 
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Note: The lines represent the accumulated impulse responses of returns on the S&P500 stock market index 
(RETSP) to a supply-side shock (EPSILON_SS), aggregate demand shock (EPSILON_AD), precautionary 
demand shock (EPSILON_PD), idiosyncratic oil price shock (EPSILON_ID) and shock to returns on the S&P500 
index (EPSILON_RETSP) respectively. Solid line represents the mean response. Dotted lines represent 95% 
confident interval (upper and lower quartiles). 
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Figure 5.10: SVAR impulse responses of returns on the DJ stock market index: 1986:1 – 
2008:8 
Panel A – Structural VAR impulse responses of the 1-month futures contract 
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Panel B – Structural VAR impulse responses of the 2-month futures contract 
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Panel C – Structural VAR impulse responses of the 3-month futures contract 
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Note: The lines represent the accumulated impulse responses of returns on the Dow Jones stock market index 
(RETDJ) to a supply-side shock (EPSILON_SS), aggregate demand shock (EPSILON_AD), precautionary 
demand shock (EPSILON_PD), idiosyncratic oil price shock (EPSILON_ID) and shock to returns on the Dow 
Jones index (EPSILON_RETDJ) respectively. Solid line represents the mean response. Dotted lines represent 95% 
confident interval (upper and lower quartiles). 
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We further our analysis focusing on the post-Great Recession period from 2008:9 to 
2016:12. The responses of stock market returns to precautionary demand and 
idiosyncratic oil price shocks are displayed in Figures 5.11 (S&P500) and 5.12 (Dow 
Jones). In general, stock market returns show a positive and significant response to an 
idiosyncratic oil price shock, irrespectively of the maturity, both in the long- and short-
term. Similarly, a precautionary demand shock causes a positive effect on returns on 
the S&P500 and Dow Jones indices for all maturities. However, the effect is significant 
only in the short-term. This finding is not consistent with the ex-ante expectation. 
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Figure 5.11: SVAR impulse responses of returns on the S&P500 stock market index: 
2008:9 – 2016:12 
Panel A – Structural VAR impulse responses of the 1-month futures contract 
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Panel B – Structural VAR impulse responses of the 2-month futures contract 
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Panel C – Structural VAR impulse responses of the 3-month futures contract 
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Note: The lines represent the accumulated impulse responses of returns on the S&P500 stock market index 
(RETSP) to a supply-side shock (EPSILON_SS), aggregate demand shock (EPSILON_AD), precautionary 
demand shock (EPSILON_PD), idiosyncratic oil price shock (EPSILON_ID) and shock to returns on the S&P500 
index (EPSILON_RETSP) respectively. Solid line represents the mean response. Dotted lines represent 95% 
confident interval (upper and lower quartiles). 
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Figure 5.12: SVAR impulse responses of returns on the DJ stock market index: 2008:9 – 
2016:12 
Panel A – Structural VAR impulse responses of the 1-month futures contract 
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Panel B – Structural VAR impulse responses of the 2-month futures contract 
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Panel C – Structural VAR impulse responses of the 3-month futures contract 
 
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
5 10 15 20
Response of RETDJ to EPSILON_SS
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
5 10 15 20
Response of RETDJ to EPSILON_AD
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
5 10 15 20
Response of RETDJ to EPSILON_PD
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
5 10 15 20
Response of RETDJ to EPSILON_ID
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
5 10 15 20
Response of RETDJ to EPSILON_RETDJ
 
 
Note: The lines represent the accumulated impulse responses of returns on the Dow Jones stock market index 
(RETDJ) to a supply-side shock (EPSILON_SS), aggregate demand shock (EPSILON_AD), precautionary 
demand shock (EPSILON_PD), idiosyncratic oil price shock (EPSILON_ID) and shock to returns on the Dow 
Jones index (EPSILON_RETDJ) respectively. Solid line represents the mean response. Dotted lines represent 95% 
confident interval (upper and lower quartiles). 
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Overall, the responses of stock market returns to both precautionary demand and 
idiosyncratic oil price shocks appear to be in accordance with our expectation before 
the Great Recession, but they are seemingly counter-intuitive after the Great Recession. 
It is also important to note that the effect of our precautionary demand shock on the 
stock market returns is less significant compared to idiosyncratic oil price shock in both 
pre- and post-Great Recession period and confirms that the strongest effect is generated 
by idiosyncratic oil price shocks. This in turn, validates our decision to disentangle the 
precautionary demand into two components, and to use of the convenience yield to 
capture the precautionary demand shock. To gain a thorough picture about the above 
relationships, a more in-depth analysis is carried out in Section 5.6. 
 
5.5.7 The response of stock market volatility 
 
We further our analysis focusing on the effects of precautionary and idiosyncratic oil 
price shocks on stock market volatility, measured by the VIX index (the implied 
volatility of S&P500 index) and the VXD index (the implied volatility of Dow Jones 
index). We consider the time period of 1990-2016 for the VIX index and the time period 
of 1998-2016 for the VXD index. The choice of this time period is particularly based 
on the VIX and VXD data availability.  
 
Our decision to employ measurements of implied volatility instead of any measurement 
of conditional volatility and realised volatility was motivated by a number of studies 
such as Christensen and Prabhala (1998), Fleming (1998), Blair et al. (2001), Giot 
(2003) and Koopman et al. (2005). They argue that accurate volatility forecasts for 
stock market returns are based on implied volatility, which is a forward-looking market 
volatility, compared with conditional volatility and realised volatility which are both 
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regarded as current-looking market volatilities. Furthermore, in a more recent study, 
Antonakakis et al. (2017) use the implied volatility indices to investigate the dynamic 
structural relationship between the three oil price shocks (we employ the same shocks 
in our study) and stock market volatility. They report that the implied volatility is 
relatively smooth compared to the backward-looking volatilities. In addition, 
Maghyereh et al. (2016) argue in favour of implied volatilities since they depend not 
only on the market’s expectations about future volatility but also on fears. If fears are 
high then options are priced with higher volatilities and a risk premium follows. In 
addition to this, Maghyereh et al. (2016) point out that the positive connectedness 
between oil and stock prices in the recent years is ideally controlled by focusing on 
implied volatility relations that account for cross market sentiments. 
 
Figures 5.13 and 5.14 show an insignificant response of stock market volatility to a 
precautionary demand shock. In addition, the results indicate a negative and significant 
effect of an idiosyncratic oil price shock on VIX index and VXD index. Overall, the 
general consensus indicates that oil-market specific demand shocks are regarded as 
negative news to the stock market and thus are expected to lead to higher volatility. 
Related studies to this consensus include papers by Baum et al. (2010) and Bloom 
(2009). 
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Figure 5.13: SVAR impulse responses of stock market volatility VIX index: 1990:1 – 
2016:12 
Panel A – Structural VAR impulse responses of the 1-month futures contract 
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Panel B – Structural VAR impulse responses of the 2-month futures contract 
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Panel C – Structural VAR impulse responses of the 3-month futures contract 
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Note: The lines represent the accumulated impulse responses of the volatility VIX index (VOLVIX) to a supply-
side shock (EPSILON_SS), aggregate demand shock (EPSILON_AD), precautionary demand shock 
(EPSILON_PD), idiosyncratic oil price shock (EPSILON_ID) and shock to volatility VIX index (VOLVIX) 
respectively. Solid line represents the mean response. Dotted lines represent 95% confident interval (upper and 
lower quartiles). 
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Figure 5.14: SVAR impulse responses of stock market volatility VXD index:  1998:1 – 
2016:12  
Panel A – Structural VAR impulse responses of the 1-month futures contract 
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Panel B – Structural VAR impulse responses of the 2-month futures contract 
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Panel C – Structural VAR impulse responses of the 3-month futures contract 
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Note: The lines represent the accumulated impulse responses of the volatility VXD index (VOLVXD) to a supply-
side shock (EPSILON_SS), aggregate demand shock (EPSILON_AD), precautionary demand shock 
(EPSILON_PD), idiosyncratic oil price shock (EPSILON_ID) and shock to volatility VXD index (VOLVXD) 
respectively. Solid line represents the mean response. Dotted lines represent 95% confident interval (upper and 
lower quartiles). 
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As in Section 5.5.6, we divide the sample period into the pre-Great Recession period 
(until 2008:08 inclusively), and into the post-Great Recession period (from 2008:09 to 
2016:12 inclusively).  Before the Great Recession, Figures 5.15 (VIX) and 5.16 (VXD) 
show a positive but insignificant response to an idiosyncratic oil price shock. Moreover, 
a precautionary demand shock has a positive and significant, albeit short-lived, effect 
on stock market volatility, particularly on the VXD index. Thus, our results lend only 
weak support to the ex-ante expectation of a positive relationship between oil-market 
specific demand shocks and stock market volatility. 
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Figure 5.15: SVAR impulse responses of stock market volatility VIX index: 1990:1 – 
2008:08 
Panel A – Structural VAR impulse responses of the 1-month futures contract 
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Panel B – Structural VAR impulse responses of the 2-month futures contract 
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Panel C – Structural VAR impulse responses of the 3-month futures contract 
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Note: The lines represent the accumulated impulse responses of the volatility VIX index (VOLVIX) to a supply-
side shock (EPSILON_SS), aggregate demand shock (EPSILON_AD), precautionary demand shock 
(EPSILON_PD), idiosyncratic oil price shock (EPSILON_ID) and shock to volatility VIX index (VOLVIX) 
respectively. Solid line represents the mean response. Dotted lines represent 95% confident interval (upper and 
lower quartiles). 
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Figure 5.16: SVAR impulse responses of stock market volatility VXD index: 1998:1 – 
2008:08  
Panel A – Structural VAR impulse responses of the 1-month futures contract 
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Panel B – Structural VAR impulse responses of the 2-month futures contract 
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Panel C – Structural VAR impulse responses of the 3-month futures contract 
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Note: The lines represent the accumulated impulse responses of the volatility VXD index (VOLVXD) to a supply-
side shock (EPSILON_SS), aggregate demand shock (EPSILON_AD), precautionary demand shock 
(EPSILON_PD), idiosyncratic oil price shock (EPSILON_ID) and shock to volatility VXD index (VOLVXD) 
respectively. Solid line represents the mean response. Dotted lines represent 95% confident interval (upper and 
lower quartiles). 
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We now turn our attention to the last period of interest which is the post-Great 
Recession period running from 2008:9 to 2016:12. The response of stock market 
volatility is shown in Figures 5.17 (VIX) and 5.18 (VXD). The findings indicate that 
both precautionary demand and idiosyncratic oil price shocks have a negative and 
significant effect on stock market volatility. This direction is not consistent with the 
general consensus, according to which a positive reaction is expected.  As mentioned 
in Bloom (2009), higher uncertainty shocks appear to be bad news for companies, cause 
a delay in investment projects, a reduction in hiring and productivity and therefore a 
higher stock market (financial) volatility is expected. Overall, the volatility response is 
seemingly counter-intuitive. Therefore, to attain a more in-depth knowledge we further 
analyse these results and provide an intuitive interpretation in Section 5.6. 
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Figure 5.17: SVAR impulse responses of stock market volatility VIX index: 2008:09 – 
2016:12 
Panel A – Structural VAR impulse responses of the 1-month futures contract 
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Panel B – Structural VAR impulse responses of the 2-month futures contract 
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Panel C – Structural VAR impulse responses of the 3-month futures contract 
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Note: The lines represent the accumulated impulse responses of the volatility VIX index (VOLVIX) to a supply-
side shock (EPSILON_SS), aggregate demand shock (EPSILON_AD), precautionary demand shock 
(EPSILON_PD), idiosyncratic oil price shock (EPSILON_ID) and shock to volatility VIX index (VOLVIX) 
respectively. Solid line represents the mean response. Dotted lines represent 95% confident interval (upper and 
lower quartiles). 
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Figure 5.18: SVAR impulse responses of stock market volatility VXD index: 2008:09 – 
2016:12 
Panel A – Structural VAR impulse responses of the 1-month futures contract 
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Panel B – Structural VAR impulse responses of the 2-month futures contract 
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Panel C – Structural VAR impulse responses of the 3-month futures contract 
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Note: The lines represent the accumulated impulse responses of the volatility VXD index (VOLVXD) to a supply-
side shock (EPSILON_SS), aggregate demand shock (EPSILON_AD), precautionary demand shock 
(EPSILON_PD), idiosyncratic oil price shock (EPSILON_ID) and shock to volatility VXD index (VOLVXD) 
respectively. Solid line represents the mean response. Dotted lines represent 95% confident interval (upper and 
lower quartiles). 
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5.6. Discussion of results 
The convenience yield is thought of as a driver for precautionary demand. Overall, our 
findings confirm the expectation of a positive relationship between the precautionary 
demand and the real oil returns. A higher convenience yield encourages market 
participants to pay for oil inventories. This increases the inventory demand in the oil 
spot market. As inventories accumulate, the availability of crude oil for current use 
declines, which puts an upward pressure on the oil price. 
 
In addition, based on our SVAR model with the convenience yield, the historical 
decomposition of real oil returns shows that a precautionary demand shock has a 
relatively weak effect on the oil price. In similar fashion, the effect of an idiosyncratic 
oil price shock is relatively stronger, which may have arisen from elevated speculative 
activity in oil futures market. Indeed, oil price movements are mostly attributed to 
changes in oil market fundamentals or speculative activity rather than fears about the 
future availability of oil. This is evident in our findings across a number of episodes 
(i.e. the period of 1990-1991, the early-1999, the period late-2000 until early-2003, the 
Great Recession of 2007-2009 and the period from the second half of 2014 to early-
2015). In this regard, our decision to include the convenience yield in the SVAR seeks 
to ascertain the origin of precautionary demand in the oil market. 
 
Next, we examine the response of stock market returns to precautionary demand and 
idiosyncratic oil price shocks originated in the crude oil market. Fears about future 
availability of oil and unexpected oil price movements are priced in the stock market. 
As aforementioned, we expect that stock market returns respond negatively to 
precautionary demand and idiosyncratic oil price shocks. Indeed, increases in the oil 
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price lead to higher production costs, which in turn cause profits, future cash flows and 
thus stock market returns to decline. However, our results only partly support this 
consensus. Importantly, we find a significant short-lived effect of precautionary 
demand shocks on stock market returns, in both pre- and post-Great Recession period, 
irrespective of the maturity of a futures contract.  
 
A plausible explanation of this relationship and specifically these short-lived effects 
can be attributed to the fact that oil inventories are more valuable and considered as 
more important for speculators in the shorter-run rather than in the longer-run. In 
practice, speculators are seeking quick returns from changing prices. In this respect, 
they prefer to buy and sell barrels of oil in the physical oil market because they do not 
intend to use crude oil. This could possibly explain the short-lived significant effects of 
precautionary demand shocks originated by the convenience yield on the stock market 
returns. 
 
We further report the effects of an idiosyncratic oil price shock on stock market returns. 
The results show a negative (positive) and significant effect before (after) the Great 
Recession. Since the results disagree with the expected negative relationship after the 
Great Recession, we turn our attention to this period. The first plausible explanation 
regarding the positive effect of an idiosyncratic oil price shock can be attributed to the 
increasing levels of uncertainty in both oil and stock markets from September 2008. In 
particular, in this period oil price experienced a sharp drop, whereas stock markets 
crashed across a number of countries. After the Great Recession both oil and stock 
markets have been following a bearish trend and they continue moving in the same 
direction. These developments have contributed to a stronger co-movement between 
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the two markets, which manifests in a positive relationship between the prices in two 
markets.  
 
The second explanation can be attributed to the financialisation of the oil market. The 
growing trading volume in oil futures derivatives driven by institutional traders since 
2003 has led to significant effects on the oil market. In this regard, anecdotal evidence 
indicates that the investment by institutional investors (i.e. pension funds, hedge funds, 
etc.) in commodity futures has grown from $15 billion in 2003 to $200 billion in mid-
2008 (Tang and Xiong, 2012), and then to $250 billion in 2009 (Irwin and Sanders, 
2011). The impact of financialisation has been studied by academic research in the 
recent years. Financial intermediaries, including hedge funds, insurance companies and 
pension funds, have recognised the importance of oil futures market derivatives as a 
financial asset that helps the owner to lay off risks or increase the value of investment 
(Fattouh et al., 2013).  
 
More specifically, Büyükşahin and Robe (2014) emphasise the role of hedge funds in 
the quest for profitable investment opportunities, which typically arise around oil price 
peaks and troughs. In particular, they document that when the share of hedge funds in 
energy futures market increases by 1% the dynamic correlation between energy returns 
and equity returns reaching increases by 5%. Moreover, the increasing financialisation 
of commodity markets – which is linked with the growth of investment in the oil futures 
market – is associated with higher oil prices (Tang and Xiong, 2012). Furthermore, 
Silvennoinen and Thorp (2013) find that the conditional correlation between 
commodity futures returns and US equity returns increases in periods of higher stock 
market uncertainty. More recently, Sadorsky (2014) reports that the dynamic 
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correlation between emerging market stock prices and oil prices grew considerably after 
2008 with no tendency to revert back to the pre-2008 levels. 
  
Other studies related to financialisation (speculative activity) of the oil market include 
Basak and Pavlova (2016), Adams and Glück (2015), Cheng et al. (2014), Hamilton 
and Wu (2014), Morana (2013), Singleton (2013), Alquist and Kilian (2010) and 
Büyükşahin et al. (2010). Overall, the growing purchase of oil-related assets (i.e. futures 
contracts) by speculators is indicative of the financialisation of the oil futures market. 
Thus, we suggest that the positive effect of an idiosyncratic oil price shock on stock 
market returns in the post-Great Recession period can be justified by speculative 
activity.  
 
Noteworthy, our findings are in line with Filis et al. (2011), who provide evidence that 
a stronger positive link between oil prices and stock markets from oil-exporting and 
oil-importing countries is associated with the global financial crisis of 2008. Similarly, 
Creti et al. (2013) report an increasing correlation between US stock market and 
commodity markets during the 2008 financial turmoil. Also, the results are in 
agreement with Sadorsky (2014) who reports growing correlations between 21 
emerging markets stock prices and oil prices in the post-2008 period. A positive and 
rising correlation between oil prices and stock prices from oil-exporting and oil-
importing countries during the global financial crisis period is also reported in Guesmi 
and Fattoum (2014). Similar findings are reported by Broadstock et al. (2012) regarding 
the relationship between oil prices and energy related stocks in China following the 
global financial crisis of 2008, as well as Hammoudeh et al. (2014) who document a 
positive correlation between commodity futures and the Chinese stock market.  
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Our findings are also in accordance with previous studies that examine the period prior 
to and after the Great Recession (see, inter alia, Reboredo and Ugolini, 2016; Tsai, 
2015; Reboredo and Rivera-Castro, 2014; Mollick and Assefa, 2013). Specifically, 
Mollick and Assefa (2013) and Tsai (2015) provide evidence that US stock market 
returns are negatively (positively) affected by oil prices prior to (after) the global 
financial crisis. Moreover, Reboredo and Rivera-Castro (2014) find that oil price 
changes exert a positive effect on European and US stock market returns after the global 
financial crisis, but not before it. Finally, Reboredo and Ugolini (2016) document a 
weak co-movement between oil prices and developed and emerging stock market prices 
in the pre-crisis period and a strong positive co-movement after the onset of the global 
financial crisis. It is worth mentioning that our findings regarding the pre-Great 
Recession are in line with Anzuini et al. (2015). By using data until 2008, they find that 
a precautionary demand shock exerts a negative and significant effect on US stock 
market returns. 
 
Finally, our study also scrutinises the response of stock market volatility to 
precautionary and idiosyncratic oil price shocks as the final part of this Section. 
Uncertainty related to oil-market specific demand shocks is considered as negative 
news to stock market participants, which may result in a delay in their investment 
decisions (see Bloom, 2009) and consequently may drive up volatility. It is thus 
expected that precautionary demand and idiosyncratic oil price shocks will have a 
positive effect on stock market volatility. Overall, our results are only consonant with 
the ex-ante expectation in the pre-Great Recession period. Indeed, before the Great 
Recession, the effect on volatility is positive and significant, albeit short-lived. Thus, 
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the uncertainty arising from oil-market specific demand shocks was provoking 
volatility increases in the US stock market. As earlier mentioned, the positions by 
institutional traders in the oil futures market were relatively low until 2003. In other 
words, the use of oil derivatives as a financial asset attracted limited attention by market 
participants. This indication provides evidence to support the argument according to 
which commodity markets (including oil) have been segmented from financial markets 
before the Great Recession. Studies related to the segmentation between commodity 
and stock markets include papers by Erb and Harvey (2006), Gorton and Rouwenhorst 
(2006) and De Roon et al. (2000). 
  
After the Great Recession, the response to oil-market specific demand shocks has 
become negative and significant, consistent with the financialisation hypothesis and 
heighted speculative activity in the oil market. This finding is counter-intuitive and is 
not in line with the general consensus which indicates that higher oil-market specific 
demand shocks exercise a positive influence on the stock market volatility. Indeed, the 
increased participation of hedge funds in the oil futures market provides evidence to 
support the argument that the performance of commodities in stock markets appears to 
change substantially. In particular, the large investment inflows by institutional traders 
could justify the dynamic relationship between commodity markets and stock markets 
especially during the Great Recession and the years onwards. Thus, the integration of 
commodity and stock markets can be attributed to a changing dynamic relationship 
between the two markets. Specifically, our results lend support to Brunetti et al. (2016), 
who show that hedge funds’ trading provides liquidity to the stock market and reduces 
market volatility.   
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More specifically, Brunetti et al. (2016) investigate the impact of speculation on 
commodity market volatility related to the US oil futures market. They find that 
positions held by hedge funds (speculators) in the oil futures market are positively 
related to contemporaneous oil futures returns and stabilise these markets by improving 
price discovery. They also indicate that hedge funds (non-commercial traders) cause a 
decrease in market volatility by taking positions opposite to commercial entities 
(dealers, manufacturers) with hedging needs in the oil futures market. In brief, they 
show that hedge funds’ trading improves market liquidity and drives down the financial 
stress which in turn reduces the stock market volatility. 
 
Our results are partly consistent with the findings of Degiannakis et al. (2014) who 
indicate that positive precautionary demand shocks have a negative but insignificant 
effect on volatility in the European stock market. In addition, our findings are in line 
with Kang et al. (2015) who argue that a positive precautionary demand shock exercises 
a negative and significant effect on volatility (realised, conditional and implied) in the 
US stock market. Moreover, our findings are consistent with those by Anzuini et al. 
(2015) who find that a positive precautionary demand shock exercises a positive and 
significant effect on the stock market volatility before the Great Recession. Overall, we 
suggest that the relationship between precautionary demand shocks and stock market 
volatility does not carry on consistent over time but reveals heterogeneous patterns with 
a particular attention to the pre- and post-Great Recession.  
 
5.7. Conclusion 
Our study builds on the works of Kilian (2009) and Kilian and Park (2009), to 
investigate the nature of the precautionary demand shocks by providing a detailed 
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analysis including the convenience yield as a proxy of uncertainty in crude oil market. 
This uncertainty arises from the expectation about the future availability of oil. In 
addition, we examine the responsiveness of the US stock market returns and stock 
market volatility to oil-market specific demand (precautionary demand and 
idiosyncratic oil price) shocks. We use monthly data over the period from January 1986 
to December 2016. Regarding the stock market returns, we employ the US stock market 
indices of S&P500 and Dow Jones, whereas the aggregate US stock market indices of 
VIX and the VXD are used to measure the stock market volatility. A structural vector 
autoregression (SVAR) model is employed to investigate the endogenous relationships 
between the estimation variables.  
 
More specifically, the main contribution of this study is that it employs the convenience 
yield in order to capture shifts in precautionary demand in the oil market arising from 
fears about the future availability of oil. We extend Kilian’s (2009) SVAR by 
disaggregating the precautionary demand into two components, namely, the new 
precautionary demand shock (based on the convenience yield) and the idiosyncratic oil 
price shock. We maintain that the convenience yield acts as a good approximation to a 
precautionary demand shock. We confirm that the convenience yield reflects the 
uncertainty about shortfalls of supply relative to expected demand, as suggested by 
Kilian and Park (2009).  
 
Overall, we provide evidence that our SVAR consideration indicates that oil price 
changes are affected in a smaller magnitude by precautionary demand shocks, whereas 
the largest effect is generated by idiosyncratic oil price shocks. This can be attributed 
to the fact that the idiosyncratic character of the oil price may possibly reflect the 
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increasing financialisation of the oil futures markets and consequently highlight the role 
of speculative activity. Hence, we argue that our consideration to separate the 
magnitude of the actual precautionary demand influenced by the convenience yield with 
this of the idiosyncratic oil price shock holds. 
 
Furthermore, this study contributes to the existing literature not only in introducing the 
convenience yield in order to capture the uncertainty about future oil supply shortfalls, 
but also in exploiting the impact of this motivation on the stock market returns and 
stock market volatility in order to validate further our innovation. We seek to identify 
different magnitudes and patterns in the attention of the research. The examination of 
the origin of the oil price shocks and the impact on stock market activity is important 
in order to understand better this dynamic relationship. In this analysis, our findings 
indicate that precautionary demand and idiosyncratic oil price shocks trigger different 
responses from the US stock market. We pay particular attention to the Great Recession 
due to the fact that oil markets and stock markets are largely affected by this period.  
 
Turning our attention to the period prior to the Great Recession, we document that 
precautionary demand (idiosyncratic oil price) shocks exert a negative and significant 
in the short-term (short-term and long-term) effect on stock market returns. Moreover, 
precautionary demand (idiosyncratic oil price) shocks exercise a positive and 
significant (insignificant) impact on stock market volatility. These findings are in line 
with the ex-ante expectations which are clearly explained in the empirical analysis 
section. Nevertheless, our findings highlight the key role of the post-Great Recession 
period to account for counter-intuitive developments in stock market activity. Thus, we 
consider that the period after the Great Recession is our keystone.  
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To be more explicit, considering the post-Great Recession, we find that the effect of the 
precautionary demand shock on the stock market returns is positive and significant for 
a very short period of time, whereas stock market returns are significantly and 
positively affected by idiosyncratic oil price shocks. Furthermore, stock market 
volatility exhibits lower levels in response to precautionary demand shocks and 
idiosyncratic oil price shocks. We suggest that the financialisation of the oil futures 
markets and the increased speculative trading activity provide superior information in 
explaining new patterns on the relationship between oil markets and stock markets in 
the post-Great Recession.  
 
The findings may be of interest to investors and energy traders who want to obtain 
information for the oil market and the stock market behaviour in the pre- and post-Great 
Recession. Due to the increased participation of hedge funds and consequently the 
financialisation of the oil market the recent years, an interesting avenue for further 
research is to assess whether a speculative shock can be incorporated into the SVAR 
model. As aforementioned, Kilian and Murphy (2014) argue that expectations about the 
uncertainty of the future oil supply shortfalls can be also explained by financialisation 
(speculation) in the oil market. On this matter, unexpected shifts in the demand for 
global above-ground crude oil inventories can be used to capture a speculative demand 
shock. 
 
Finally, given the different magnitudes and patterns between oil price shocks and stock 
market activity in the pre- and post-Great Recession, another area for future work would 
be to examine the above relationship in a time-varying environment. Specifically, the 
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use of time-varying approaches which allow time series to vary over time such as a 
time-varying parameter vector autoregression (TVP-VAR) model rather than static 
approaches can be considered in order to understand the dynamic correlations between 
oil price shocks and stock market returns or volatility. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
6.1. Introduction 
This research study attempts to explore further the link between oil price movements and 
financial markets performance by containing three empirical chapters. Based on the purposes 
of each empirical chapter, the gap in the existing literature is clearly indicated. It is worth noting 
that each empirical chapter also presents its own research aims and contributions that generated 
from the denoted gap. It should be mentioned that similar or different sets of data have been 
used, different time periods have been examined and different econometric approaches have 
been employed among the three empirical chapters in order to conduct this research study. In 
this regard, the first empirical chapter examines the WTI/Brent oil futures price differential and 
the globalisation-regionalisation hypothesis. The second empirical chapter investigates the 
relationship between oil price shocks and EMU sovereign yield spreads. The third empirical 
chapter examines the financial effects of changes in the precautionary demand for oil.  
 
With reference to the data frequency, the use of monthly data is preferred due to data 
availability from a variety of commercial suppliers. Furthermore, this study follows the existing 
literature and adopts the variables that other relevant studies have commonly used. For 
instance, the first empirical chapter uses oil price data of WTI and Brent futures since both 
have the most actively and highly liquid traded oil futures contracts (source: Bloomberg). The 
second empirical chapter uses oil spot price data of Brent (source: Datastream). This is due to 
the fact that Brent is considered as the European crude oil benchmark and is largely consumed 
locally in Europe. Finally, following Kilian’s (2009) empirical work, the third empirical 
chapter uses oil price data in the form of US refiner’s acquisition cost of imported crude oil 
(source: EIA).  
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The sample period in each empirical chapter depends on the data availability. For example, the 
sample period of the second empirical chapter ranges from January 1999 (2001) to January 
2016 for core (periphery) countries. In this chapter, we seek to investigate the relationship 
between oil price shocks and the 10-year sovereign yield spread of the (core and periphery) 
country members of the EMU, which was established in January 1999. Since Greece (deemed 
a periphery country) joined EMU in January 2001, the sample period is adjusted for the 
periphery countries to begin from this period.  
 
It is worth noting that the year 2016 represents the end period of this study. It should be 
mentioned that in the first and the third empirical chapters the sample period ends in December 
2016, whereas in the second empirical chapter the end period is January 2016, due to data 
availability. During the period of this study, the empirical tests were repeatedly performed in 
order to include the most recent developments in the oil markets and the financial markets, to 
capture all the available market information, to obtain the most accurate results and finally to 
provide the most plausible explanations, either expected or unexpected, in accordance with the 
economic theory. In this regard, the final update of the variables under consideration was the 
year 2016 and the final update for the empirical results was the beginning of 2017 for the three 
empirical chapters given the submission of this thesis in July 2018. 
 
Turning to the methodology, each empirical chapter employs a different econometric model. 
The first empirical chapter uses i) a battery of single-equation multiple linear regression 
models, which aim to assess the determinants of the WTI/Brent oil futures differential, and ii) 
a SUR model which serves as a robustness check. The second empirical chapter uses i) a SVAR 
model, and ii) a time-varying Scalar-BEKK model. The third empirical chapter employs a 
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SVAR. Overall, all estimated models have been well explained by the extant literature and 
have been extensively utilised by the research community.  
 
Having summarised the chosen data and econometric methods, this chapter concludes the main 
findings achieved from each empirical chapter and further attempts to offer a combination of 
findings to form a joint entity. Even though each empirical chapter is associated with different 
strands of the oil-related literature, we seek to present some common ground for the findings 
reported in the empirical chapters on the relation among oil markets, financial markets and the 
macroeconomy. Finally, we make reference to the policy implications and the limitations of 
this study and suggest avenues for future research.  
 
6.2. Findings from each empirical chapter  
Starting with the first empirical chapter, the determinants of the WTI/Brent oil futures 
differential and the globalisation-regionalisation hypothesis in the oil futures market are 
examined. Traditionally, the oil futures differential (WTI futures price minus Brent futures 
price, which is expressed in logarithm) is measured as the difference between the quality and 
freight rates (location) in the two crude oil markets. Therefore, we ask whether a set of oil-
market specific and oil-futures market specific determinants in differential form are 
informative about variation in the WTI/Brent oil futures differential. To this end, we examine 
three futures contracts maturities (i.e. 1, 3 and 6-month contracts), which are regarded as short-
term maturities. 
  
The findings indicate that the WTI/Brent oil futures differential is influenced by the 
convenience yield spread, the oil production spread, the oil consumption spread, the open 
interest spread, and the trading volume spread. Overall, these determinants exercise a 
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significant impact on the oil futures differential and therefore all drive a significant wedge and 
contribute to disparities between the WTI and Brent oil futures prices in the short-run. This 
provides evidence that the oil futures market appears to be regionalised in the short-run. 
 
Turning to the second empirical chapter, the time-varying correlations between different 
shocks originating from the oil market and the 10-year sovereign yield spread of the core 
(Austria, Belgium, Finland, France and Netherlands) and the periphery (Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain) countries in the EMU are investigated. The 10-year sovereign yield spread 
is the difference between the yields of 10-year sovereign bonds issued by a member of the 
EMU and the yield of the 10-year sovereign bond issued by Germany (Bund).  
 
The findings reveal that the correlations between different oil price shocks and sovereign yield 
spreads is time-varying and depends on specific economic and geopolitical events that took 
place during the study period. Our hypotheses about a negative (positive) correlation related to 
aggregate (precautionary) demand shocks are mostly confirmed, whereas the data do not offer 
full support to our hypothesis regarding the negative correlation patterns with reference to 
supply-side shocks. In addition, the correlation patterns appear to be less volatile in the pre-
2008 period and passed into moderate and more volatile patterns in the post-2008 period. 
Finally, we do not find evidence of differentiation in the correlation patterns of sovereign yield 
spreads between core and periphery countries to different oil price shocks.  
 
The third empirical chapter, which is based on the contributions of Kilian (2009) and Kilian 
and Park (2009), seeks to explore the exact origin of the precautionary demand shocks, which 
represent the uncertainty about the future availability of oil. In this regard, the convenience 
yield is used to capture this uncertainty within the crude oil market. This innovation implies 
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that the precautionary demand is disaggregated into two components, namely, the new 
precautionary demand shock (based on the convenience yield) and the idiosyncratic oil price 
shock. In addition, we use this innovation in order to test how the US stock market returns and 
stock market volatility respond to precautionary demand and idiosyncratic oil price shocks. We 
maintain that the convenience yield acts as a good approximation to a precautionary demand 
shock. Also, the findings document that oil price changes are driven in a smaller magnitude by 
precautionary demand shocks, whereas the largest effect is generated by idiosyncratic oil price 
shocks. A plausible explanation is ascribed to the fact that the idiosyncratic character of the oil 
price may possibly reflect the increasing financialisation of the oil futures markets.  
 
Turning our attention to the impact of this innovation on the US stock market activity, we pay 
particular consideration to the Great Recession due to the fact that both oil and stock prices 
collapsed during this period. Even though stock market returns (stock market volatility) show 
the expected negative (positive) responses to precautionary demand shocks and idiosyncratic 
oil price shocks prior to the Great Recession, this does not hold after the Great Recession. 
Indeed, stock market returns (stock market volatility) respond positively (negatively) to 
precautionary demand shocks and idiosyncratic oil price shocks. Once again, the increasing 
financialisation of the oil market seems to alter the effects of precautionary demand and 
idiosyncratic oil price shocks on the stock market after the Great Recession. 
 
6.3. The combination of empirical findings  
The detailed analysis of the empirical findings allows us to detect common relations that are 
achieved from each individual empirical chapter and draw useful conclusions. An important 
common finding is the financialisation of the oil market. As aforementioned, oil-related 
products such as futures contracts or physical inventories have been considered as financial 
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assets by traders and investors over the last decade. They invest in oil futures markets in an 
attempt to reduce the value of their investment risk or to increase the value of their investment 
revenues. Expressed differently, it seems that the oil market is not only affected by physical 
(fundamental) energy traders’ activity but also influenced by financial (non-fundamental) 
traders’ positions. For example, a large purchase of oil futures contracts by speculators triggers 
rises to expected oil spot prices. This provides an incentive to oil producers to decrease current 
oil production and hold inventories which in turn reduces the current availability of barrels of 
oil in the market. 
 
With regard to this study, the first empirical chapter provides evidence of financialisation in 
the case of financial indicators such as open interest and trading volume. These two factors 
reflect hedging demand activity and trading information in the oil futures markets. We provide 
evidence that the oil futures market is significantly affected by these two indicators. The 
magnitude of financialisation is also noticeable in the third empirical chapter, given that stock 
market returns and stock market volatility exercise unexpected patterns in response to different 
oil price shocks. Specifically, the beginning of the post-Great Recession, which coincides with 
the mid-2008 period, corresponds to new developments in the oil futures market that influence 
largely stock market activity. This can be attributed to increasing speculative trading in the oil 
futures market. 
 
Another important common finding is related to the convenience yield in the oil market which 
could approximate the uncertainty about the future availability of oil and hence it can be used 
to measure precautionary demand. To this end, it is important to note that the first empirical 
chapter and the third empirical chapter highlight the importance of this variable to justify 
unexpected changes in precautionary demand for oil. In this regard, the first empirical chapter 
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considers the political instability in the Middle East from the beginning of 2011, onwards, as a 
cause of increasing concern about the future availability of oil. In turn, this episode triggered a 
precautionary demand shock, which was consequently reflected in the convenience yield which 
represents the insurance premium against unexpected disruptions of oil supply. Adopting the 
same line of reasoning, the third empirical chapter uses the convenience yield to approximate 
shifts in precautionary demand for oil. In the light of the findings, the convenience yield is 
performing a useful role and appears to reflect the uncertainty of expected supply relative to 
expected demand. 
 
A further important common finding is associated with the origin of the oil price shock, either 
from the demand-side or the supply-side of the economy. In this regard, the second empirical 
chapter and the third empirical chapter consider oil price changes with a particular attention to 
their origin. In particular, oil price shocks can be disentangled into supply-side shocks, 
aggregate demand shocks and precautionary demand shocks. On general principles, the origin 
of the oil price change is an important topic in order to establish a more thorough picture of the 
relationship between oil markets and financial markets and, hence, to evaluate their actuals 
effect on the economic activity. It is worth noting that the second empirical chapter indicates 
that the correlations between sovereign yield spreads and oil price shocks show heterogeneous 
patterns among the three shocks during a number of episodes in the oil market. Similarly, the 
third empirical chapter suggests the disaggregation of precautionary demand into two 
components and notices that this alternative decomposition presents different magnitudes and 
patterns.  
 
Finally, the significant impact of the Great Recession of 2007-2009 on the global economy and 
the financial markets reflects an additional common theme. In particular, during this period and 
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specifically in the second half of 2008, financial markets and institutions collapsed. Stock 
market returns experienced high levels of volatility and significant negative returns. The 
unprecedented levels of global uncertainty contributed to a significant economic downturn in 
the world economy. Similarly, a dramatic steep fall in oil prices has originated from the 
significant decline in global economic activity and the fact that the oil market appeared to be 
financialiased during that period. In this respect, the second empirical chapter and the third 
empirical chapter provide evidence that the relationship between oil markets and financial 
markets is largely affected by the Great Recession. 
 
6.4. Policy implications 
This research study provides interesting new insights for the attention of market participants, 
such as financial investors and energy traders. Initially, the first empirical study offers a better 
understanding of the fundamental oil market and financial market predictors of the oil futures 
differential and consequently the status of the oil futures market as regionalised in the short-
run. Therefore, market participants should be benefit from the findings of this study since they 
need to know to what extent the oil futures market is affected by the physical oil market factors 
of supply and demand, as well as financial indicators. In addition, market participants who 
trade oil futures contracts in both WTI and Brent crude oil futures markets should gain in terms 
of managing their asset portfolios and protect themselves against adverse future price 
movements.  
 
By considering the second empirical chapter, the time-varying correlations among different oil 
price shocks and sovereign yield spreads could inform financial markets participants about 
their dynamic asset allocation and portfolio diversification strategies. For instance, although 
sovereign bonds can act as a hedging instrument in periods of turmoil, the degree to which they 
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can be used to hedge risky investments will also depend on the oil price shocks over the period 
when such hedging is required. Moreover, when considering investing in both oil and bond 
markets, attention should be given to oil price events, since aggregate demand shocks may 
serve in favour of greater diversification opportunities (due to the negative correlations), 
whereas precautionary demand shocks could result in diminishing such opportunities (due to 
the positive correlations).  
 
Along the same line of interest, the third empirical study provides superior information to 
market participants regarding the behaviour of oil markets and the stock markets by particularly 
focusing on the pre- and post-Great Recession. This is due to the fact that the recent evidence 
of the financialisation of the oil market and the increasing speculative trading activity indicate 
new patterns in respect of the relationship between oil markets and stock markets. Specifically, 
the impact of financialisation on the oil market is mainly endorsed in the post-Great Recession. 
Therefore, the findings of this study may offer benefits to those market participants who hold 
oil-related products and stock market products in order to make portfolio rebalances or to make 
risk management decisions. They also gain advantages by receiving information about stock 
market volatility as a basic component of derivative pricing.   
 
6.5 Limitations  
This research consists of three empirical chapters. Each empirical chapter clearly presents its 
own aims, contributions, dataset, econometric approaches and empirical findings. Overall, the 
structure of all econometric models is clearly justified and no technical issues during the 
investigation process were detected, while satisfactory information has been extracted. 
Furthermore, plausible explanations and discussion were provided by taking into consideration 
the economic theory related to the empirical results, even for those that appeared to be 
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unanticipated. In addition, the empirical findings are linked with the existing literature in order 
to test if they are in line with previous studies and appeared to represent new insights to the 
growing oil-related literature. Although each empirical chapter reflects a different strand of the 
literature and hence different research outcomes, we are able to detect substantial associations 
in terms of a general observation. On general principles, we maintain that this research study 
has been carefully organised and conducted. However, a few limitations could be mentioned. 
 
The adoption of proxy variables could be considered as a general limitation, although all time 
series data are measured with error. This issue arises when the required time series are not free 
of charge and therefore significant amount of payments is needed in order to collect the 
accurate data. In this regard, the use of proxies which are strongly related to the variables of 
interest must be indicated. In this study, all empirical chapters employ proxy variables. Overall, 
we argue that the use of proxy variables can be beneficial, given the lack of the original 
variables and could provide a precise and accurate measurement. However, this has maybe 
caused limitations in terms of creating some degree of error which might be greater than the 
typical error related to all time series data.  
 
A second limitation can be attributed to the size of the data sample. It is evident that the sample 
size depends on the needs of each empirical chapter and the data availability. Therefore, 
different sample periods are employed with a particular attention to the sample start date. For 
example, the sample period in the first empirical chapter runs from 1993 to 2016 whereas the 
time period in the third empirical chapter spans from 1986 to 2016. Although the sample period 
differs substantially, this can be justified by the aforementioned data availability. However, 
this could be possibly regarded as a limitation, which is based on the argument concerning 
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what is the precise number of observations to generate an effective sample size and further 
meaningful data. 
 
A third limitation concerns the use of robustness checks in order to evaluate the stability of our 
findings. Although two robustness checks are presented in the first empirical chapter and one 
robustness check is employed in the third empirical chapter, this does not hold for the second 
empirical chapter. Overall, a robustness exercise represents an alternative approach to examine 
whether estimated findings remain robust in the case of adding or removing variables from the 
estimated model. If the coefficients of the robustness checks do not alter this is indicative of 
structural validity. To this end, it appears plausible to employ robustness exercises. The 
information provided by these tests helps to manage the uncertainty generated to the researcher 
regarding the validity of his/her model by comparing with other alternative specifications. 
 
6.6 Future research 
This research study is comprised of analysis within three empirical chapters in order to expand 
the existing literature by examining relationships that have previously not been explored. The 
findings of this study are satisfactory in covering the indicated aims and filling specified voids. 
In this regard, superior information has been provided for the attention of the research 
community. However, research in the oil market area is still growing and the attention of the 
researcher should be expanded to new strands. Therefore, this study attempts to offer exciting 
avenues for future research, based on the findings of each empirical chapter which represents 
a different strand in the oil-related literature. 
 
Further potential research regarding the globalisation-regionalisation hypothesis includes the 
consideration of additional crude oil benchmarks other than WTI and Brent, such as, the 
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Dubai/Oman. This would suggest a more thorough picture of the degree in which the state of 
the international oil futures market is globalised or regionalised. In addition, an interesting 
question that the future study might address regarding the determinants of oil futures 
differential is the adoption of time-varying parameter models. This helps to identify whether 
the oil futures differential is affected by physical market and financial market factors at 
different time periods. Furthermore, it would be interesting for future research to investigate 
the effect of renewable energy sources on the total energy sources, including petroleum. The 
increasing use of renewable energy sources could influence the dependence upon fossil fuels 
and consequently lead to reduced levels of oil production and oil consumption and further 
affect the convenience yield. These factors are regarded as significant determinants of the oil 
futures differential. 
 
With reference to the relationship between oil price shocks and sovereign risk, our decision to 
employ 10-year sovereign yield spreads in the EMU, which is in aggregate the largest oil-
importer of the world, provides interesting areas for further research. For instance, the 
consideration of sovereign CDS spreads which can be used as an alternative measurement to 
approximate sovereign risk in the EMU, since a widening of CDS spreads can be indicative of 
higher levels of country’s risk. Furthermore, the examination of the time-varying correlation 
between the 10-year sovereign yield spread and oil prices (or shocks) for developed and 
emerging countries, either oil-exporters or oil-importers, is another promising area for future 
research. Finally, the inclusion of shorter-term sovereign yield spreads as proxies of sovereign 
risk is also recommended. 
 
Regarding the financial effects of precautionary demand for oil, future study may examine 
whether a speculative shock can be incorporated into the SVAR model. This can be justified 
257 
 
by the fact that the oil market appears to be highly financialised due to the increased 
participation of hedge funds in recent years. The extent to which the financialisation 
(speculation) in the oil market has altered its nature requires further attention. This is the reason 
why global, above-ground crude oil inventories can be used to capture a speculative demand 
shock which in turn will be incorporated within the SVAR model. In addition, another area that 
future research should be examining is the link between oil markets and the stock markets in a 
time-varying environment. To this end, a time-varying parameter vector autoregression (TVP-
VAR) model should be employed with aim to allow the correlations between oil price shocks 
and stock market returns or volatility to vary over time.  
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